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 SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the impact of CEO compensation, analysts’ characteristics, earnings 
management and country governability on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
In summary, the thesis includes the following chapters: 
Firstly, Chapter 2 examines the interplay between CEO compensation and analysts’ 
forecast errors over different forecasting horizons. A unique analyst-level sample for U.S. 
firms covering the period between 1992 and 2015 has been employed. Evidence obtained 
from this analysis suggests that CEO compensation, measured by various forms such as 
restricted stock holdings and stock ownership would correct for optimism in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, whereas CEO bonus and sensitivity to changes in firm’s value would 
exacerbate analysts’ optimism. Results also show that CEO compensation would augment 
the effect of earnings management on analysts’ forecasts with CEO bonus being of 
importance. The findings of this chapter also indicate that analysts’ characteristics and 
regulation can affect earnings forecasts.  
Next, Chapter 3 investigates the effect of governance on analysts’ earnings forecasts. By 
employing a comprehensive dataset of 911 U.S. firms for the period 2000 – 2014, this 
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chapter demonstrates a strong positive association between the government effectiveness 
and analysts’ earnings forecasts. We extend this analysis employing corporate 
governance variables such as CEO equity incentives and CEO power, whilst a possible 
cross-term association between governability and the former has also been examined. 
This chapter explores further the effects of earnings management on analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy documenting a negative impact of the former on the latter. Lastly, underlying 
causality strands and endogeneity issues are addressed opting for a flexible panel VAR 
model.  
Finally, Chapter 4 presents evidence of the effects of corruption on the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts. Using a global sample, this chapter reveals that analysts face greater 
difficulty in forecasting earnings in advanced and emerging countries due to the 
detrimental effect of corruption. Interestingly, findings suggest that for firms located in 
developing countries, corruption enhances analysts’ accuracy. This chapter also shows 
that the effect of earnings manipulation on the accuracy of forecasts is aggravated in the 
presence of corruption, whilst greater country freedom would enhance analysts’ accuracy 
when corruption is present. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis examines the impact of CEO compensation, analyst-specific characteristics, 
earnings management and country governability on financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Studying the underlying determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast errors could not be 
far from defining an important, but rather a neglected research topic. It is only in recent 
years, partly because of noticeable analysts’ forecast errors and partly due to strong voices 
to enhance regulation  and safeguard the accuracy of earnings forecasts, that this topic 
started gathering momentum (Kanagaretnam et al. 2012; Chan et al. 2012; Mande and 
Son 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013). 
The choice of developing and focusing this thesis on the determinants of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts is thus of utmost importance. Earnings forecasts issued by financial 
analysts play an important role in capital markets as an instrument of interpreting public 
information concerning firms and industries and contribute to the reduction of 
information asymmetries between firms and investors (Loh and Mian 2006; Hall and 
Tacon 2010). Furthermore, early research (Fried and Givoly 1982; Brown 1987) 
demonstrates timing and informational advantages of analysts’ earnings forecasts over 
past time series of earnings. It has been well documented that investors use analysts’ 
forecasts as a significant source of information for their investment decisions (Brown 
1987; Das et al. 1998). 
Although analysts’ forecasts exhibit some superiority over earnings time series models, 
there is evidence of bias in earnings forecasting (Brown et al. 1985; O’Brien 1988; Das 
et al. 1998; De Bondt and Thaler 1990; Easterwood and Nutt 1999; Kim 2001; Abarbanell 
and Lehavy 2003; Gu and Wu 2003; Eames and Glover 2003). The existing literature on 
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financial analysts defines forecast bias as the deviation of mean earnings forecasts from 
the actual value and/or the failure of them to accurately incorporate new information 
(Bondt and Thaler 1990; Easterwood and Nutt 1999). Bias in analysts’ forecasts has been 
reported in many studies, arguing that analysts issue forecasts that are systematically 
optimistic meaning that the earnings forecasts are higher than the actual earnings (O'Brien 
1988; Stickel 1990; O'Brien et al. 1994; Gu and Wu 2003; Loh and Mian 2006).1 This 
thesis puts particular emphasis on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The 
inaccuracy in analysts’ forecasts could have serious consequences for investors who use 
these forecasts naively as a key determinant of expected returns (Richardson et al. 2004).  
Although there have been many studies demonstrating the importance of analysts’ 
forecasts (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Cohen and Lys 2003; Loh and Mian 2006; 
Kanagaretnam and Mathieu 2012; Mande and Son 2012), it remains an open question 
regarding the factors that induce inaccuracy in earnings forecasts. Empirical studies state 
that analysts’ forecast decisions might be influenced by both incentives and behavioral 
biases (Bondt and Thaler 1990; Das et al. 1998; Lim 2001; Loh and Mian 2006).  
Bondt and Thaler (1990), Das et al. (1998) and Lim (2001) argue that analysts may have 
incentives to issue inaccurate forecasts to enhance trading by customers and/or to improve 
the relationships with corporate management, safeguarding their access to private 
information. This strand of literature claims that it is harder for analysts to predict 
earnings forecasts for firms with higher informational uncertainty. Thereby, since the 
primary role of analysts is to provide market participants with information about firms – 
                                                          
1 According to Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Loh and Mian (2003), the changes in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are larger in magnitude than the changes in actual earnings. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
U.S. analysts underreact to bad news and overreact to good news (Easterwood and Nutt 1999). 
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beyond that publicly available – one may expect that analysts strive to get access to non-
public information (Das et al. 1988).2 
Yu (2010) argues that the corporate structure is a significant determinant of analysts’ 
forecasts and that information disclosure about corporate governance can lead to more 
accurate earnings forecasts. Furthermore, there is evidence (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; 
Byard et al. 2006; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 2011) that the quality of analysts’ 
information improves with the quality of corporate structure, and that in turn, benefits 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Along these lines, more effective boards enhance the quality 
and quantity of information disclosure (Ho and Wong 2001), contributing to lower 
analysts’ forecast errors.  The choice of developing and focusing this thesis on the CEO 
compensation is driven by prior evidence supporting the crucial role of CEOs in corporate 
governance.  It has been well documented that CEOs are responsible for the firm 
performance and particularly, they are credited for the negative performance (Zemba et 
al. 2006; Crossland and Chen 2013). There is also evidence that powerful CEOs can 
increase the unity of the boards and form clear strategic positions fastening the decision-
making procedures (Cannella and Monroe 1997; Adut et al. 2011). Therefore, CEOs with 
higher compensation and power might have greater accountability and career concerns, 
as they feel more responsible for firms’ performance. Greater accountability could 
eliminate analysts’ forecast errors due to the increased liability of the executives. 
Additionally, it is a well-documented fact that greater CEO ownership aligns CEO’s 
interests with those of the shareholders’ mitigating the conflict of interest between them 
                                                          
2 Das et al. (1998) employing a sample of 241 U.S. firms over the period 1989 – 1993 show that analysts’ 
bias is stronger for firms with less predictable earnings as measured by the historical earnings variability. 
Their findings indicate that for firms with more predictable earnings, analysts do not strive for non-public 
information and thus, do not need access to firms’ management. Conversely, in case of firms whose 
earnings are less predictable, analysts might deliberately issue biased forecasts. Analysts might follow such 
practictices to establish a better relationship with the managers in order to get access to information that is 
not publicly available. 
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(Johnson and Natarajan 2005; Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi 2014). To this end, it is 
appropriate to examine whether disclosures over CEO compensation would provide 
analysts with valuable information enhancing the forecast accuracy of the latter. 
However, the task of measuring CEO compensation does not come without challenges. 
Over the years, a plethora of CEO compensation forms, such as option grants, have been 
put forward (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Hall and Murphy 2003; 
Jensen 2005b; Efendi et al. 2007; Beaver et al. 2008). Existing literature documents some 
association between analysts’ forecasts and CEO stock option holdings. This strand of 
research has been attracting significant interest as stock options are becoming an 
important part of CEO compensation. Firms may provide CEOs with options, restricted 
stocks, cash bonus and equity stocks. In such event, firms intent to enhance CEO 
compensation towards the direction of making decisions that would benefit shareholders. 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) suggest the “incentive alignment” effect. According to this 
effect, higher option holdings could align managers’ interests with those of the 
shareholders’, improving firms’ information disclosure that can result in lower analysts’ 
forecast errors. Furthermore, firms might use stock options as part of CEOs’ 
compensation to reduce reported accounting expenses, to attract high skilled executives 
as well as to delay tax payments (Kanagaretnam et al. 2012; Mande and Son 2012).3 This 
thesis places a particular attention on CEO compensation as a key determinant of analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. We hypothesize that CEO compensation could serve as an important 
                                                          
3 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has implemented executive compensation disclosure 
rules in August 2006. According to Donahue (2008), these rules intend to increase transparency and 
information disclosure to provide investors detailed information about board compensation. Furthermore, 
Sheu et al. (2010) argue that Taiwanese firms that voluntarily disclose information about executive 
compensation document a higher market valuation. 
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source of non-public information for analysts and that access to information about the 
former could mitigate analysts’ earnings forecast errors. 
There is also another issue concerning financial analysts that has not been adequately 
examined in the existing literature. Although prior research has recognized the important 
role of analysts’ earnings forecasts for market participants, most of the extant literature 
has looked at firm-specific characteristics, also related to corporate governance as a key 
to delineate forecast errors (Chan et al. 2012; Kanagaretnam et al. 2012; Mande and Son 
2012).  This thesis emphasizes the role of analyst-specific characteristics as well. Analysts’ 
characteristics may help explain why some analysts issue more accurate forecasts for 
some firms than others. Identifying those particular analysts’ characteristics is a valuable 
exercise for all market participants that strive to increase the accuracy of forecasts. Alas, 
earlier research provides mixed results and is rather limited, in particular across forecast 
horizons. Some evidence suggests a link between analysts’ accuracy and their career 
concerns and reputation (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Trueman 1994). Other studies 
(Hong et al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003; Clement and Tse 2005; Clarke and 
Subramanian 2006) show that less experienced analysts are associated with lower forecast 
errors. Herein, we argue that these approaches would lead to defragmentation of evidence 
and loss of information, as it is the interaction between CEOs’ and analysts’ 
characteristics that is of prominence. The reason is that analysts’ forecasts are not 
emerging in a vacuum, they are subject to influence from firm’s corporate governance, as 
well as the economic environment, including the overall regulatory framework. 
As analysts and CEOs operate in regulated market conditions, we shall take into account 
such conditions. This thesis focuses on the impact of Global Analyst Research Statement 
regulation and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act. Global Analyst 
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Research Statement is an enforcement provision between the Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC), National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and twelve of the largest U.S. investment institutions. The 
provision aims to address issues related to possible conflict of interests regarding analysts, 
who release forecasts and recommendations for investing or not in selected firms. The 
Global Analyst Research Statement regulation was first introduced in 2002 and went into 
effect in 2003. The main motivation of this regulation was to prevent the engagement of 
the investment institutions (the brokers) in practices to influence analysts’ forecasts to 
gain higher compensation fees. Accordingly, the main aim of the Dodd-Frank Act was to 
improve the regulation of the financial industry and to prevent the U.S. economy from 
experiencing a crisis like that of 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act is implemented by the SEC 
and includes provisions requiring detailed disclosure of executive compensation and 
corporate governance structure. According to the Dodd-Frank Act, firms should disclose 
information about CEO pay versus firm performance ratio and a compensation recovery 
policy for the excess incentive-based executive compensation in case of misreporting of 
the financial statements.  Prior research provides evidence for a positive impact of the 
Dodd-Frank Act on information disclosure and transparency of the financial statements 
reported by the firms (Chan et al. 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013). Particularly, these studies 
find that the adoption of the Dodd-Frank provisions enhances the quality of firms’ 
financial statements, decreases the number of financial report restatements and analysts’ 
earnings forecast dispersion. Given that analysts use financial statements as their main 
source of information, greater quality and quantity of information disclosed through 
financial statements could decrease analysts’ forecast errors (Byard et al. 2006).  
There is also evidence that analysts’ forecast ability varies with forecast horizons and that 
forecast errors tend to be greater for long-term than for short-term forecasts (Richardson 
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et al. 2004; Hovakimian and Saenyasiri 2010, 2014).  Therefore, it is necessary not only 
to control for differences in the relationships between analysts’ forecast errors and a 
plethora of characteristics but also to account for different forecasting horizons. To this 
end, this thesis bridges a gap in the literature by providing comprehensive evidence of the 
underlying determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast errors in a unified way, where 
analysts and corporate governance interact over several forecast horizons, while the 
regulation also affects. 
There is another angle of financial analysts’ literature that has not been sufficiently 
examined yet. This thesis investigates whether CEO compensation can augment the 
effects of firm’s engagement in earnings management on analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
Following Leuz et al. (2003), we define earnings management as the intentional 
misreporting of firms’ performance and/or misapplication of accounting standards by 
insiders to deceive and mislead market participants. We put emphasis on earnings 
management as analysts’ earnings forecasts might be more complex for firms that engage 
in earnings manipulation than for those that do not. Firms’ engagement in earnings 
manipulation come through various channels, i.e. through the use of discretionary 
accruals that increases analysts’ forecast errors (Bradshaw et al. 2001; Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003; Ahmed et al. 2005). CEO incentives might exist encouraging managers to 
involve in accruals manipulation and that, in turn, could result in impediments on 
information disclosure regarding earnings (Leuz et al. 2003). Prior research claims that 
markets reward/penalize firms that consistently achieve/miss analysts’ earnings forecasts 
in short-term (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002). 
History has shown that there is a higher probability of firings or forced resignations for 
powerful CEOs when the latter do not achieve analysts’ forecasts (Farrell 2007; Laura 
2011; Wiersema and Zhang 2011).  According to this strand of literature, there is a strong 
16 
 
link between boards’ decision about CEOs’ dismissal and analysts’ recommendations. 
The main reason for this association is that investors, whom the board intends to please, 
use analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for the future firm valuation. Thus, it could be the case 
that CEOs with higher compensation and power driven by managerial and career concerns 
will engage in earnings management to affect analysts’ forecasts. Along with these lines, 
Graham (2005) argues that firms engage in earnings management to meet analysts’ 
forecasts and that 73.5% of chief executive managers consider achieving analysts’ 
forecasts as an important managerial target. In line with this note, Brown and Caylor 
(2005) show that during the period between 1996 and 2001, the main aim of firm’s 
managers was to eliminate negative earnings surprises rather than mitigate losses.  
Furthermore, there is a support that in U.S. small earnings forecast errors are regarded as 
a form of managerial opportunism (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Kanagaretnam et al. 2012; 
Mande and Son 2012).   Evidence also exists showing that market places a higher value 
to firms that achieve analysts’ forecasts on a continuous basis than to those firms that 
meet analysts’ expectations occasionally (Bartov et al. 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002).  
Recently, De Jong et al. (2014) in an interview-based survey of 306 analysts employed 
by 11 of the world’s largest investment banks conclude that 88.2% of the analysts believe 
that firms achieving their forecasts built credibility with capital markets. Moreover, 87.5% 
of the analysts state that meeting earnings forecasts enhances firm’s future growth 
prospects to investors. Finally, there is evidence to suggest a negative impact of earnings 
management on analysts’ accuracy (Bradshaw et al. 2001; Cohen and Lys 2003; Ahmed 
et al. 2005). According to this research, firms’ involvement in earnings management 
increases the complexity of analysts’ forecasts resulting in less accurate earnings 
forecasts. Karpoff et al. (2008) examine the market reaction to financial misbehaviour 
and find that on average firms lose 38% of their market value when their engagement in 
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financial misreporting is uncovered. The 24.5% of these loses is due to market adjustment 
to more accurate presentation of firms’ financial statements. 
There is some evidence arguing that CEO compensation affects firms’ engagement in 
earnings management through financial misreporting (Greenspan 2002; Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). Greenspan (2002), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) suggest that the likelihood of 
earnings misstatement is positively related to the CEO option portfolio. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) show that CEOs with high stock and stock option portfolios engage in 
earnings management to avoid future earnings disappointments. Despite the plethora of 
studies that report a significant relationship between CEO characteristics and earnings 
management (Xie et al. 2003; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Rahman and Ali 2006; Ebrahim 
2007; Cornett et al. 2008; Sáenz González and García-Meca, 2014), the empirical 
evidence concerning the interplay between analysts’ earnings forecasts, earnings 
management and CEO compensation is limited. Therefore, motivated by the evidence 
that CEO compensation could encourage earnings management (Xie et al. 2003; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Rahman and Ali 2006; Ebrahim 2007; Efendi et al. 
2007; Cornett et al. 2008; McAnally et al. 2008; Jiang et al. 2010; Sáenz González and 
García-Meca 2014) and that earnings management can affect analysts’ forecasts, this 
thesis examines whether the impact of earnings management on analysts’ forecasts varies 
with CEO compensation. 
Finally, this thesis investigates a critical, but rather neglected area of the extant literature 
of financial analysts, the country governability. Particular attention has been placed on 
the way that government effectiveness and corruption affect the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts. Some studies investigate the impact of institutional settings, on analysts’ 
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accuracy (Hope 2003; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat et al. 2006; Chen 2010). There is 
evidence for a significant positive relationship between the degree of legal enforcement 
and forecast accuracy, indicating that stronger country governance could enhance 
analysts’ accuracy. Although previous research on analysts’ forecasts (Brown 1993; Duru 
and Reeb 2002; Clarke and Subramanian 2006; Hall and Tacon 2010) has emphasized 
that institutional settings should not be ignored, little is known about the direct impact of 
corruption, as well as its interaction with other factors of importance, on the accuracy of 
financial analysts. 
This thesis puts a special emphasis on corruption, as it has far-reaching adverse 
repercussions on the effective functioning of an economy at an aggregate level, but it also 
affects the performance of a firm and an economic agent. But what is corruption? The 
World Bank defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ (World 
Bank 1997).4  Macrae (1982) argues that corruption is ‘an arrangement that involves a 
private exchange between two parties which can influence the allocations of sources and 
might involve the abuse of public or collective responsibility for private gain’. Regarding 
the private exchange between parties, and in particular in relation to the exchange of 
information, we examine the association between corruption and analysts’ forecasts. This 
area has rarely been investigated, yet the importance of analysts’ forecasts in providing 
valuable information that enhances market efficiency is unequivocal. It could be the case 
that corruption increases the injustice and decreases the information transparency 
(DiRienzo et al. 2007). As information transparency drops, analysts could face difficulties 
in forecasting earnings accurately. However, a positive relationship between accuracy 
                                                          
4 The World Bank defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’(World Bank 1997). It 
exists in both private and public sectors and involves arrangements that provide benefits for others closely 
related to the perpetrator. Other international organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Transparency International have 
conducted many surveys regarding the level of corruption internationally, aiming to combat corruption. 
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and corruption might also exist as higher corruption could help firms smooth their 
earnings and therefore, make them more predictable (Chen et al. 2010). This thesis 
bridges a gap in the literature by directly measuring the impact of corruption on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and indirectly through the interaction of corruption with analysts’ 
characteristics and practices, as well as through the interaction of corruption with 
institutional settings. We show that the impact of corruption on the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts varies across countries and thus, such research is warranted. 
Another issue that this thesis explores is the interaction of corruption with earnings 
management and whether the above affect the accuracy of financial analysts. In countries 
where corruption is present, firms’ managers might engage in earnings manipulation to 
deceive market participants by publishing financial statements that do not reflect the real 
financial position of a company, increasing the difficulty in earnings forecasts for analysts. 
For this reason, this thesis investigates whether the effect of corruption on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy is more pronounced in countries where firms’ engage in earnings 
manipulation practices related to discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the institutional 
settings literature (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000) has highlighted the role of democracy in 
relation to corruption, as the former could deter the latter. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) 
demonstrate that country freedom subdues the level of corruption through democratic 
freedoms, such as political rights and civil liberties. Montimola and Jackman (2002) and 
Sung (2004) suggest that democratization through stronger political rights affects the 
level of corruption positively, albeit this effect is nonlinear. Given this evidence, the 
current study also explores whether country freedom would lessen the effect of corruption 
on analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
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This thesis is structured into five chapters. The following chapter (Chapter 2), investigates 
the interplay between CEO compensation and analysts’ forecast errors over different 
forecasting horizons. A unique analyst-level sample for U.S. firms covering the period 
between 1992 and 2015 has been assembled. Empirical evidence suggests that CEO 
compensation, measured by various forms, such as restricted stock holdings and stock 
ownership, would correct for optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts, whereas CEO 
bonus and sensitivity to changes in firm’s value would exacerbate analysts’ optimism. 
Results also show that CEO compensation would augment the effect of earnings 
management on analysts’ forecasts with CEO bonus being of importance. The findings 
of this chapter also indicate that analysts’ characteristics would affect earnings forecasts. 
It is warranted not only to control for differences in the underlying relationships between 
analysts’ forecast errors and a plethora of characteristics but also to account for different 
forecasting horizons. Such characteristics are analyst and firm-specific, for example, 
analyst’s experience and brokerage size. In terms of forecasting horizon, we employ 
forecasts of the current year, one year-ahead and two years ahead, while we also consider 
for the frequency of forecasts. Estimation results suggest different impact of CEO 
compensation and analysts’ characteristics on the accuracy of the latter across different 
forecast horizons. Since analysts and CEOs operate in regulated market conditions, 
Chapter 2 takes into account such conditions as well. The impact of the Global Statement 
Regulation and Dodd-Frank Act on the underlying relationships has been examined. 
Results show that while these regulations can reduce analysts’ optimism, they do not 
affect the relationship between forecasts errors and analysts’ characteristics/CEO 
compensation in the same way. Variability exists both across firms with different CEO 
compensation and across analysts’ characteristics.  
21 
 
Next, Chapter 3 investigates the effect of country-level governance on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. By employing a comprehensive dataset for 911 U.S. firms for the period 2000 
– 2014, our evidence reports that governance variables, such as government effectiveness 
and quality of government regulations, positively affect analysts’ accuracy. CEO 
characteristics such as CEO equity incentives, on the other hand, assert a negative impact 
on accuracy. Our results further provide evidence for a positive association between CEO 
power and accuracy, whilst there exists evidence of cross term relationship between the 
government effectiveness and the latter. This chapter also provides evidence for a 
significant negative impact of discretionary accruals on analysts’ accuracy, suggesting 
that analysts’ forecast accuracy reduces as firms engage in earnings manipulation by 
using discretionary accruals. Finally, the panel VAR modeling enriches previous findings, 
as it sheds new light regarding the underlying causality of the main covariates of earnings 
forecasting accuracy, whilst also tackling issues related to endogeneity.  
Chapter 4 explores the effects of corruption on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. 
Employing a global sample, the results of this chapter show that corruption negatively 
affects analysts’ accuracy across the world, with some variability though. We derive a 
comprehensive measure of corruption from the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index and the Control for Corruption Index obtained from the World Bank. 
As corruption could vary from country to country, and thereby its impact on analysts’ 
accuracy could also vary, we assemble a global sample. There are also methodological 
advantages of employing a global sample, as it provides appropriate variability across a 
plethora of countries. Such variability comes from the heterogeneity across countries that 
we adequately deal with within a panel regression setting that also takes into account 
possible issues related to endogeneity.  Analysts’ forecast accuracy appears higher for 
firms located in less corrupt advanced and emerging countries, whereas for firms located 
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in developing countries, results show that corruption could enhance analysts’ accuracy. 
The findings of this chapter also show that earnings manipulation can exacerbate analysts’ 
accuracy for firms in emerging and developing countries with corruption present. 
Additionally, we use data from World Freedom Index and Press Freedom Index obtained 
from the Freedom House as proxies of country freedom to examine the interaction 
between country freedom and corruption in relation to the impact of the latter on accuracy. 
Chapter 4 reveals the plethora of complexities involved in the relationship between 
corruption and analysts’ forecasts, suggesting that country freedom in parallel with 
corruption would improve forecast accuracy. Lastly, Chapter 5 presents a summary of the 
contributions of this thesis and discusses some policy implications.  
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Chapter 2: What affects analysts’ earnings forecasts? The role of CEO 
compensation, analyst-specific characteristics and regulation 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the interplay between CEO compensation 
and analysts’ forecast errors. Financial analysts are sophisticated intermediaries between 
the firms and markets, who use all available information to form their earnings forecasts 
(Barvin et al. 2009). Given that CEOs are responsible for the strategic decision making 
of the firms (Zemba et al. 2006; Crossland and Chen 2013), CEO compensation could 
affect the quality and quantity of the information disclosure that analysts, in turn, would 
employ to come forward with earnings forecasts (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Nanda et al. 
2003; Hermalin and Weisbach 2012). 
However, to measure CEO compensation is not without its challenges. Over the years a 
plethora of CEO compensation forms, such as option grants, have been put forward (Hall 
and Murphy 2003; Jensen 2005b; Efendi et al. 2007). Firms grant CEOs equity options, 
restricted stocks, cash bonus and increase the stock ownership of the latter. In such event, 
firms intent to enhance CEO compensation towards the direction of making decisions that 
would benefit shareholders. Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) suggest the “incentive alignment” 
effect. According to this effect, higher option holdings could align managers’ interests 
with those of the shareholders’, improving firms’ information disclosure that can result 
in lower analysts’ forecast errors. 
In particular, the current chapter examines whether CEO compensation would affect 
analysts’ forecasts. Previous studies provide some evidence that such an association is 
highly likely. Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) argue that CEO option holdings could affect 
analysts’ forecasts. According to the authors, managers with higher stock option 
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compensation might undertake higher risk, exert greater effort to improve firm 
performance and show opportunistic disclosure behaviour. This thesis takes the above 
evidence a step further examining whether such CEO behaviour could enhance the 
complexity of analysts’ forecasts that, in turn, could lead to higher forecast errors. 
Another strand of literature links analysts’ forecasts with firms’ engagement in earnings 
management. Prior research documents both positive (Matsumoto 2002; Brown and 
Caylor 2005; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Mande and Son 2012) and negative 
(Bradshaw et al. 2001; Cohen and Lys 2003; Ahmed et al. 2005) impact of earnings 
management that come through different channels, i.e. through the use of discretionary 
accruals, on analysts’ forecasts. There is also evidence that CEO compensation 
encourages executives to engage in earnings management. The evidence, to date, argues 
that executives with high option compensation would opportunistically manage earnings 
to affect stock price and achieve higher gains from their equity portfolios (Aboody and 
Kasznik 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy 2001; Greenspan 2002; Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; McAnally et al. 2008). Motivated by 
prior findings of a positive relationship between CEO compensation and the likelihood 
of earnings misreporting, we expect that CEO compensation could affect analysts’ 
earnings forecasts through earnings management. 
In addition, we model analyst-specific characteristics. There is evidence that analysts’ 
characteristics help explain why some analysts issue more accurate forecasts for some 
firms than others (Hong et al. 2000; Hong and Kubik 2003; Clement and Tse 2005; Clarke 
and Subramanian 2006). Identifying those particular analysts’ characteristics is a valuable 
exercise for all market participants that strive to increase the accuracy of forecasts. Herein, 
we argue that these approaches would lead to defragmentation of evidence and loss of 
information, as it is the interaction between CEO compensation and analysts’ 
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characteristics that is of prominence. It could be the case that, the impact of analysts’ 
characteristics on forecast errors would vary with differences in CEO compensation 
across the firms.  
Finally, although it is warranted to control for differences in the underlying relationships 
between analysts’ forecast errors and a plethora of characteristics, we also need to control 
for different forecasting horizons. There is evidence that analysts’ forecast ability varies 
with the forecast horizon and that forecast errors tend to be greater for long-term than for 
short-term forecasts (Richardson et al. 2004; Hovakimian and Saenyasiri 2010, 2014). 
Richardson et al. (2004) argue that initially analysts issue earnings forecasts that deviate 
more from the actual reported earnings and later, as time converges to the forecast period 
end, they revise (walk-down) their forecasts closer to the actual earnings. The authors 
refer to this as the “walk-down” phenomenon suggesting a positive relationship between 
forecast horizon and analysts’ forecast errors. Additionally, Hovakimian and Saenyasiri 
(2014, 2010) find that analysts’ forecast bias is higher for long-term forecast horizons 
than for short-term. For this reason, we employ forecasts of the current year, 1-year and 
2-years ahead.  
This chapter contributes to the growing literature of analysts’ forecasts in several ways. 
First, we extend Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) and employ forecast errors issued by 
individual analysts, rather than the consensus forecasts over 20 years. By doing so, we 
correct for aggregation bias in analysts’ forecasts that could emerge from consensus 
forecast. This is the first time in the recent literature that analyst-specific forecasts are the 
main focus. Second, we extend the analysis beyond the impact of CEO stock options on 
analysts’ forecasts to cover also other forms of compensation such as total compensation, 
cash bonus, restricted stock holdings and stock ownership.  We also account for the 
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impact of analysts’ characteristics. Employing a panel regression analysis, this study 
reveals the impact of such characteristics on forecasts over multiple forecasting horizons.  
Third, since prior research shows that CEO option grants increase the likelihood for 
financial misreporting, we consider the effect of earnings management on analysts’ 
forecasts and investigate whether this effect varies with CEO compensation. We show 
that earnings management increases analysts’ forecast errors and that CEO compensation, 
such as CEO restricted stock holdings, sensitivity to changes in firm’s value and 
ownership can mitigate this effect. Conversely, CEOs who enjoy high cash bonus can 
augment the above relationship. Fourth, we consider that analysts’ forecasts are not the 
outcome of a process in a vacuum and argue that the interaction between their 
characteristics and CEO compensation could be of high importance. Therefore, we 
employ the interactions between analysts’ characteristics and CEO compensation. 
Estimation results indeed provide evidence for channels of interaction between CEOs and 
analysts with analysts’ experience being the leading indicator that corrects optimism for 
firms where CEOs enjoy high compensation, cash bonus, have greater sensitivity to 
changes in firm’s value and greater stock ownership.  
Finally, we also examine the impact of the Global Statement Regulation (GS thereafter) 
and Dodd-Frank Act (DF thereafter) on the above relationships. We show that while these 
regulations can reduce analysts’ optimism, they do not affect the relationship between 
forecasts errors and analysts’ characteristics/CEO compensation in the same way. 
Variability exists both across firms with different CEO compensation and across analysts’ 
characteristics. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2. presents the hypotheses 
to be tested. Section 2.3. discusses the data and offers some statistical description, while 
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section 2.4. presents the methodology and the estimated results. Finally, section 2.5. 
concludes and provides the policy implication of this study. 
2.2. Hypotheses to be tested 
2.2.1.  The interplay between CEO compensation and analysts’ forecast errors 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) show that stock option compensation results in higher 
analysts’ forecast errors due to the higher level of forecasting complexity. The increase 
in forecasting complexity can be because of the compensation for higher risk projects and 
better managerial efforts. When firms use stock options as a part of CEO compensation, 
they aim to motivate executives to exert a greater effort for better firm performance and 
this, in turn, might encourage managers to undertake riskier strategies. These managerial 
activities increase the difficulty for analysts’ forecasting. Overall, one reason that high 
compensation could increase analysts’ forecast errors is the forecast complexity induced 
by option compensation. In this case, analysts need greater access to management’s 
information resulting in less accurate earnings forecasts. Arguably, the “interest 
alignment” effect can be present. It could be the case that high CEO compensation aligns 
the interests of managers with those of the shareholders’, enhancing the information 
disclosure and thus, resulting in lower forecast errors. 
There is also evidence that links analysts’ forecasts with firms’ engagement in earnings 
management. Both positive and negative association between earnings management and 
analysts’ forecasts has been documented. Regarding the positive, literature (Matsumoto 
2002; Brown and Caylor 2005; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Mande and Son 2012) 
argues that firms manage their earnings to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts using 
earnings smoothing practices. Conversely, there is evidence to suggest a negative impact 
of earnings management on analysts’ accuracy (Bradshaw et al. 2001; Cohen and Lys 
2003; Ahmed et al. 2005). According to this research, firms’ involvement in earnings 
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management increases the complexity of analysts’ forecasts resulting in less accurate 
earnings forecasts. 
Prior literature also provides strong evidence of the impact of CEO compensation on 
earnings management through financial misreporting (Greenspan 2002; Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). Greenspan (2002), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) argue that the likelihood of 
earnings misstatement is positively related to the CEO option portfolio. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) show that CEOs with high stock and stock option portfolios engage in 
earnings management to avoid future earnings disappointments. However, the existing 
research does not document any significant association between other measures of CEO 
compensation, such as bonus and restricted stock holdings and the likelihood of earnings 
misreporting. 
Motivated by the evidence that CEO compensation could encourage earnings 
management (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cornett et al. 2008; Jiang et al. 2010; 
McAnally et al. 2008; Ebrahim 2007; Efendi et al. 2007; Rahman and Ali 2006; Sáenz 
González and García-Meca 2014; Xie et al. 2003), and that earnings management can 
affect analysts’ forecasts, we examine whether the impact of earnings management on 
analysts’ forecasts varies with CEO compensation. We proxy CEO compensation 
employing CEO total compensation, cash bonus, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
one percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity (Bergstresser and Philippon 
2004), CEO in-the-money option holdings, restricted stock holdings and stock ownership. 
Table 1 presents the predicted impact of the compensation variables on analysts’ forecast 
errors. We classify the impact of the compensation variables by “interest alignment” and 
“forecast complexity” effect. Concerning the “interest alignment”, CEOs with high total 
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compensation driven by career concerns might have fewer incentives to mislead analysts 
and thus, leading to lower forecast errors for the latter.5 We also predict a negative sign 
for CEO stock ownership. It is well documented that greater CEO stock ownership 
enhances the “interest alignment” effect, mitigating the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders (Johnson and Natarajan 2005; Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi 
2014). Johnson and Natarajan (2005) using a sample of 149 firms over the period between 
1984 and 1988 show that CEOs with greater stock holdings disclose more information to 
analysts than other CEOs. For these reasons, we hypothesize that CEO restricted stock 
holdings and stock ownership could increase the information disclosure to analysts and 
decrease CEO incentives for earnings management. This, in turn, could mitigate analysts’ 
forecast errors. 
The difference between restricted stocks and other stocks is that the CEO has to meet 
some conditions before the actual grant of the stocks. These conditions can be either time-
based or performance-based or combination of both (Bettis et al. 2010). Due to regulatory 
changes, the number of restricted stock grants has increased dramatically in relation to 
the option compensation (Carter et al. 2007; Lord and Saito 2015).6 The question is how 
the increasing use of restricted stocks as an executive compensation form affects analysts’ 
forecasts.  
In contrast to CEO option compensation, there is a symmetric relation between the wealth 
from restricted stock holdings/stock ownership and stock price (Burns and Kedia 2006).  
                                                          
5 It is more likely that CEOs will be fired by the board if the former miss analysts’ earnings forecasts (Farrell 
and Whidbee 2003; Wiersema and Zhang 2011). Particularly, Wiersema and Zhang (2011) using a panel 
data on the S&P 500 firms during the period 2000 – 2005, show that analysts play an important role in 
boards evaluation of the CEOs’ efficacy.  The authors suggest that boards’ decision about CEOs’ dismissal 
is strongly associated with analysts’ recommendations, as the latter influence investors whom the board 
intends to please. 
6 Accounting Standards (FAS 148) requires firms to expense stock options by their fair value and not the 
intrinsic value. 
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These findings suggest that restricted stocks and stock ownership expose CEO to wealth 
losses when the stock price drops and therefore, they may not increase CEO incentives 
for earnings manipulation. In line with this argument, Efendi et al. (2007) did not find a 
significant relationship between restricted stock holdings and earnings misreporting. 
Since restricted stocks can be conditional on performance-related targets, literature has 
documented a positive relationship between restricted stock grants and firm performance 
(Ryan and Wiggins 2002; Bettis et al. 2010). Therefore, it could be the case that higher 
amount of CEO restricted stock holdings can enhance firm performance and this might 
improve analysts’ forecasts. However, one might argue that the restrictions applied to 
restricted stocks might increase CEO’s incentives to meet specific targets, motivating 
them to engage in earnings manipulation and financial misreporting leading to higher 
forecast errors. Therefore, a positive or a negative relationship between restricted stock 
holdings and analysts’ forecast errors is equally likely.  
Conversely, under the “forecast complexity” hypothesis we expect a positive impact of 
compensation variables on analysts’ forecast errors. Particularly, cash bonus 
compensation directly links executives’ compensation to earnings, and thus, CEOs with 
greater bonus compensation could have higher incentives to engage in financial 
misreporting (Efendi et al. 2007). Hence, we hypothesize that higher cash bonus may lead 
to greater analysts’ forecast errors. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that CEOs engage in earning manipulation when 
their compensation is tied to the value of their stock and option holdings.  For this reason, 
we expect that the sensitivity of CEO stock and option compensation to one percentage 
point increase in the value of the equity of the company would increase analysts’ forecast 
errors. 
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Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) state that managers with higher stock option compensation 
might undertake higher risk, exert greater effort to improve firm performance and show 
opportunistic disclosure behaviour increasing the complexity of analysts’ forecasts and 
leading to higher forecast errors. Burns and Kedia (2006) argue that CEO option 
compensation renders CEO wealth a convex function of the stock price. Although there 
is a limited loss to CEO wealth from a stock price decline, executives are rewarded when 
stock prices surge. For this reason, managers with high option compensation tend to 
inflate reported earnings to maintain high stock prices. Therefore, if forecasting 
complexity increases with high option compensation (Kanagaretnam et al. 2012) and the 
latter can motivate earnings management (Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007), 
then one might expect that option compensation can increase analysts’ forecasts errors. 
Alternatively, it could be the case that greater option compensation enhances the 
alignment of managers’ interests with those of the shareholders’ providing evidence for 
the “interest alignment” effect. This, in turn, can increase management disclosure and 
lower forecast errors.   
To examine whether other CEO characteristics drive the association between CEO 
compensation and analysts' forecast errors, we further account for CEO power. As stated 
in Table 1, we would equally expect either a positive or a negative sign for the CEO power 
variables. There is evidence that CEOs can increase the unity of the boards and form clear 
strategic positions fastening the decision-making procedures (Cannella and Monroe 1997; 
Adut et al. 2011). Therefore, CEOs with greater power might have greater accountability 
and career concerns, as they feel more responsible for firm performance. Greater 
accountability could eliminate analysts’ forecast errors due to the increased liability of 
the executives. In this case, powerful CEOs can improve analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
Arguably, there is evidence that firms with boards where CEOs are dominant disclose 
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less information to market participants, whilst powerful CEOs can overpower all other 
members of the board eliminating board effectiveness (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988; 
Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993).  Thus, it could also be the case that CEO power increases 
analysts’ forecast errors. 
Furthermore, CEOs who occupy dual roles on the board might have greater power. The 
duality in the role of the CEO and Director or Chairman could have a positive impact on 
analysts’ accuracy due to the greater accountability of the powerful executive. However, 
the CEO – Director/CEO – Chair duality could reduce the board independence and impair 
the monitoring of the CEO. This, in turn, could allow the CEO to serve self-interests, such 
as short-term compensation, rather than in favour of the shareholders (Frankforter et al. 
2000; Dunn 2004; Combs et al. 2007). CEOs driven by self-interests could lean towards 
practices of financial misreporting and conceal bad news from market participants 
(Graham et al. 2005; Ball 2009; Kothari et al. 2009). Such practices could impede the 
information disclosure to analysts and thus, increase forecast errors (Lustgarten and 
Mande 1995). 
Moreover, CEO ranking as the best-payed executive in a firm could be an indicator for 
higher power (Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2013). Thus, CEOs with a higher ranking are 
more likely to dominate over the other executives, follow self-serving practices and 
impede information disclosure leading to higher forecast errors for the analysts.  
Therefore, to examine the above associations, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: CEO compensation could affect analysts’ forecast errors. 
2.2.2.  CEO compensation, earnings management and analysts’ forecasts 
Although, CEO compensation could be associated with firms’ engagement in earnings 
management and earnings management can affect analysts’ forecasts, up till now, there 
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is no evidence examining whether CEO compensation can amplify the impact of earnings 
management on analysts’ forecasts. To cover this gap in the literature, this chapter 
examines whether the impact of discretionary accruals (DA thereafter) on forecast errors 
varies with CEO compensation. 7  We predict a negative sign for the DA variable 
supporting the increasing forecast complexity for analysts due to earnings manipulation 
(see Table 1). We opt for the interaction terms between discretionary accruals and 
indicators of CEO compensation. It could be the case that behind earnings management 
lays CEOs with specific compensations (Frankforter et al. 2000; Dunn 2004; Combs et 
al. 2007) who would undermine analysts’ forecasts. However, the impact might vary 
across different forms of compensation. Therefore, a positive or a negative coefficient is 
equally likely for the interaction between DA and CEO compensation variables. Thus, 
the following hypothesis is examined: 
H2: CEO compensation could affect the relationship between earnings management and 
analysts’ forecasts errors. 
2.2.3. Analysts’ characteristics, CEO compensation and earnings forecast errors 
Unlike Kanagaretnam et al. (2012), we assume that analysts’ forecast errors vary with 
analysts’ forecast characteristics and that the interaction between these characteristics and 
CEO compensation could explain part of the variability in forecast errors. A plethora of 
previous research reports systematic differences in forecast accuracy (Scharfstein and 
Stein 1990; Trueman 1994; Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement 1999; Hong et al. 2000; Hong 
and Kubik 2003). Earlier research provides mixed results and is rather limited, in 
particular across forecast horizons. Some evidence suggests a link between analysts’ 
accuracy and their career concerns and reputation (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Trueman 
                                                          
7 Discretionary or abnormal accruals are defined as the difference between the total accruals and normal accruals. 
Normal accruals are estimated employing Jones (1991) model. 
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1994; Hong and Kubik 2003). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Trueman (1994) first 
investigate the relation between analysts’ forecasts and career concerns concluding that 
financial analysts try to enhance their reputation mimicking other analysts as a safe 
forecast strategy. According to the authors, analysts tend to issue forecasts similar to those 
released by other analysts previously, even if they are not accurate. Furthermore, Hong 
and Kubik (2003) find that more accurate earnings forecasts increase the probability for 
favourable career outcomes for the analysts. 
 Other studies (Hong et al. 2000; Clement and Tse 2005; Clarke and Subramanian 2006) 
show that inexperienced analysts may be more likely to be fired for inaccurate earnings 
forecasts compared to more experienced analysts. The authors suggest that less 
experienced analysts put greater effort in forecasting and thus, are associated with lower 
forecast errors and greater earnings revision frequency. Clement and Tse (2005) 
employing a variety of analysts’ characteristics such as analyst prior accuracy, experience 
and employer size, demonstrate that analysts with higher previous accuracy and 
experience are more likely to release bold forecasts.8  Furthermore, they show that the 
likelihood of an analysts’ forecast revision to be bold increases with the forecast horizon, 
forecast frequency and employer size. Clarke and Subramanian (2006) provide evidence 
that analysts with very good or very poor forecasting ability issue bold forecasts, while 
analysts experience enhances forecasting boldness in a non-linear way. The authors also 
document a negative association between the probability of an analyst to be fired by the 
broker house and analyst forecasting ability.  
                                                          
8 Forecast boldness is measured as the deviation of analyst i forecast for firm j from the consensus forecast 
for the specific firm. 
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Therefore, as presented in Table 1, we would equally expect a positive or a negative 
impact of analysts’ characterises on forecast errors. To examine whether the impact of 
CEO compensation on analysts’ forecasts varies with different analyst-specific 
characteristics, we test the following hypothesis: 
 H3: Analysts’ characteristics could affect the relationship between CEO compensation 
and analysts’ forecasts errors. 
2.2.4.  The impact of Global Analyst Research Statement and Dodd-Frank Act 
regulations on analysts’ forecast errors 
As analysts and CEOs operate in regulated markets, we shall take into account such 
conditions. For this reason, we focus on the impact of Global Analyst Research Statement 
regulation (GS) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act (DF). GS 
is an enforcement provision between the Security Exchange Commission (SEC), National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
twelve of the largest US investment institutions. The provision aims to address issues 
related to possible conflict of interests regarding analysts, who release forecasts and 
recommendations for investing or not in selected firms. GS was first introduced in 2002 
and went into effect in 2003. The main motivation of GS regulation was to prevent the 
engagement of the investment institutions (the brokers) in practices to influence analysts’ 
forecasts to gain higher compensation fees from their investment banking services.   
An example of such a case can be the crash in technology stocks during 2000 and 2002. 
Analysts’ optimistic research reports were considered to enhance the stock price surge in 
the late 90s when less than 1% of analysts provided “sell” recommendations (Bogle 2002). 
Apparently, brokers’ incentives to maintain their investment banking businesses with 
firms induced a conflict of interest between the brokers and analysts. We predict a 
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negative sign for the GS variable in Table 1. The rationale is that if the GS regulation 
eliminates the influence of brokers on analysts, then we expect that GS will enhance 
analysts’ independence and this, in turn, will lower their incentives for optimistic 
forecasts. Since the GS enforcement focuses on analysts, this research examines the effect 
of GS on analysts’ forecast errors and whether the efficacy of the GS provisions varies 
with analysts’ characteristics. Concerning the interaction terms between the GS 
regulation and analysts’ characteristics, we would equally expect either a positive or a 
negative sign as this effect could vary with different analysts’ characteristics and across 
forecast horizons. 
Concerning the DF Act, the main aim was to improve the regulation of the financial 
industry to prevent the U.S. economy from experiencing a crisis like that of 2008. The 
DF Act is implemented by the SEC and includes provisions requiring detailed disclosure 
of executive compensation and corporate governance structure. According to the DF Act, 
firms should disclose information about CEO pay versus firm performance ratio and a 
compensation recovery policy for the excess incentive-based executive compensation in 
case of financial misreporting. It could be the case that, prior DF analysts would issue 
biased forecasts to establish good relations with firms and gain access to inside 
managerial information. As reported in Table 1, we expect a negative sign for the DF 
variable. The rationale is that if the DF Act eliminates the need for inside information, 
then analysts’ forecasts should be less biased post-DF. We extend our analysis by 
investigating the impact of the DF Act on analysts’ forecast errors and whether the 
efficacy of the DF provisions varies with CEO compensation. We cannot predict the sign 
of the interaction between the DF regulation and compensation measures as the impact of 
DF could vary with different CEO compensation forms and across different forecast 
horizons. 
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Prior research shows that both Global Analyst Research Statement and Dodd-Frank Act 
can affect analysts’ forecasts (Kadan et al. 2006; Ertimur et al. 2007; Ke and Yu 2007; 
Chan et al. 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013; Hovakimian and Saenyasiri 2014). Kadan et al. 
(2006) argue that the implementation of such regulations has decreased analysts’ 
optimism by 40% for stocks that have recently undergone an IPO. In line with this finding, 
Ertimur et al. (2007) and Ke and Yu (2007) report an improvement in analysts’ 
recommendations after GS regulation.  Moreover, Chan et al. (2012) and Dehaan et al. 
(2013) find that the adoption of DF provisions enhances the quality of firms’ financial 
statements, decreases the number of financial report restatements and analysts’ earnings 
forecast dispersion. Given that analysts use financial statements as their main source of 
information, greater quality and quantity of information disclosed through financial 
statements could decrease analysts’ forecast errors (Byard et al. 2006). In a cross-country 
analysis, Hovakimian and Saenyasiri (2014) examine the impact of the GS on analysts’ 
forecasts for 40 countries in developing and emerging regions over the period 1991 – 
2010, revealing that before the GS, analysts issued more optimistic forecasts, whereas 
this bias is greater for longer-term forecasts. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
H4: The Global Analyst Research Statement regulation (GS) and Dodd-Frank Act (DF) 
could affect analysts’ forecast errors. 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 1: Predicted sign of the variables 
Variable Predicted sign 
 Current 
year 
forecasts 
1-year 
ahead 
forecasts 
2-years 
ahead 
forecasts 
CEO Compensation 
Interest alignment effect    
TOTAL_PAY - - - 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP - - - 
RESTRICTED STOCKS +/- +/- +/- 
Forecast complexity effect    
BONUS + + + 
CEO_SENSITIVITY + + + 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS +/- +/- +/- 
Other variables 
CEO_DIR +/- +/- +/- 
CEO_RANK +/- +/- +/- 
DA + + + 
DA×CEO Compensation +/- +/- +/- 
Analysts’ Characteristics +/- +/- +/- 
Analysts’ Characteristics ×CEO 
compensation 
+/- +/- +/- 
GS/DF Regulation - - - 
GS×Analysts’ Characteristics +/- +/- +/- 
DF×CEO compensation +/- +/- +/- 
Notes: the table reports the predicted sign of the variables. A negative (positive) predicted sign 
corresponds to a decrease (increase) in analysts’ forecast errors. Finally, when either a positive or a 
negative relationship is equally likely, both signs are reported. 
 
2.3. Data selection and research design  
2.3.1. Analysts’ earnings forecasts 
We construct a unique individual analyst-level sample of U.S. firms covering the period 
between 1992 and 2015 assembled from three different databases. First, we derive 
analysts’ earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S data source over three different horizons: 
current year, 1-year ahead and 2-years ahead. These earnings forecasts, say 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, are 
identified by analyst i for the firm j and referring to year t. For each of these forecasts, we 
obtain information about the broker and the analyst in question as they are individually 
identified by a code, whilst we also observe the forecast period and forecast revision dates. 
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This information is crucial in defining forecast errors. We include forecast issued no later 
than the end of forecast period.9 
 We also obtain information about the firm. In some detail, information about firms’ 
balance sheet items is drawn from COMPUSTAT. The challenge has been to match the 
two samples. We achieve a match using CUSIP identifier that allows merging I/B/E/S 
Detail file with COMPUSTAT. A further challenge we faced is the use of CEO-specific 
data. Such data comes from EXECUCOMP, which provides detailed information 
regarding firms’ executives. To extract data for the CEOs, we filter for executives that 
serve as CEOs in j firm of analysts i over the sample period t. In the third step, we match 
data from I/B/E/S, COMPUSTAT with EXECUCOMP. Given that our analysis accounts 
for different forecast horizons, we follow the same procedure to construct the dataset for 
each forecast horizon. Table 2 presents the distribution of analysts, brokers and firms for 
the different forecast horizons over the years 1992 – 2015. Note that both the number of 
analysts issuing earnings forecasts and the number of firms followed by analysts decline 
as the forecast horizon increases (see Panels A, B and C in Table 2). This trend might be 
due to the greater difficulty and complexity of earnings forecasts for longer horizons and 
reveals analysts’ preferences to provide forecasts for shorter horizons. This fact raises the 
significance of examining various horizons.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 As in the empirical section we are interesting on multiple analysts’ forecasts on firm j, we exclude firms 
followed by only one analyst.   
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Table 2: Analysts, brokers and firms over the years. 
  
Panel A: Current year 
forecast 
Panel B: 1-year ahead 
forecast 
Panel C: 2-years ahead 
forecast 
Year Analysts Brokers Firms Analysts Brokers Firms Analysts Brokers Firms 
1992 249 33 50 250 20 40 51 11 19 
1993 874 97 212 849 83 157 150 35 62 
1994 1023 103 332 1023 79 157 211 52 89 
1995 1142 102 385 1143 91 239 275 52 117 
1996 1270 120 419 1313 98 274 294 47 117 
1997 1452 136 438 1364 104 310 314 57 132 
1998 1608 151 463 1554 129 370 338 70 140 
1999 1614 119 471 1583 125 391 402 65 157 
2000 1628 155 464 1559 98 313 351 59 130 
2001 1710 125 499 1688 101 352 413 59 150 
2002 1922 124 546 1794 70 289 326 55 140 
2003 1879 147 592 1918 74 393 480 62 213 
2004 2023 179 647 1963 134 519 686 83 262 
2005 2038 198 712 1983 174 629 910 115 348 
2006 2092 185 774 1996 167 688 937 106 402 
2007 1969 123 795 1985 161 713 1029 107 450 
2008 1848 138 803 1838 147 730 1000 95 476 
2009 2015 189 973 2063 153 882 1249 126 639 
2010 2313 201 1096 2187 150 813 1269 141 726 
2011 2295 181 1148 2185 135 851 1365 144 766 
2012 2243 181 1170 2227 159 1051 1415 142 812 
2013 2254 195 1165 2258 172 1081 1560 134 833 
2014 2252 182 1139 2337 174 1070 1451 134 848 
2015 947 118 135 996 99 126 483 60 105 
Distinct 
Number  
10700 745 2828 10641 742 2728 6457 520 2286 
Observations 40660 3482 15428 40056 2897 12438 16959 2011 8133 
Notes: This table presents the sample distributions of analysts, brokers and firms over the period 1992 - 
2015 for the current, 1-year and 2-years ahead forecast horizons. 
 
Table 3 reports the industry breakdown over different forecast horizons. Clearly across 
forecast horizons (see Panels A, B and C in Table 3) there is a stable pattern of what 
appears as ‘popular’ industries to forecast. For example, firms in Information Technology 
industry show a high percentage of earnings forecasts at 17.75%, 13.18% and 17.39% of 
for the current, 1-year ahead and 2-years ahead forecast horizons respectively. Consumer 
Discretionary also shows strong ‘popularity’ (at 17.19%, 15.42% and 16.98% of overall 
earnings forecasts for the current, 1-year ahead and 2-years ahead forecast horizons 
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respectively), as well as Financials (at 17.39%, 17.31% and 17.57% of overall earnings 
forecasts for the current, 1-year ahead and 2-years ahead forecast horizons respectively). 
Table 3: Distribution of analysts' forecasts over industries. 
 
    
Panel A: Current year 
forecast 
Panel B: 1-year ahead 
forecast 
Panel C: 2-years ahead 
forecast 
      
SIC 
Code 
Industry group Observ. % Observ. % Observ. % 
10 Energy 18424 9.43% 6786 10.96% 17366 9.12% 
15 Materials 11855 6.07% 3985 6.44% 11589 6.09% 
20 Industrial 22775 11.65% 7640 12.34% 21718 11.41% 
25 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
33603 17.19% 9547 15.42% 32317 16.98% 
30 
Consumer 
Staples 
8168 4.18% 2393 3.87% 8087 4.25% 
35 Health Care 22955 11.75% 9272 14.98% 22688 11.92% 
40 Financials 33981 17.39% 10712 17.31% 33447 17.57% 
45 
Information 
Technology 
34695 17.75% 8158 13.18% 33099 17.39% 
50 Telecom. 3266 1.67% 1002 1.62% 3372 1.77% 
55 Utilities 5704 2.92% 2400 3.88% 6693 3.52% 
  Total  195426 100.00% 61895 100.00% 190376 100.00% 
Notes: This table presents the sample distribution of analysts’ forecasts over the different industries for the 
period between 1992 and 2015 for the current, 1-year and 2-years ahead forecast horizons. We classify 
industries based on the 2-digit SIC codes. 
 
 
2.3.2. Earnings forecast errors 
The starting block of our analysis is analysts’ forecast errors. Consistent with previous 
literature (O’Brien 1990; Sinha et al. 1997; Clement et al. 2005), we construct forecast 
errors taking as forecast the most recent forecast issued by analyst i for year t. The actual 
value is the actual earning as reported by firm j for year t. Thus, the forecast error is:  
𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = (𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇_𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 −  𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡)/𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 𝑗,𝑡−1,                                         (1) 
where 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  presents analyst’s i earning forecast error for firm j and year t,   
𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇_𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  is the most recent earning forecast issued by analyst i for firm j and 
year t, and  𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡  is the actual earning reported by firm j for year t. Finally, 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 𝑗,𝑡−1 is the stock price of firm j one year before the forecast period end t, which is 
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a way to scale the forecast error in order to facilitate comparisons across firms (Duru and 
Reeb 2002; Bhat et al. 2006). A positive/negative forecast error in equation (1) would 
indicate that analysts are optimistic/pessimistic. 
Having derived the forecast error, we turn to analyst’s characteristics, such as experience. 
We employ two measures: the first measure indicates analyst i firm-specific experience 
(FIRM_EXP thereafter) and is calculated as the number of years that analyst i follows 
firm j. The second measure reflects the general experience of analyst i and it is measured 
as the total number of years that analyst i issues earnings forecasts (GEN_EXP thereafter). 
We also account for the forecast revision (FOR_REV thereafter) of analyst i calculated 
as the number of days remained until the forecast period ends and since the last forecast 
revision issued by analyst i for firm j and year t. FOR_FREQ captures the number of 
earning forecasts of analyst i for firm j during year t. In addition, we employ a metric for 
the brokerage size of analyst i (BROKERAGE thereafter).  BROKERAGE stands for the 
number of analysts hired by the brokerage company that has employed analyst i. 
Table 4 indicates that the mean forecast error varies across different forecast horizons 
from 0.0002 in the current year to 0.0054 and -0.0008 in 1-year ahead and 2-years ahead 
respectively. A positive value in forecast errors implies that analysts are, on average, 
rather optimistic when it comes to forecasting earnings. This optimism is much greater 
for 1-year ahead forecast horizon, while interestingly for 2-years ahead analysts turn to 
be more pessimistic. It is remarkable that in the current year, there is a strong correction 
in the degree of optimism of analysts’ forecasts. On the other hand, analysts’ forecast 
frequency during the forecast period decreases in longer forecast horizon, indicating that 
analysts prefer releasing forecasts for short-term than for long-term. There is an 
increasing trend in the number of days remained until the forecast period ends and since 
the last forecast revision issued by analyst i for firm j and year t from 81 for the current 
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year to 360 and 711 days for 1-year and 2-years ahead respectively. This increasing 
number of days elapsed is in line with the lower forecast frequency for longer forecast 
horizons.  
Table 4 shows that both firm and general experience are relatively similar for current and 
1-year ahead forecasts (about 3 years of firm experience and 7 years of general experience 
in current and 1-year ahead), whereas analysts have less experience in 2-years ahead 
earnings forecasting (about 2.5 years of firm experience and 5 years of general 
experience). In addition, the number of analysts that the broker company employs for 
current year forecasts is significantly higher than those of the longer-term horizons (about 
69 analysts for the current year forecasts and 19 to 18 analysts for 1-year and 2-years 
ahead forecasts respectively). 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Analysts' specific variables 
  Current year forecast 1-year ahead forecast 2-years ahead forecast 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
FE 0.0002 0.0096 0.0054 0.0292 -0.0008 0.0094 
ANALYST_EST 2.05 2.51 2.11 2.32 2.69 2.59 
FOR_FREQ 4.42 2.66 3.79 2.58 2.92 2.52 
FOR_REV 81.09 69.77 360 102.56 711 99.25 
FIRM_EXP 3.26 2.52 3.26 4.1 2.52 1.9 
GEM_EXP 6.86 4.71 6.74 4.67 5.19 3.47 
BROKERAGE 69.2 61.62 19.4 17.73 18.34 15.1 
Panel B: CEO and other firm-specific variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
SALARY  733 446 
IN_THE_MONEY 
OPTIONS 
740.25 1756 
BONUS 442 1412 LVRGE 0.18 0.18 
TOTALPAY 6363.21 10120 NUM_ANAL 20.26 10.88 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP 1822.98 13043 SIZE 8.22 1.85 
CEO_SENSITIVITY 0.19 0.21 ACTUAL 1.95 2.54 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS 564.51 1929  DA -0.001  0.007  
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A describes analyst-specific 
variables, while Panel B presents CEO and other firm-specific variables. Analyst-specific variables are 
obtained from I/B/E/S Detailed file for current, 1-year and 2-years ahead forecast horizons. FE stands 
for analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued by analyst i 
for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and year t, scaled with the stock price 
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of the previous year t-1. ANALYST_EST stands for the last earning forecast issued by analyst i for firm 
j and year t. FOR_FREQ presents analyst forecast frequency and is calculated as the number of earnings 
forecasts by analyst i for firm j during year t. Next, FOR_REV stands for analyst forecast horizon and 
is calculated as the number of days remaining until the forecast period ends since the last forecast 
revision issued by analyst i for firm j and year t. FIRM_EXP is the analyst firm-specific experience and 
is measured as the number of years that analyst i follows firm j. GEN_EXP presents the general 
experience of analyst and is calculated as the total number of years that an analyst i issue earnings 
forecasts. Finally, BROKERAGE presents the size of the broker that employs analyst i and is calculated 
as the number of analysts hired by the analyst’s i broker company during year t. CEO characteristics are 
derived from EXECUCOMP database. SALARY and BONUS stand for CEO salary and bonus 
respectively TOTALPAY stands for CEO total compensation as measured by the sum of cash pay, stock 
option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan pay-outs and other annual compensation 
as reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock 
ownership. The above CEO characteristics are expressed in thousand dollars. CEO_SENSITIVITY 
captures the share of the hypothetical CEO total compensation (CEO sensitivity) that would be resulted 
from one percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity. RESTRICTED_STOCKS stands for 
the value of restricted stock holdings and IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-
the-money options.  ACTUAL is the actual earning reported by firm j for year t. LVRGE presents firm 
leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. t. NUM_ANAL presents 
the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. 
SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Finally, DA 
stands for firms’ engagement in earnings management through the use of discretionary accruals. Details 
for the calculation of DA are presented in section 2.3.4. 
 
2.3.3. Measuring CEO compensation 
Table 4 also reports some descriptive statistics for CEO compensation. We use CEO total 
compensation (TOTALPAY thereafter) as the natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, 
stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plan payouts, and other 
annual compensation as reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1.  Our next 
indicator for CEO compensation is CEO cash bonus (BONUS thereafter) measured by 
the ratio of executive’s bonus over total salary.10  
We proxy CEO option compensation including CEO in-the-money option holdings 
(IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS thereafter).11 We also consider for CEO compensation 
driven by restricted stock holdings employing the value of restricted stock holding grants 
over CEO salary (RESTRICTED_STOCKS thereafter). Additionally, we account for 
executive’s stock ownership. Bhagat et al. (1999) argue that CEOs with greater stock 
                                                          
10 Following McAnally et al. (2008) and Efendi et al. (2007), we deflate CEO compensation measures by 
CEO salary so as to capture the relative degree of the incentive. 
11 We also account for the impact of the total value of CEO options on analysts’ forecasts, however the 
impact is either insignificant or the same with in-the-money options in few cases.  
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holdings could exhibit greater incentives for efficient monitoring and information 
disclosure reducing analysts’ forecast errors. Since current earnings are employed as a 
proxy to predict future earnings, it could be the case that CEOs might attempt to eliminate 
analysts’ forecast errors to achieve high short-term stock prices (Stein 1989). Our 
executive’s stock ownership measure (STOCK_OWNERSHIP thereafter) is the ratio of 
the fair value of stocks owned by the executive, excluding options, divided by executive’s 
salary.  
Furthermore, following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) we calculate CEO 
compensation sensitivity to changes in firm’s equity value using the following equation: 
CEO_SENSITIVITY𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑗𝑡/(𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌𝑗𝑡 +  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑗𝑡),           (2) 
where SALARY and BONUS are CEO salary and bonus respectively as reported in 
EXECUCOMP. ONEPCT is the dollar change in the value of CEO’s stock and option 
portfolio due to one percentage point increase in the company’s stock price and is 
calculated as follows: 
ONEPCT𝑗𝑡 = 0.01 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗𝑡 × (𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡),                                     (3) 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗𝑡 stands for firm’s stock price, 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑡  for the number of shares held by 
the CEO and 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 stands for the total number of options held by the CEO. The 
above indicator of CEO sensitivity captures the share of hypothetical CEO total 
compensation that would be the result of one percentage point increase in the value of 
firm’s equity.  
Regarding CEO power measures, we employ an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if the CEO occupies the position of the Director on the board and zero otherwise 
(CEO_DIR thereafter). Finally, EXECUCOMP provides information regarding the 
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ranking of the CEO within the firm. We employ CEO ranking within the company based 
on the sum of the salary plus bonus as an indicator for CEO power (CEO_RANK 
thereafter). 
In addition, we include firm-specific characteristics. To this end, we employ the natural 
logarithm of the number of the distinct analysts following firm j during year t 
(NUM_ANAL thereafter) and this variable serves as a proxy for analysts’ coverage and 
an indicator for a greater information disclosure. The greater number of analysts 
following a firm could increase information disclosure, and as a result, it might decrease 
analysts’ forecast errors (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Gu and Wu 2003; Yu 2010). 
However, it could be the case that a greater number of analysts covering a firm increases 
the competition between analysts for higher commission fees, increasing forecast errors. 
Furthermore, we account for years with a loss, including a dummy that takes the value 
one for loss years and zero otherwise (LOSS thereafter). There is evidence that earnings 
forecasts for firms with losses are less accurate than those of profitable firms due to the 
problematic estimation of losses arising from managerial compensation (Brown 2001; 
Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Mande and Son 2012). We also account for firm size (SIZE 
thereafter) measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and firm’s leverage (LVRGE 
thereafter) as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  
 
2.3.4. Measuring discretionary accruals 
We define earnings management as the intentional misreporting of firms’ performance 
and/or misapplication of accounting standards by insiders to deceive and mislead market 
participants (Leuz et al. 2003). Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we employ the 
modified version of Jones (1991) to measure the discretionary accruals for each year and 
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each industry classified by its 2-digit SIC code. This measure takes into account industry-
level changes that might affect accruals and enables for time-varying coefficients. We 
measure discretionary accruals based on the following model: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2
𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑘3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡,                                  (4) 
 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the total accruals defined as 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝐸𝐵𝑋𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , where EBXI 
presents the earnings before the extraordinary items and discontinued operations and CFO 
stands for the operational cash flows as are reported in the cash flow statement. 
Furthermore, 𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the change in revenues, while 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 represents the gross value 
of property, plant and equipment. Finally, we use total assets of the previous year 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) to deflate our variables.  
We use the estimated coefficients form equation (4) to calculate the normal accruals (𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡) 
for each firm.  
𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  ?̂?1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2
𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  ?̂?3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
                                            (5) 
 
Next, we measure discretionary accruals for each firm as the difference between total 
accruals and the estimated normal accruals based on the following equation: 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
) −  𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡                                                                                (6) 
Since earnings manipulation involves both positive and negative value of discretionary 
accruals, in our analysis, we employ the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(Warfield et al. 1995; Gabrielsen et al. 2002; Wang 2006; Barth et al. 2008; Sáenz 
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González and García-Meca 2014). The absolute value of discretionary accruals measures 
the extent to which managers engage in earnings manipulation practices to adjust 
reporting earnings. Descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals are reported in Table 4, 
while Table 5 reports the correlation matrix. The mean value of discretionary accruals for 
our sample is -0.001 suggesting that on average firms manage their accruals downwards.
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for variables 
. 
              Note: The table presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in this analysis 
 
 
 
 
FE 1.000
TOTALP AY -0.083 1.000
BONUS -0.002 -0.011 1.000
CEO_SENSITIVITY 0.013 -0.021 -0.001 1.000
IN_THE_MONEY_OP TIONS -0.006 0.017 0.674 0.072 1.000
RESTRICTED_STOCKS 0.003 -0.020 0.000 0.052 0.000 1.000
STOCK_OWNERSHIP -0.004 -0.131 0.003 0.125 0.005 0.003 1.000
DA 0.019 0.009 -0.001 -0.011 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 1.000
CEO_RANK 0.012 -0.329 -0.009 -0.003 0.038 0.056 0.085 -0.003 1.000
CEO_DIR 0.009 0.167 0.007 0.121 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.004 -0.429 1.000
FIRM_RXP -0.015 0.143 0.000 0.049 -0.001 0.006 -0.009 -0.005 -0.124 0.084 1.000
FOR_REV 0.023 -0.029 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 0.009 1.000
FOR_FREQ -0.024 0.086 -0.006 0.020 -0.010 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.033 0.206 -0.384 1.000
BROKERAGE -0.022 0.077 -0.006 0.006 -0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.016 -0.030 0.047 -0.050 0.109 1.000
NUM_ANAL -0.044 0.408 0.034 0.121 0.053 0.012 0.045 -0.015 0.067 0.014 0.056 -0.039 0.130 0.056 1.000
LOSS 0.041 -0.073 -0.007 -0.073 0.001 0.042 -0.011 0.031 -0.023 0.025 -0.051 0.004 0.008 -0.014 -0.053 1.000
SIZE -0.033 0.532 0.026 -0.028 0.040 -0.009 0.032 0.023 0.105 0.011 0.140 -0.070 0.127 0.109 0.573 -0.103 1.000
LVRGE 0.054 0.069 -0.018 -0.089 -0.029 -0.014 -0.010 0.029 -0.004 0.025 0.011 -0.023 0.034 0.050 0.026 0.110 0.201 1.000
LOSS SIZE LVRGE
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2.4. Model specification and empirical estimations 
2.4.1. The association between earnings forecast errors and CEO compensation 
In this chapter, we use the last earnings forecast issued by the individual analyst rather 
than the consensus earnings forecast. The starting point of our analysis is a panel 
estimation of the interplay between analysts’ forecast errors and CEO compensation 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2012). Our regressions control for fixed effects and time effects, 
while we report robust standard errors. 
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡_𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐻𝐸_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡 +
 𝛼5𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7𝐷𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼10𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗𝑡 +
 𝛼13𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼15𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼16𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼17𝐿𝑉𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡,                                                                                             (7) 
 
where 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡_𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡  stands for analyst’s i forecast error for firm j in year t. 
 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑗𝑡  ,  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑗𝑡 , 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗𝑡 , 𝐼𝑁_𝑇𝐻𝐸_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑌_𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡 , 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑆𝑗𝑡 , 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡 are proxies of CEO compensation 
and stand for CEO total compensation, cash bonus, CEO sensitivity to firm’s equity value, 
in-the-money options, restricted stock holdings and stock ownership respectively. 
𝐷𝐴𝑗𝑡 captures firms’ engagement in earnings management using discretionary accruals. 
 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑆_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  presents analysts’ general or firm-specific experience, 
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𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 is analysts’ forecast frequency, 𝐹𝑂𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡  measures analysts’ forecast 
revision period, and 𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the size of broker house that employs analyst i. 
In an extension, 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑗𝑡  and 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗𝑡  proxy CEO power and are the ranking of 
the CEO among the executives in the firm during the year and the CEO – Director duality 
respectively.12 𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑗𝑡 ,  𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  and 𝐿𝑉𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  stands for the number of 
analysts following the firm during a year, the loss years, the size and the leverage ratio of 
the firm respectively.  
The interplay between CEO compensation and analysts’ forecast errors is reported in 
Tables 6 – 8 for the current, 1-year and 2-years ahead forecasts respectively. Starting with 
the current year forecasts in Table 6, in Models (1) – (6) we examine the individual impact 
of the CEO compensation variables on forecast errors, while Model (7) considers the 
simultaneous effect of all CEO compensation measures on forecasts. The coefficients of 
TOTALPAY, RESTRICTED_STOCKS and STOCK_OWNERSHIP are negative and 
significant at 5% or better (see Models 1, 5 and 7). These results are in line with the 
“interest alignment” effect proposed by Kanagaretnam et al. (2012). Higher the total 
compensation, restricted stock holding and stock ownership, greater the alignment of 
managers’ interests with those of the shareholders (Johnson and Natarajan 2005; 
Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi 2014). Managers with higher compensation and stock 
holdings might improve firm performance to achieve specific performance targets. This, 
in turn, can increase the information disclosure lowering the forecast complexity for 
analysts. Furthermore, CEOs with high salary compensation driven by career concerns 
might have fewer incentives to mislead analysts and thus, enhance the accuracy of 
forecasts for the latter.  Therefore, our results confirm hypothesis H1 for current year 
                                                          
12 In this analysis, we have also accounted for CEO-Chairperson duality as an indicator for CEO power, 
however the impact was insignificant. 
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forecasts, providing evidence for the “interest alignment” effect of higher compensation 
and stock holdings. 
Conversely, the impact of BONUS, CEO sensitivity to one percentage change in the value 
of firm’s equity (CEO_SENSITIVITY) and IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS is positive 
and significant at 1% level in Models (2) – (4) in Table 6. These results are consistent 
with Hypotheses H1 for current year forecasts, suggesting that analysts’ forecast errors 
are higher for firms where CEOs enjoy higher cash bonus, are more sensitive to the 
changes in firm’s equity value and have substantial in-the-money option holdings. Our 
findings are in agreement with previous evidence that higher level of CEO bonus and 
option compensation may induce executives to take greater risks. CEOs by engaging in 
opportunistic behaviour, such as earnings and disclosure management, would escalate 
forecasting complexity (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006, Efendi 
et al. 2006; Kanagaretnam et al. 2012). Finally, in Model (7) which accounts for all CEO 
compensation variables simultaneously, estimated coefficients for TOTALPAY, 
CEO_SENSITIVITY, RESTRICTED_STOCKS and STOCK_OWNERSHIP maintain 
their significant effect on analysts’ forecast errors. Interestingly, in Model (7) the impact 
of in-the-money options turns negative, albeit insignificant indicating that perhaps other 
forms of compensation are of importance for analysts’ forecasts rather than the option 
holdings. 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
Table 6: The impact of CEO compensation on analysts’ forecast errors for current 
year forecasts. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
TOTALPAY -0.082***      -0.088*** 
 (0.006)      (0.006) 
BONUS  0.074***     0.047 
  (0.024)     (0.037) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY  0.002***    0.003*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS   0.001***   -0.001 
    (0.000)   (0.003) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS    -0.011**  -0.012** 
     (0.004)  (0.005) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP     0.005* -0.009*** 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
NUM_ANAL 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.039** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.043** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
LOSS -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.024) (0.030) (0.040) 
Constant -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 
R-squared 0.525 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.526 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the association between analyst forecast errors and CEO 
compensation for the current year forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable 
is FE, which stands for analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference between the last forecast 
issued by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and year t, scaled with 
the stock price of the previous year t-1. CEO compensation includes the following variables: TOTALPAY 
that stands for CEO total compensation as measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, stock 
option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan payouts and other annual compensation as 
reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. BONUS presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the 
ratio of CEO bonus over CEO salary. CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO 
total compensation that would be resulted from one percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity. 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-the-money options, RESTRICTED_STOCKS 
stands for the value of restricted stock holdings and STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership 
measured by the ratio of the value of CEO stock grants excluding options over CEO salary.  NUM_ANAL 
presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst 
coverage. LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value one for loss year and zero otherwise. SIZE stands 
for firm’s size and is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, while LVRGE presents firm 
leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Next, we turn to the impact of CEO compensation for 1-year ahead forecast horizon as 
presented in Table 7. TOTALPAY decreases analysts’ forecast errors at 1% significance 
level, whereas analysts’ forecast errors increase at 1% level for firms where CEOs enjoy 
higher bonus and are more sensitive to changes in the value of firm’s equity (see Models 
1-3).   
One can notice that the impact of IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS on analysts’ forecast 
varies across different forecast horizons (compare current year with 1-year ahead 
forecasts). While IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS variable carries a positive sign for the 
current year (see Model 4 in Table 6), for 1-year forecast horizon, the coefficient is 
insignificant (see Model 4 in Table 7). Interestingly, along with STOCK_OWNERSHIP, 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS would reduce analysts’ forecast errors at 1% level as 
reported in Model (7) in Table 7 which considers for all CEO compensation variables.  
This result, in combination with the insignificant impact of in-the-money options in 
Model (7) in Table (6), implies that when we account for other forms of CEO 
compensation, option compensation is of a lower importance for analysts’ forecasts for 
the shorter-term forecasts. Notably, for the longer-term forecast, analysts face lower 
difficulty in forecasting for firms where CEOs have substantially higher in-the-money 
option holdings. This result supports the “interest alignment” effect of options and is at 
odds with Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) who find that options increase analysts forecast 
errors.  
Herein, we argue that there are other forms of compensation that affect analysts’ forecasts 
and, in line with the interest alignment effects of options, the latter could lead to a higher 
information disclosure and thus, to lower forecast errors. Overall, for 1-year forecast 
horizon, estimation results confirm hypothesis H1, according to which CEO 
compensation can affect analysts’ forecast errors.   
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Table 7: The impact of CEO compensation on analysts’ forecast errors for 1-year 
ahead forecasts. 
VARIABLES  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
TOTALPAY -0.048***      -0.051*** 
 (0.002)      (0.002) 
BONUS  0.342***     0.275** 
  (0.074)     (0.138) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY  0.006***    0.009*** 
   (0.001)    (0.001) 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS   0.003   -0.004*** 
    (0.005)   (0.001) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS    -0.005  -0.010 
     (0.007)  (0.013) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP     -0.013 -0.094*** 
      (0.008) (0.012) 
NUM_ANAL -0.043 -0.077 -0.097* -0.076 -0.076 -0.077 -0.079 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
LOSS 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015) 
Constant -0.045*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.042*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 
R-squared 0.563 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.563 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the association between analyst forecast errors and CEO 
compensation for 1-year ahead forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
FE, which stands for analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued 
by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and year t, scaled with the 
stock price of the previous year t-1. CEO compensation includes the following variables: TOTALPAY that 
stands for CEO total compensation as measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, stock 
option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan payouts and other annual compensation as 
reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. BONUS presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the 
ratio of CEO bonus over CEO salary. CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO 
total compensation that would be resulted from one percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity. 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-the-money options, RESTRICTED_STOCKS 
stands for the value of restricted stock holdings and STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership 
measured by the ratio of the value of CEO stock grants excluding options over CEO salary.  NUM_ANAL 
presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst 
coverage. LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value one for loss year and zero otherwise. SIZE stands 
for firm’s size and is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, while LVRGE presents firm 
leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Finally, Table 8 reports the regression results for 2-years ahead forecast horizon. Among 
all compensation variables, TOTALPAY and CEO_SENSITIVITY maintain their 
significant impact on forecast errors confirming hypothesis H1 for 2-years ahead 
forecasts (see Models 1, 2 and 7). In the literature (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Jiang 
et al. 2010; Sáenz González and García-Meca 2014) is reported that CEOs with a greater 
sensitivity to changes in firm’s value might have a greater motivation to engage in 
earnings manipulation. Our results show that such actions would increase analysts’ 
forecast complexity and thus, their forecast errors.  
In line with the results in Model (7) in Table (7), the negative coefficient of 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS provides further evidence for the “interest alignment” 
effect of the stock options for longer-term forecasts. This finding is at odds with previous 
evidence that support the forecast complexity hypothesis for options (Kanagaretnam et al. 
2012). Therefore, our results suggest that the sign of the above relationship varies across 
different forecasting horizons. Furthermore, the insignificant coefficients of restricted 
stock holdings and stock ownership for 2-years ahead forecasts imply that the “interest 
alignment” effect of stock holdings is less pronounced for longer-term forecasts. 
Overall, our results complement Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) suggesting that CEO option 
compensation indeed affects analysts’ forecasts. However, we extend their findings 
showing that CEOs do not affect analysts’ forecasts only through their option holdings, 
but total compensation, cash bonus, restricted stock holdings and ownership are also 
significant determinants of earnings forecast errors. Finally, we extend Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2012) research suggesting that these effects vary for longer forecast horizon. 
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Table 8: The impact of CEO compensation on analysts’ forecast errors for 2-years 
ahead forecasts. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
TOTALPAY -0.005***      -0.005*** 
 (0.001)      (0.001) 
BONUS  -0.019     0.103 
  (0.044)     (0.073) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY  0.003***    0.003*** 
   (0.001)    (0.001) 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS   -0.000   -0.002* 
    (0.001)   (0.001) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS    -0.017  -0.019 
     (0.011)  (0.012) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP     -0.001 -0.008 
      (0.007) (0.007) 
NUM_ANAL 0.080 0.077 0.066 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.068 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) 
LOSS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.01) (0.011) (0.010) 
Constant -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 
R-squared 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.596 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the association between analyst forecast errors and CEO 
compensation for 2-years ahead forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
FE, which stands for analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued 
by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and year t, scaled with the 
stock price of the previous year t-1. CEO compensation includes the following variables: TOTALPAY that 
stands for CEO total compensation as measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, stock 
option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan payouts and other annual compensation as 
reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. BONUS presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the 
ratio of CEO bonus over CEO salary. CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO 
total compensation that would be resulted from one percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity. 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-the-money options, RESTRICTED_STOCKS 
stands for the value of restricted stock holdings and STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership 
measured by the ratio of the value of CEO stock grants excluding options over CEO salary.  NUM_ANAL 
presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst 
coverage. LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value one for loss year and zero otherwise. SIZE stands 
for firm’s size and is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, while LVRGE presents firm 
leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Concerning the impact of other firm-specific variables, the greater the number of analysts 
following a firm the higher the current year forecast errors. The greater number of analysts 
following a firm might signal higher competition among the analysts who strive for better 
commission fees and management relations leading them to issue less accurate forecasts 
(Das et al. 1998; Gu and Wu 2003).  We also control for firm size, leverage and firms in 
loss. SIZE has a positive impact on forecast error in all specifications at 1% level, 
insinuating that analysts issue earnings forecasts with greater errors for larger firms. The 
insignificant coefficient of LVRGE shows that analysts’ forecasts are not affected by 
firm’s leverage ratio. Note that the coefficient of the LOSS is negative (positive) for 
current year (1-year ahead) forecasts, indicating that for longer-term forecasts, forecast 
errors are greater for firms with losses than for firms without losses (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003; Mande and Son 2012). 
 
2.4.2. Earnings management, CEO compensation and analysts’ forecast errors 
One of the motivations of our analysis is to examine whether CEO compensation would 
encourage executives to engage in financial misreporting (Greenspan 2002; Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 
2007), and this in turn, would affect analysts’ forecasts since they use firms’ financial 
reports to extract information. Furthermore, existing literature argues that earnings 
management can affect analysts’ forecasts (Bradshaw et al. 2001; Matsumoto 2002; 
Cohen and Lys 2003; Ahmed et al. 2005;  Brown and Caylor 2005; Burgstahler and 
Eames 2006; Mande and Son 2012). For this reason, we account for earnings management 
employing firms’ discretionary accruals. Most importantly, we include the interaction 
terms between discretionary accruals and indicators of CEO compensation to examine 
whether behind earnings management lay CEOs with specific forms of compensation 
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(Frankforter et al. 2000; Dunn 2004; Combs et al. 2007) who would further undermine 
analysts’ forecasts. 
Starting from the current year forecasts, Table 9 presents estimation results for the model 
including the impact of discretionary accruals. Apparently, analysts’ forecast errors are 
higher for firms that engage in earnings management. This is supported by the positive 
and 1% significant coefficient of DA in most specifications. Turning to the interaction 
terms between discretionary accruals and CEO compensation, DA×TOTALPAY is 
insignificant suggesting that total compensation does not motivate CEOs to engage in 
earnings management and this, in turn, does not affect analysts’ forecasts. However, when 
it comes to the interaction between bonus and discretionary accruals, results reveal 
different relation. CEOs with higher cash bonus augment the positive impact of DA on 
analysts’ forecast errors at 1% level confirming hypothesis H2 (see Model 3 and Model 
8). Cash bonus compensation directly links executives’ compensation to earnings. 
Therefore, CEOs with greater bonus might have higher incentives to engage in financial 
misreporting (Efendi et al. 2007) augmenting the positive relationship between analysts’ 
forecast errors and discretionary accruals. 
The interaction term DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY carries a negative coefficient at 1% level 
(see Model 4 and Model 8) indicating that CEO sensitivity to changes in firm’s value 
curbs the positive impact of DA on forecast errors. Similarly, the interaction terms 
DA×IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS in Model (8), DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS in 
Model (6) and DA×STOCK_OWNERSHIP in Models (7) and (8) are of a negative sign 
at 5% level or better. Thus, this analysis concludes that when CEOs are more sensitive to 
changes in firm’s value and/or their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders, 
the impact of earnings management on analysts’ forecasts will be less pronounced. Given 
these results, we accept hypothesis H2 for the current year forecasts. 
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Table 9: The impact of earnings management, CEO compensation and their interactions for current year forecast 
errors. 
VARIABLES  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
DA 0.015*** -0.012 0.016*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.032 
 (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.034) 
DAXTOTALPAY  0.371      -0.077 
  (0.307)      (0.404) 
TOTALPAY  -0.075***      -0.081*** 
  (0.006)      (0.006) 
DAXBONUS   4.470***     4.290*** 
   (0.813)     (0.838) 
BONUS   6.121***     5.901*** 
   (1.105)     (1.139) 
DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY    -4.456***    -4.429** 
    (1.328)    (1.861) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY    0.001***    0.002*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
DA× IN_THE_MONEY_ OPTIONS    -0.445   -2.910*** 
     (0.507)   (0.866) 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS     -0.003   -0.005*** 
     (0.003)   (0.001) 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS      -2.496**  -0.996 
      (1.013)  (12.089) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS      -0.026***  -0.013 
      (0.009)  (0.010) 
DA×STOCK_OWNERSHIP       -0.343** -0.371** 
       (0.162) (0.165) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP       0.003 -0.009*** 
       (0.003) (0.003) 
NUM_ANAL 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
LOSS -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
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VARIABLES  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020) (0.028) 
Constant -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 161,374 161,374 161,374 161,374 161,374 161,374 161,374 161,374 
R-squared 0.534 0.535 0.534 0.534 0.534 0.534 0.534 0.535 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the impact of earnings management on the association between analyst forecast errors and CEO 
compensation for current year forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is FE, which stands for analyst forecast error 
and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and 
year t, scaled with the stock price of the previous year t-1. DA stands for firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation and presents the use of 
discretionary accruals. CEO compensation includes the following variables: TOTALPAY that stands for CEO total compensation as measured by the 
natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, stock option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan payouts and other annual compensation 
as reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. BONUS presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the ratio of CEO bonus over CEO salary. 
CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO total compensation that would be resulted from one percentage point increase in the 
value of firm’s equity. IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-the-money options, RESTRICTED_STOCKS stands for the value 
of restricted stock holdings and STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership measured by the ratio of the value of CEO stock grants excluding 
options over CEO salary.  DA×TOTALPAY, DA×BONUS, DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY, DA×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS, and DA×STOCK_OWENSHIP are the interaction terms between DA and CEO compensation. NUM_ANAL presents 
the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one for loss year and zero otherwise. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, while LVRGE presents 
firm leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Next, Table 10 presents estimation results for 1-year ahead forecast horizon. The negative 
and significant at 1% level coefficients of DA×TOTALPAY in Models (2) and (8) show 
that for longer-term forecast horizon, higher CEO compensation can curb the impact of 
earnings management on analysts’ forecasts. Similarly, higher CEO sensitivity to changes 
in firm’s value and greater stock ownership mitigate the impact of DA on analysts’ 
forecasts at 1% level in Model (8). Conversely, CEOs who enjoy greater cash bonus 
augment the above effect leading to higher forecast errors.  
Although the interaction term DA×IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS has a positive sign in 
Model (5), this impact turns insignificant in Model (8). Interestingly, 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS carries a positive sign in Model (8) suggesting that CEOs 
with greater restricted stock holdings augment the impact of earnings management on 
analysts for 1-year ahead forecasts. It could be the case that, CEOs engage in earnings 
management to meet the performance requirements put on their restricted stocks for the 
next year and this, in turn, can increase forecast errors for analysts. Therefore, estimation 
results provide strong evidence to accept hypothesis H2 for 1-year ahead forecasts as well. 
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Table 10: The impact of earnings management, CEO compensation and their interactions for 1-year ahead forecast 
errors. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
DA -0.011 0.480*** -0.011 0.014 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.873*** 
 (0.018) (0.096) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.138) 
DAXTOTALPAY  -0.648***      -1.055*** 
  (0.136)      (0.171) 
TOTALPAY  -0.045***      -0.048*** 
  (0.002)      (0.002) 
DAXBONUS   3.309***     2.975*** 
   (0.273)     (0.290) 
BONUS   4.398***     3.994*** 
   (0.287)     (0.297) 
DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY    -1.027    -3.491*** 
    (0.612)    (0.683) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY    -0.000    0.003*** 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
DA× IN_THE_MONEY_ OPTIONS    9.644***   -3.839 
     (1.404)   (4.739) 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS     0.014***   -0.007 
     (0.002)   (0.008) 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS      1.971  1.329*** 
      (2.002)  (0.431) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS      0.001  0.059** 
      (0.014)  (0.026) 
DA×STOCK_OWNERSHIP       -0.556 -0.818** 
       (0.353) (0.400) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP       -0.016** -0.087*** 
       (0.008) (0.011) 
NUM_ANAL -0.079 -0.047 -0.083 -0.077 -0.078 -0.079 -0.080 -0.068 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) 
LOSS 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
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VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.069*** -0.043*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.041*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
         
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 156,991 156,991 156,991 156,991 156,991 156,991 156,991 156,991 
R-squared 0.570 0.575 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.576 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the impact of earnings management on the association between analyst forecast errors and CEO 
compensation for 1-year ahead forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is FE, which stands for analyst forecast error 
and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and 
year t, scaled with the stock price of the previous year t-1. DA stands for firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation and presents the use of 
discretionary accruals. CEO compensation includes the following variables: TOTALPAY that stands for CEO total compensation as measured by the 
natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, stock option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan payouts and other annual compensation 
as reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. BONUS presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the ratio of CEO bonus over CEO salary. 
CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO total compensation that would be resulted from one percentage point increase in the 
value of firm’s equity. IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-the-money options, RESTRICTED_STOCKS stands for the value 
of restricted stock holdings and STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership measured by the ratio of the value of CEO stock grants excluding 
options over CEO salary.  DA×TOTALPAY, DA×BONUS, DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY, DA×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS, and DA×STOCK_OWENSHIP are the interaction terms between DA and CEO compensation. NUM_ANAL presents 
the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one for loss year and zero otherwise. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets, while LVRGE presents 
firm leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Finally, for 2-years ahead forecasts one can notice that while the impact of DA on analysts’ 
forecasts is almost insignificant in all specifications, the interaction terms between CEO 
compensation and DA are of importance (see Table 11).   In line with the findings for 
current year forecasts, the interaction terms DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY, 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS and DA×STOCK_OWNERSHIP are of a negative sign 
indicating that for firms that CEOs have such compensation, the impact of earnings 
management on forecast errors is less pronounced. Contrary, the bonus compensation 
appears to enhance the positive effect of DA on forecast errors at 1% level in Model (8). 
Overall, the findings of this analysis document an interaction channel between CEO 
compensation and earnings management that can affect analysts’ forecast errors.  
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Table 11: The impact of earnings management, CEO compensation and their interactions for 2-year ahead 
forecast errors. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
DA 0.009 0.039 0.009 0.027* 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.082 
 (0.012) (0.100) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.101) 
DAXTOTALPAY  -0.037      -0.071 
  (0.133)      (0.127) 
TOTALPAY  -0.005***      -0.005*** 
  (0.001)      (0.001) 
DAXBONUS   -7.005     0.439*** 
   (9.436)     (0.118) 
BONUS   -9.542     5.972*** 
   (12.828)     (1.620) 
DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY    -9.100    -7.865* 
    (5.919)    (4.757) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY    0.001*    0.002** 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
DA×IN_THE_MONEY_ OPTIONS    -1.219   -0.912 
     (1.480)   (2.064) 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS     -0.002   -0.003 
     (0.002)   (0.004) 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS      -4.267*  -3.169 
      (2.403)  (2.675) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS      -0.045*  -0.025 
      (0.024)  (0.020) 
DA×STOCK_OWENERSHIP       -8.779** -7.539*** 
       (3.815) (1.949) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP       -0.017 -0.102*** 
       (0.011) (0.027) 
NUM_ANAL 0.079 0.082 0.079 0.073 0.079 0.080 0.077 0.072 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) 
LOSS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
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VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
Time Effects YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 51,488 51,488 51,488 51,488 51,488 51,488 51,488 51,488 
R-squared 0.609 0.610 0.609 0.610 0.609 0.610 0.610 0.611 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the impact of earnings management on the association between analyst forecast errors and CEO 
compensation for 2-years ahead forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is FE, which stands for analyst forecast 
error and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form 
firm j and year t, scaled with the stock price of the previous year t-1. DA stands for firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation and presents the 
use of discretionary accruals. CEO compensation includes the following variables: TOTALPAY that stands for CEO total compensation as 
measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, stock option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan payouts and other 
annual compensation as reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. BONUS presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the ratio of CEO 
bonus over CEO salary. CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO total compensation that would be resulted from one 
percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity. IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-the-money options, 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS stands for the value of restricted stock holdings and STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership measured 
by the ratio of the value of CEO stock grants excluding options over CEO salary.  DA×TOTALPAY, DA×BONUS, DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY, 
DA×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS and DA×STOCK_OWENSHIP are the interaction terms between DA and 
CEO compensation. NUM_ANAL presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. 
LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value one for loss year and zero otherwise. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the natural 
logarithm of firm’s total assets, while LVRGE presents firm leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4.3.  The association between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and analysts’ 
characteristics 
Tables 12-14 present the panel fixed effects regressions where the impact of analysts’ 
characteristics is the main focus. We account for two different measures of analyst 
experience, the firm-specific experience and the general experience. Furthermore, we 
hypothesize that analysts’ forecast frequency, revision period and the brokerage size are 
related to their forecast errors. Results are reported for the current year, 1-year and 2-
years ahead forecasts respectively.  
For the current year, firm-specific experience exerts a positive impact on forecast errors 
at 1% level (see Table 12). A one percentage point increase in analysts’ firm-specific 
experience would increase forecast errors by 0.045 percentage.  Our findings could be 
compared with Clarke and Subramanian (2006) who argue that less experienced analysts 
are more likely to be fired for inaccurate earnings forecasts compared to more experienced 
analysts. According to the authors, less experienced analysts might put greater effort in 
forecasting and thus, are associated with lower forecast errors. Conversely, we find that 
forecast errors decrease with forecast frequency at 5% level in the Model (3), while the 
impact turns insignificant when we consider the full Models (6) and (7). Finally, results 
suggest that forecast errors increase with forecast revisions at 1% level, whereas the 
impact of broker’s size is insignificant. These results indicate that higher forecast 
frequency corrects analysts’ optimism lowering forecast errors. On the contrary, greater 
the number of days remained until the forecast period ends (FOR_REV), higher the 
forecast errors.  
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Table 12: The impact of analysts’ characteristics on earnings forecast error for 
current year forecasts. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
FIRM_EXP 0.045***     0.042***  
 (0.009)     (0.009)  
GEN_EXP  0.015     0.012 
  (0.013)     (0.013) 
FOR_FREQ   -0.014**   -0.009 -0.007 
   (0.006)   (0.006) (0.006) 
FOR_REV    0.014***  0.010*** 0.012*** 
    (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
BROKERAGE    -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 
     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
NUM_ANAL 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
LOSS -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Time Effects YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 191,518 
R-squared 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.524 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the association between analysts’ forecast errors and 
analysts’ characteristics for current year forecast. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is FE, which stands for analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference between the 
last forecast issued by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and 
year t, scaled with the stock price of the previous year t-1. The explanatory variables are the natural 
logarithm of the following analysts’ characteristics: GEN_EXP presents the general experience of 
analyst and is calculated as the total number of years that an analyst i issue earnings forecasts. 
FIRM_EXP is the analyst firm-specific experience and is measured as the number of years that analyst 
i following firm j.  FOR_FREQ presents analyst forecast frequency and is the number of earnings 
forecasts by analyst i for firm j during year t.  FOR_REV stands for analyst forecast horizon and is 
calculated as the number of days remained until the forecast period ends since the last forecast revision 
issued by analyst i for firm j and year t. Finally, BROKERAGE presents the size of the broker that 
employs analyst i and is calculated as the number of analysts hired by the analyst’s i broker company 
during year t. NUM_ANAL presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t and 
serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the natural 
logarithm of firm’s total assets. Finally, LVRGE presents firm leverage and is calculated as the ratio 
of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
When it comes to the longer-term forecast horizon, Table 13 shows that both general and 
firm-specific analysts’ experience assert a positive and 1% level significant impact on 
forecast errors for 1-year ahead forecast horizon. A one percentage increase in analysts’ 
firm-specific (general) experience would increase forecast errors by 0.188 percentage 
70 
 
(0.139 percentage) in 1-year-ahead forecasts (see Models 6 and 7). The effect of forecast 
frequency on analysts’ forecast errors is negative and significant at 1% level. Note, though, 
that there is some variability in the results across forecast horizons.  
Specifically, while the impact of FOR_FREQ is insignificant for the current year (see 
Models 6 and 7 in Table 12), a one percent increase in the number of earnings forecasts 
would decrease forecast errors by 0.073 percentage on average in 1-year ahead (see 
Models 6 and 7 in Table 13). Apparently, more frequent earnings forecasts are associated 
with lower forecast errors, in particular in one year ahead.  Interestingly, one percent 
increase in the number of days remained until the forecast period ends (FOR_REV) 
decreases analysts’ forecast errors by 0.023 percentage. It could be the case that, for 
longer-term forecast horizons, the greater revision period provides analysts with further 
opportunities of correcting their bias. 13 
Finally, Table 14 presents results for 2-years ahead earnings forecasts. For longer-term 
forecasts, analysts’ experience appears to mitigate their errors, albeit the relationship is 
insignificant is all models. Among all analysts’ characteristics variables, only forecast 
revision exerts a positive impact on analysts’ forecasts errors at 5% level. Overall, these 
findings show that the impact of analysts’ characteristics on the forecast errors varies 
across forecast horizons, in terms of both magnitude and sign, being more pronounced 
for 1-year ahead. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 We have to note that the variable “forecast revision” of an earnings forecast issued by analysts i for firm 
j and year t is different for the current, 1-year ahead and 2-years ahead forecast horizons. The first one is a 
variable that measures the number of days that mediate until the forecast period end for the specific earnings 
forecast, while the second one presents the different forecast windows that we examine.  
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Table 13: The impact of analysts’ characteristics on earnings forecast error for 1-
year ahead forecasts. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
FIRM_EXP 0.161***     0.188***  
 (0.028)     (0.028)  
GEN_EXP  0.116***     0.139*** 
  (0.037)     (0.037) 
FOR_FREQ   -0.061***   -0.078*** -0.068*** 
   (0.015)   (0.015) (0.015) 
FOR_REV    -0.023***  -0.023*** -0.023*** 
    (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
BROKERAGE    0.005 0.004 0.006 
     (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
NUM_ANAL -0.069 -0.072 -0.069 -0.073 -0.076 -0.054 -0.059 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
LOSS 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.064*** -0.068*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
        
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 186,572 
R-squared 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 0.558 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the association between analysts’ forecast errors and 
analysts’ characteristics for 1-year ahead forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The 
dependent variable is FE, which stands for analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference 
between the last forecast issued by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning 
form firm j and year t, scaled with the stock price of the previous year t-1. The explanatory variables 
are the natural logarithm of the following analysts’ characteristics: GEN_EXP presents the general 
experience of analyst and is calculated as the total number of years that an analyst i issue earnings 
forecasts. FIRM_EXP is the analyst firm-specific experience and is measured as the number of years 
that analyst i following firm j.  FOR_FREQ presents analyst forecast frequency and is the number 
of earnings forecasts by analyst i for firm j during year t.  FOR_REV stands for analyst forecast 
horizon and is calculated as the number of days remained until the forecast period ends since the last 
forecast revision issued by analyst i for firm j and year t. Finally, BROKERAGE presents the size 
of the broker that employs analyst i and is calculated as the number of analysts hired by the analyst’s 
i broker company during year t. NUM_ANAL presents the number of distinct analysts following 
firm j during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is 
measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Finally, LVRGE presents firm leverage and 
is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: The impact of analysts’ characteristics on earnings forecast error for 
2-years ahead forecasts. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
FIRM_EXP -0.006     -0.008  
 (0.021)     (0.021)  
GEN_EXP  -0.037     -0.040 
  (0.029)     (0.029) 
FOR_FREQ   0.003   0.003 0.004 
   (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011) 
FOR_REV    0.015**  0.015** 0.015** 
    (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
BROKERAGE    0.010 0.009 0.010 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
NUM_ANAL 0.076 0.074 0.076 0.073 0.078 0.073 0.071 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
LOSS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 60,659 
R-squared 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.595 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the association between analysts’ forecast errors and analysts’ 
characteristics for 2-years ahead forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is FE, 
which stands for analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued by 
analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and year t, scaled with the stock 
price of the previous year t-1. The explanatory variables are the natural logarithm of the following analysts’ 
characteristics: GEN_EXP presents the general experience of analyst and is calculated as the total number of 
years that an analyst i issue earnings forecasts. FIRM_EXP is the analyst firm-specific experience and is 
measured as the number of years that analyst i following firm j.  FOR_FREQ presents analyst forecast 
frequency and is the number of earnings forecasts by analyst i for firm j during year t.  FOR_REV stands for 
analyst forecast horizon and is calculated as the number of days remained until the forecast period ends since 
the last forecast revision issued by analyst i for firm j and year t. Finally, BROKERAGE presents the size of 
the broker that employs analyst i and is calculated as the number of analysts hired by the analyst’s i broker 
company during year t. NUM_ANAL presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j during year t 
and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the natural logarithm 
of firm’s total assets. Finally, LVRGE presents firm leverage and is calculated as the ratio of firm long-term 
debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4.4. The interaction between analysts’ characteristics and CEO compensation 
In the previous sections (see sections 2.4.1. and 2.4.3.), we show that the individual 
impact of both CEO compensation and analysts’ characteristics are of importance for 
earnings forecasts. It might be the case that there are inter-linkages between the two that 
could amplify their impact on forecast errors. For example, the impact of CEO 
compensation on analysts’ forecasts could vary with differences in analysts’ 
characteristics. In this stage, we also account for CEO power including indicators of CEO-
Director duality (CEO_DIR) and the ranking of the CEO among the executives in the 
firm (CEO_RANK). We employ these measures to account for any variability in analysts’ 
forecast errors that might be driven by the opportunistic behaviour of powerful CEOs and 
is not captured by the CEO compensation variables. 
The estimated results for the interaction between CEO compensation and analysts’ 
characteristics for the current year, 1-year and 2-years ahead forecasts are presented in 
Table 15. In this analysis, we focus on firm-specific experience. Interestingly, CEO 
compensation, such as TOTALPAY, BONUS, CEO_SENSITIVITY and 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP, when interact with analysts’ experience correct for optimism in 
earnings forecasts especially for the current year (see the negative coefficients of the 
interaction variables in Table 15). These results indicate that analysts with greater firm 
experience issue less optimistic forecasts for firms where CEOs enjoy higher 
compensation, cash bonus, are more sensitive to changes in firm’s value and have greater 
ownership. Conversely, the interaction term between analysts’ experience and restricted 
stock holdings is positive and significant across all forecast horizons, insinuating that for 
firms where CEOs hold substantially higher restricted stocks would signal to analysts’ to 
present higher optimism. This evidence shows the existence of a trade-off between the 
various CEO compensation forms and analysts’ behaviour. From the one hand, restricted 
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stock holdings curb analysts’ forecast errors as presented by the negative coefficient of 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS in Table 15, but on the other hand, analysts with greater firm 
experience issue more optimistic forecasts when CEOs restricted stock holdings increases 
(see EXP×RESTRICTED_STOCKS in Table 15).  
Overall, these results reveal that there might be channels of interaction between CEOs 
and analysts’ confirming hypothesis H3. It is also of interest that such channels are 
stronger in 1-year ahead forecasts, compared to the current year forecasts where a 
correction in optimism is reported as some actual data regarding firm’s earnings become 
available. 
Next, we report panel regressions, focusing on the frequency of forecasts (FOR_FREQ). 
Results show that the higher the forecast frequency of an analyst for a specific firm, the 
lower the forecast error, in particular for the current year (see the individual impact of 
FOR_FREQ in Table 15). On the other side, the interactions FOR_FREQ×TOTALPAY, 
FOR_FREQ×BONUS and FOR_FREQ×STOCK_OWNERSHIP are positive and highly 
significant for the current year forecasts. These results imply that when CEOs enjoy 
higher compensation, bonus and hold greater stock ownership, an increase in the forecast 
frequency can augment analysts’ forecast optimism. However, it is not the same story 
when there is a strong CEO sensitivity, as the interaction term 
FOR_FREQ×CEO_SENSITIVITY reveals that analysts correct their optimism. Once 
again, we show that there is a channel on operation between CEOs and analysts when it 
matters most for the formers, with the latter willing to revise frequently their forecasts in 
a window dressing fashion. 
Finally, we also report the estimation results for the interactions between analysts’ 
forecast revisions, measured as the number of days remained until the forecast period 
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ends since the last forecast revision (FOR_REV) and CEO compensation. The individual 
impact of FOR_REV on forecast errors is positive and significant at 1% level for current 
and 2-year ahead forecasts. The interactions between FOR_REV – CEO total 
compensation, in-the-money options and restricted stock holdings reduce forecast errors 
for the current year, thus correcting for the individual positive effect of FOR_REV. On 
the other hand, the interaction coefficient of FOR_REV×CEO_SENSITIVITY for the 
current year forecasts is positive at 5% significance level. This result implies that CEO 
sensitivity to changes in firm’s value would increase analysts’ forecast errors at the 
expense of forecast accuracy when the number of days remained until the forecast period 
ends is greater. Finally, for the 2-years ahead forecasts, CEOs with higher ownership 
appear to mitigate the impact of forecast revision on analysts’ forecast at 5% level. 
One can notice that the inclusion of the CEO power measures has not changed the impact 
of the CEO compensation on analysts’ forecasts, with CEO_DIR being positive and 
significant in all specifications at 5% level or better. This finding implies that it is of 
importance to separate the role of the CEO and other top executives to enhance board 
effectiveness. The CEO – Director duality could reduce the board independence and 
impair the monitoring of the CEO. This in turn, allows the CEO to serve self-interests 
(Frankforter et al. 2000; Dunn 2004; Combs et al. 2007). CEO driven by self-interests 
lean towards practices of financial misreporting and conceal bad news from market 
participants (Graham et al. 2005; Kothari et al. 2009; Ball 2009). Such practices could 
impede the information disclosure to analysts and thus, increase forecast errors 
(Lustgarten and Mande 1995). 
Overall, we reveal evidence supporting hypothesis H3 according to which the interaction 
between CEOs and analysts should be examined as it assists our understanding of how 
analysts form their forecasts.  
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Table 15: The interaction effects between CEO compensation and analysts’ 
characteristics on analysts’ forecast errors for the current, 1-year and 2-years 
ahead forecasts. 
VARIABLES  Current year 
forecast 
1-year ahead 
forecast 
2-years ahead 
forecast 
    
FIRM_EPX×TOTALPAY -1.275*** -0.817*** -0.031 
 (0.473) (0.149) (0.108) 
FIRM_EPX×BONUS -6.622* -2.134 4.436 
 (3.748) (9.449) (3.251) 
FIRM_EPX ×CEO_SENSITIVITY -3.408* 1.915 -4.221 
 (2.069) (6.483) (4.929) 
FIRM_EXP×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MON 0.037 -0.107 0.011 
 (0.033) (0.084) (0.307) 
FIRM_EXP×RESTRICTED_STOCKS 7.657*** 1.959*** 7.257** 
 (1.732) (0.615) (2.910) 
FIRM_EXP×STOCK_OWNERSHIP -0.615*** -1.054*** -0.341 
 (0.100) (0.166) (0.212) 
    
FOR_FREQ×TOTALPAY 1.978*** 0.254* 0.138 
 (0.630) (0.151) (0.103) 
FOR_FREQ×BONUS 1.599*** -5.357 1.438 
 (0.583) (12.113) (2.733) 
FOR_FREQ×CEO_SENSITIVITY -3.423 -1.833*** -0.309 
 (2.898) (0.695) (4.562) 
FOR_FREQ×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MON -0.033 0.064 -0.166 
 (0.037) (0.096) (0.351) 
FOR_FREQ×RESTRICTED_STOCKS -2.052* 1.486 -2.954* 
 (1.057) (2.879) (1.753) 
FOR_FREQ×STOCK_OWNERSHIP 0.156*** -0.023 0.191 
 (0.046) (0.073) (0.124) 
    
FOR_REV×TOTALPAY -1.860*** -0.025 -0.280*** 
 (0.303) (0.085) (0.076) 
FOR_REV×BONUS -1.232 -6.199 1.267 
 (2.817) (4.593) (3.177) 
FOR_REV×CEO_SENSITIVITY 3.165** -2.852 3.739 
 (1.339) (3.865) (3.075) 
FOR_REV×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MON -0.033** 0.058 -0.211 
 (0.015) (0.039) (0.314) 
FOR_REV×RESTRICTED_STOCKS -0.535* 1.744 0.991 
 (0.322) (1.132) (1.160) 
FOR_REV×STOCK_OWNERSHIP 0.010 0.063 -0.243** 
 (0.027) (0.056) (0.102) 
    
DA×TOTALPAY -0.092 -1.055*** -0.074 
 (0.407) (0.171) (0.128) 
TOTALPAY -0.025 -0.046*** 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.003) 
DA×BONUS 0.429*** 2.978*** 5.089*** 
 (0.084) (0.249) (0.028) 
BONUS 0.569*** 4.080*** 6.821*** 
 (0.164) (0.293) (1.727) 
DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY -4.455** -3.517*** -7.517 
 (1.886) (0.687) (4.868) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY 0.002** 0.008*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
DA×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY -2.781*** -5.303 -0.988 
 (0.964) (5.580) (3.383) 
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VARIABLES  Current year 
forecast 
1-year ahead 
forecast 
2-years ahead 
forecast 
    
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS -0.003* -0.012 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.018) 
DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS -8.355*** -4.614 -4.898 
 (2.477) (6.840) (3.103) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS -0.141*** -0.445** -0.149** 
 (0.043) (0.181) (0.075) 
DA×STOCK_OWNERSHIP -2.581*** -6.332*** -8.621*** 
 (0.448) (1.050) (2.125) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP -0.008** -0.096*** -0.101*** 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.027) 
DA 0.033 0.871*** 0.084 
 (0.035) (0.139) (0.102) 
CEO_RANK 0.002 -0.144*** 0.018 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.023) 
CEO_DIR 0.000** 0.002*** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FIRM_EXP 0.156*** 0.867*** 0.026 
 (0.039) (0.124) (0.095) 
FOR_REV 0.158*** 0.014 0.254*** 
 (0.026) (0.073) (0.068) 
FOR_FREQ -0.187*** -0.283** -0.106 
 (0.053) (0.129) (0.094) 
BROKERAGE -0.003 -0.008 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.012) 
NUM_ANAL 0.067*** -0.027 0.071 
 (0.019) (0.058) (0.051) 
LOSS -0.001*** 0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.011*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.012*** -0.036*** -0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
    
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 161,374 156,991 51,488 
R-squared 0.537 0.577 0.612 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the interaction effects of CEO compensation and analysts’ 
characteristics on analysts’ forecast errors for the current, 1-year and 2-years ahead forecasts. We control 
for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is FE, which stands for analyst forecast error and is 
measured as the difference between the last forecast issued by analyst i for firm j and year t minus the actual 
reported earning form firm j and year t, scaled with the stock price of the previous year t-1. The explanatory 
variables are the natural logarithm of the following analysts’ characteristics: GEN_EXP presents the 
general experience of analyst and is calculated as the total number of years that an analyst i issue earnings 
forecasts. FIRM_EXP is the analyst firm-specific experience and is measured as the number of years that 
analyst i following firm j.  FOR_FREQ presents analyst forecast frequency and is the number of earnings 
forecasts by analyst i for firm j during year t.  FOR_REV stands for analyst forecast horizon and is 
calculated as the number of days remained until the forecast period ends since the last forecast revision 
issued by analyst i for firm j and year t. Finally, BROKERAGE presents the size of the broker that employs 
analyst i and is calculated as the number of analysts hired by the analyst’s i broker company during year t. 
CEO compensation includes the following variables: TOTALPAY that stands for CEO total compensation 
as measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of cash pay, stock option grants, restricted stock grants 
long-term incentive plan payouts and other annual compensation as reported in EXECUCOMP under the 
variable TDC1. BONUS presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the ratio of CEO bonus over CEO salary. 
CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO total compensation that would be resulted 
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from one percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity. IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents 
the value of CEO in-the-money options, RESTRICTED_STOCKS stands for the value of restricted stock 
holdings and STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership measured by the ratio of the value of 
CEO stock grants excluding options over CEO salary.  FIRM_EPX×TOTALPAY, FIRM_EPX×BONUS, 
FIRM_EPX×CEO_SENSITIVITY, FIRM_EXP×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, 
EXP×RESTRICTED_STOCKS, EXP×STOCK_OWNERSHIP are the interactions between analysts’ 
experience and CEO compensation. FOR_FREQ×TOTALPAY, FOR_FREQ×BONUS, 
FOR_FREQ×CEO_SENSITIVITY, FOR_FREQ×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, 
FOR_FREQ×RESTRICTED_STOCKS, FOR_FREQ×STOCK_OWNERSHIP stands for the interactions 
between analysts’ forecast frequency (FOR_FREQ) and CEO compensation. FOR_REV×TOTALPAY, 
FOR_REV×BONUS, FOR_REV×CEO_SENSITIVITY, FOR_REV×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, 
FOR_REV×RESTRICTED_STOCKS, FOR_REV×STOCK_OWNERSHIP present the interactions 
between analysts’ forecast revision (FOR_REV) and CEO compensation.  DA×TOTALPAY, DA×BONUS, 
DA×CEO_SENSITIVITY, DA×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, DA×RESTRICTED_STOCKS and 
DA×STOCK_OWENSHIP are the interaction terms between DA and CEO compensation.  CEO_RANK 
stands for CEO ranking among the executives in the firm based on the salary and bonus compensations and 
CEO_DIR is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the CEO occupies the role of the director on 
the board, and zero otherwise. NUM_ANAL presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j 
during year t and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Finally, LVRGE presents firm leverage and is calculated as the ratio 
of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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2.4.5.  The impact of regulation changes on analysts’ forecasts:  Global Analyst 
Research Statement and Dodd-Frank Act 
Both analysts and CEOs operate in regulated market conditions. Since regulations might 
affect analysts’ forecasts, we shall take into account such conditions. For this reason, we 
extend our analysis accounting for the impact of the Global Analyst Research Statement 
(GS) and Dodd-Frank Act (DF) on the relation between analysts’ forecasts and analysts’ 
characteristics/CEO compensation. This research is imperative as it sheds light on an 
issue of great importance for both regulators and market participants: To what extent 
regulations can curb or augment the impact of CEO compensation and analysts’-specific 
characteristics on the forecasting ability of the latter?  
Table 16 presents panel regression results for the current year, 1-year and 2-years ahead 
forecasts. GS and DF are indicator variables that take the value one following the 
implementation of the GS and DF regulations respectively, and 0 otherwise. The 
individual impact of analysts’ and CEO compensation variables present the relationship 
between these variables and analysts’ forecast errors pre-GS and pre-DF period. Whereas, 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between analysts’ characteristics – GS and CEO 
compensation – DF present the impact of the regulations on the underlying relationships. 
Therefore, if the interaction coefficients are greater (less) than zero, then the relation 
between forecast errors and analysts’ characteristics/CEO compensation has increased 
(decreased) following GS and DF regulations respectively.   
One can observe that GS variable carries a negative sign as predicted for the current year 
forecasts at 1% level suggesting that GS has indeed reduced analysts’ forecast errors. 
Conversely, analysts’ forecast errors are positively related to DF regulation for the current 
year and negatively related for 1-year ahead at 1% level. Thus, DF augments analysts’ 
errors for current year forecasts, while it mitigates forecast errors for 1-year ahead. 
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Furthermore, while the individual impact of analysts’ experience on forecast error is 
positive, the interaction term GS×FIRM_EXP is negative and significant at 1% and 5% 
level for current and 1-year ahead forecasts respectively.  These results imply that 
following the GS regulation, more experienced analysts issue more accurate forecasts. In 
opposition, the positive sign of GS×FOR_FREQ suggests that following the GS, greater 
forecast frequency augments analysts’ errors for the current year. The interaction between 
FOR_REV and GS carries a positive sign for 1-year ahead forecasts, indicating that after 
GS, longer forecast revision increases analysts’ errors. Overall, our findings provide 
evidence to accept the H4 hypothesis that the GS regulation would affect the relationship 
between analysts’ errors and their own characteristics, documenting a significant 
correction in the over-prediction of analysts’ earnings forecasts by experienced analysts.  
Next, we turn to the impact of the DF regulation on the relationship between CEO 
compensation and analysts’ forecasts. One can observe that the correction in the analysts’ 
forecasts driven by CEO total compensation and ownership is more pronounced for the 
current year following the DF regulation (see the interaction terms DF×TOTALPAY and 
DF×STOCK_OWNERSHIP in Table 16). Interestingly, post-DF, the results of this 
section document a significant decrease in analysts’ forecast optimism for firms where 
the CEO is more sensitive to changes in firm’s equity value (see the negative coefficients 
for DF×CEO_SENSITIVITY). Note, that the coefficients of the interaction terms 
DF×BONUS and DF×RESTRICTED_STOCKS are positive and significant at 1% level 
for the current year, implying that the DF regulation could augment forecast errors for 
analysts following firms where CEOs enjoy high cash bonus and hold a greater amount 
of restricted stocks. Regarding the 1-year ahead forecasts, while the DF has reduced 
analysts’ optimism, there is a significant enhancement of forecast errors for firms where 
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CEOs enjoy higher compensation, hold a greater amount of restricted stocks and have 
greater ownership.   
Overall, the findings of this section document a significant reduction in analysts’ forecast 
errors post DF for the current year forecasts regarding firms where CEOs enjoy high 
compensation, are more sensitive to stock price changes and have higher ownership. 
Following the DF regulation, analysts issue less optimistic forecasts for the 1-year-ahead 
horizon. Our findings are consistent with hypothesis H4 according to which Dodd-Frank 
Act can affect the relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and CEO compensation. 
The results of this analysis complement earlier findings (Kadan et al. 2006; Ertimur et al. 
2007; Ke and Yu 2007; Chan et al. 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013; Hovakimian and Saenyasiri 
2014) showing that analysts’ forecast errors have declined significantly after the 
implementation of the GS and DF regulations. Our study extends prior research 
suggesting that these regulations do not affect the relationship between forecast errors 
and analysts’ characteristics/CEO compensation in the same way. Variability exists both 
across firms with different forms of CEO compensation and across analysts’ 
characteristics. Therefore, we suggest that it would be prudent for future regulation 
changes to account for analysts’ experience, forecast frequency and revision. Additionally, 
the efficacy of the regulations could be enhanced if policymakers put greater emphasis 
on CEO bonus, CEO sensitivity to changes in firm’s value and CEO restricted stock 
holdings. 
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Table 16: The impact of the Global Analyst Research Statement (GS) and 
Dodd-Frank Act (DF) on analysts’ forecast errors for the current, 1-year and 
2-yeards ahead forecasts. 
VARIABLES Current year 
forecast 
1-year ahead 
forecast 
2-years ahead 
forecast 
    
GS -0.003*** -0.004 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
GS×FIRM_EXP -0.055*** -0.104** -0.039 
 (0.017) (0.052) (0.077) 
GS×FOR_FREQ 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GS×FOR_REV -0.006 0.059*** -0.035 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.027) 
GS×BROKER 0.014 0.022 0.010 
 (0.012) (0.033) (0.039) 
FIRM_EXP 0.090*** 0.313*** 0.028 
 (0.016) (0.048) (0.073) 
FOR_REV 0.016** -0.055*** 0.054** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.026) 
FOR_FREQ -0.073*** -0.083** 0.069 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.058) 
BROKERAGE -0.014 -0.022 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.032) (0.038) 
    
DF 0.003*** -0.020*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
DF×TOTALPAY -0.017** 0.006** -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) 
DF×BONUS 12.191*** -4.1089 4.573 
 (3.981) (12.339) (7.607) 
DF×CEO_SENSITIVITY -0.080** -0.028 -0.115 
 (0.036) (0.112) (0.085) 
DF×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) 
DF×RESTRICTED_STOCKS 0.099*** 0.615*** 0.038 
 (0.029) (0.082) (0.070) 
DF×STOCK_OWNERSHIP -0.041*** 0.055** -0.020 
 (0.008) (0.024) (0.016) 
    
DF×DA 0.004 0.060 0.048 
 (0.015) (0.053) (0.032) 
TOTALPAY -0.084*** -0.054*** -0.006*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
BONUS 0.011 -0.062 0.053 
 (0.039) (0.146) (0.077) 
CEO_SENSITIVITY 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS -0.103*** -0.595*** -0.054 
 (0.030) (0.083) (0.070) 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP 0.010** -0.144*** 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.013) 
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VARIABLES Current year 
forecast 
1-year ahead 
forecast 
2-years ahead 
forecast 
    
CEO_RANK 0.002 -0.130*** 0.018 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.023) 
CEO_DIR 0.000** 0.002*** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DA 0.016*** -0.011 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.019) (0.013) 
NUM_ANAL 0.062*** -0.042 0.067 
 (0.019) (0.058) (0.051) 
LOSS -0.001*** 0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.011*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LVRGE -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.006*** -0.026*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 161,374 156,991 51,488 
R-squared 0.536 0.576 0.611 
Note: The table reports estimation results for the effects of the Global Analyst Research Statement 
(GS) and Dodd-Frank Act (DF) on analysts’ forecast errors for the current, 1-year and 2-years ahead 
forecasts. We control for time and fixed effects. The dependent variable is FE, which stands for 
analyst forecast error and is measured as the difference between the last forecast issued by analyst i 
for firm j and year t minus the actual reported earning form firm j and year t, scaled with the stock 
price of the previous year t-1. GS and DF are indicator variables that take the value one following 
the implementation of GS and DF regulations respectively, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory 
variables are the natural logarithm of the following analysts’ characteristics: GEN_EXP presents the 
general experience of analyst and is calculated as the total number of years that an analyst i issue 
earnings forecasts. FIRM_EXP is the analyst firm-specific experience and is measured as the 
number of years that analyst i following firm j.  FOR_FREQ presents analyst forecast frequency and 
is the number of earnings forecasts by analyst i for firm j during year t.  FOR_REV stands for analyst 
forecast horizon and is calculated as the number of days remained until the forecast period ends 
since the last forecast revision issued by analyst i for firm j and year t. Finally, BROKERAGE 
presents the size of the broker that employs analyst i and is calculated as the number of analysts 
hired by the analyst’s i broker company during year t. CEO compensation includes the following 
variables: TOTALPAY that stands for CEO total compensation as measured by the natural logarithm 
of the sum of cash pay, stock option grants, restricted stock grants long-term incentive plan payouts 
and other annual compensation as reported in EXECUCOMP under the variable TDC1. BONUS 
presents CEO bonus and is calculated as the ratio of CEO bonus over CEO salary. 
CEO_SENSITIVITY captures the share of the hypothetical CEO total compensation that would be 
resulted from one percentage point increase in the value of firm’s equity. 
IN_THE_MONEY_OPTIONS presents the value of CEO in-the-money options, 
RESTRICTED_STOCKS stands for the value of restricted stock holdings and 
STOCK_OWNERSHIP reflects CEO stock ownership measured by the ratio of the value of CEO 
stock grants excluding options over CEO salary.  GS×FIRM_EXP, GS×FOR_FREQ, 
GS×FOR_REV, GS×BROKER are the interactions between GS regulation and analysts’ 
characteristics. DF×TOTALPAY, DF×BONUS, DF×CEO_SENSITIVITY, 
DF×OPTIONS_IN_THE_MONEY, DF×RESTRICTED_STOCKS, DF×STOCK_OWENERSHIP 
stands for the interactions between DF regulation and CEO compensation. GS×DA and DF×DA are 
the interaction terms between GS/DF regulations and DA.  CEO_RANK stands for CEO ranking 
among the executives in the firm based on the salary and bonus compensations and CEO_DIR is an 
indicator variable that takes the value one if the CEO occupies the role of the director on the board, 
and zero otherwise. NUM_ANAL presents the number of distinct analysts following firm j during 
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year t and serves as a proxy for analyst coverage. SIZE stands for firm’s size and is measured as the 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Finally, LVRGE presents firm leverage and is calculated as 
the ratio of firm long-term debt over total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
The results of this chapter show that CEO compensation such as restricted stock holdings 
and stock ownership could correct analysts’ optimism reducing their forecast errors. 
Conversely, CEO cash bonus, sensitivity to changes in firm’s equity value and in-the-
money options could enhance analysts’ optimism. Accounting for different forecast 
horizons, we report stronger impact of CEO compensation for the current year forecasts. 
We further provide evidence of significant interaction effects between CEO 
compensation and earnings management on analysts’ forecasts. This analysis concludes 
that when CEOs are more sensitive to changes in firm’s value and/or their interests are 
aligned with those of the shareholders, the impact of earnings management on analysts’ 
forecasts will be less pronounced. In contrast, CEOs with higher cash bonus augment the 
positive impact of DA on analysts’ forecast errors. 
We also account for the interactions between analysts’ characteristics and CEO 
compensation. Estimation results reveal that there is a channel of interaction between 
CEOs and analysts. It is also of interest that such channels are stronger for 1-year ahead 
forecasts, compared to the current year forecasts. Finally, we show that following the 
Global Analyst Research Statement, experienced analysts are less optimistic, while 
analysts who issue more frequently forecasts exhibit greater errors for current year 
forecasts. Following the Dodd-Frank Act, results for the current year forecasts report a 
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significant reduction in forecast optimism for firms where CEOs have high compensation, 
are more sensitive to changes in firm’s value and have greater ownership.14 
The results of this study could be of high interest to several groups. In particular, the 
findings of this chapter could be of interest in designing compensation packages for the 
executives. Additionally, this study could provide investors with valuable information 
when it comes to the reliability of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Investors take into account 
analysts’ forecasts when they decide on their portfolio allocation. Thus, our findings 
could facilitate investors’ ability to assess the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
This study also provides new evidence to broker houses that employ financial analysts. 
We show that experienced analysts issue more optimistic earnings forecasts and thus, 
brokers might consider a threshold in the number of years that an analyst could follow a 
firm. In this way, the networking channel between analysts and firms might be mitigated. 
Furthermore, since forecast frequency corrects analysts’ optimism, brokers should 
introduce a minimum number of forecasts by each analyst for each firm during the 
forecast period. Moreover, given the evidence that the impact of CEO compensation on 
analysts’ forecasts varies with analysts’ characteristics, brokers could enhance the 
forecasts of analysts’ that they employ in several ways. First, by assigning relatively more 
experienced analysts to firms where CEOs have higher compensation. Second, reducing 
the forecast frequency for analysts’ following firms where CEOs enjoy higher 
compensation and cash bonus. Finally, brokers can reduce analysts’ optimism by 
increasing the forecast frequency for firms where CEOs are more sensitive to changes in 
firm’s value and hold substantially higher amount of restricted stocks. 
                                                          
14 We also show that both DF and GS regulations affect analysts’ accuracy. However, we argue that the 
effects of GS and DF enforcements vary with analysts’ characteristics and CEO compensation respectively 
and are less pronounced for longer-term forecasts. Thus, incorporating analysts’ characteristics and CEO 
compensation in future changes in regulations could increase their efficacy.  
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Chapter 3: Does country governability affect analysts’ earnings 
forecasts? 
 
3.1.   Introduction 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts play a crucial role for market participants, as they reduce 
information asymmetries between firms and investors (Loh and Mian 2006; Hall and 
Tacon 2010). Although there have been many studies regarding the importance of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Cohen and Lys 2003; Loh and 
Mian 2006; Kanagaretnam et al. 2012; Mande and Son 2012), up till now there has not 
been adequate research on the impact, if any, of governance.  In this chapter, we 
distinguish between the micro-level (corporate governance) and macro-level (country 
governability) factors that could affect analysts’ forecasts. We extend the literature 
employing macro indicators such as country-level governability. We demonstrate that the 
impact of country governability matters, whilst corporate governance also affects analysts’ 
earnings forecasts.  
Existing studies suggest that the country governability affects the effective function of 
economies by reducing the opportunistic behaviour of firms’ managers (Gill and Kharas 
2007; Aidt 2009; Sáenz González and García-Meca 2014). There is also evidence that 
country governability affects analysts’ forecasts (Hope 2003; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat 
et al. 2006). Bhat et al. (2006) examine the relationship between governance transparency 
and analysts’ accuracy. They account for governance transparency by including measures 
of (1) corporate reporting, (2) acquisition of private information and (3) information 
dissemination.15  Hope (2003) using a sample of 22 countries over the period 1993 – 1995, 
                                                          
15 The authors employ a country-level proxy of governance transparency as developed by Bushman et al. 
(2004). 
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examines the impact of information disclosure by firms and the degree of enforcement of 
accounting standards of a country on analysts’ accuracy. 16  He documents a positive 
association between the level of information disclosure by firms and analysts’ accuracy, 
while he also shows that country-level enforcement is significantly and positively related 
to accuracy. These findings indicate that strong enforcement of accounting standards in a 
country can force managers to follow the rules and thereby, reduce analysts’ uncertainty.  
Hope and Kang (2005) employing a sample of non-U.S. firms for the period 1992 – 2002 
investigate the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty as measured by the inflation and 
foreign exchange rate volatility on analysts’ accuracy, suggesting that macroeconomic 
uncertainty undermines analysts’ accuracy. Furthermore, they examine the impact of 
country governability on analysts’ accuracy and show that strong country governability 
enhances analysts’ forecasts. The authors capture the degree of country governability 
through the degree of legal enforcement. The degree of legal enforcement is captured as 
a linear combination of the La Porta et al. (1997) enforcement variables including the 
efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of 
contract repudiation. Furthermore, Bhat et al. (2006) document a positive association 
between government transparency and analysts’ accuracy and suggest that weak country 
governability can augment this effect.17 In this thesis, we employ indicators of country 
governability as proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010), such as the rule of law, the quality 
of government regulations and government effectiveness.  
                                                          
16 Hope (2003) employs the total disclosure index obtained from the Centre for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR), which is constructed using 85 annual report variables as a measure of 
firm-level disclosure. Regarding the enforcement of accounting standards, he constructs an index based on 
the following five country-level factors: (i) audit spending measured by the total fees of 10 largest auditing 
firms for each country as a percentage of the GDP (Meek et al. 1995), (ii) insider trading laws assigning a 
value of 1 for countries that had laws against insider trading and 0 otherwise (Bhattacharya and Daouk 
2002), (iii) judicial efficiency which measures the “ efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it 
affects business” obtained from La Porta (1997), (iv) the rule of law which presents the law and order 
tradition for each country (La Porta et al. 1997), and (v) shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 1998). 
17 Bhat et al. (2006) measure the strength of country governability through the degree of legal enforcement. 
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Disclosures over corporate governance attitudes could also affect forecasts as they 
provide financial analysts with information regarding the corporate policy and the 
associated risks for firms (Klapper and Love 2004; Durnev and Kim 2005; Yu 2010).18 
There is evidence that the quality of analysts’ information goes hand in hand with the 
quality of corporate governance (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Byard et al. 2006;  
Kanagaretnam et al.  2007; Kanagaretnam et al. 2012). According to this strand of 
literature, more effective boards improve the quality as well as the quantity of information 
disclosure by the firms leading to more accurate earnings forecasts. 
Regarding corporate governance and specifically CEO equity incentives, previous 
literature documents some association with analysts’ forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002; 
Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Beaver et al. 2008).19 This strand of research has been 
gaining significance as stock options are becoming an important part of CEO 
compensation.  Firms have many reasons for granting stock options to the CEOs as a form 
of compensation. The enhancement of CEOs incentives to make decisions that would 
benefit shareholders is one of these motivations. Furthermore, firms might use stock 
options as a part of CEO compensation to reduce reported accounting expenses, to attract 
high skilled executives, as well as to delay tax payments (Kanagaretnam et al. 2012; 
Mande and Son 2012).20  
Furthermore, it is well documented that firms with boards where the CEO is dominant 
disclose less information, whilst a powerful CEO can overpower all other members of the 
                                                          
18 We define the term “corporate governance” as the control of a company’s operations through the system 
of laws, rules and other factors (Gillan and Starks 1998).   
19 Most of prior studies have examined the impact of stock options on firm performance (Core et al. 1999; 
Bauman and Shaw 2006; Lam and Chng 2006; Hayes et al. 2012). 
20 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has implemented executive compensation disclosure 
rules in August 2006. According to Donahue (2008), these rules intend to increase transparency and 
information disclosure so as to provide investors detailed information about board compensation. Moreover, 
Sheu et al. (2010) argue that Taiwanese firms that voluntarily disclose information about executive 
compensation document higher market valuation. 
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board (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993). Klein (2002) 
shows that more independent boards and audit committees enhance the monitoring 
effectiveness, while Bizjak et al. (2009) provide strong evidence that firms with no CEO-
Chair separation exhibit higher level of financial fraud by backdating the stock options. 
Furthermore, Adutet et al. (2011) argue that CEO-Chair duality could dampen corporate 
governance as the absence of duality can improve managerial decision-making leading to 
a better performance. Boards with CEOs who are also the chairmen could be less effective 
as they might be influenced by the powerful CEOs, who could discourage other directors 
from expressing their viewpoints (Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Adut et al. 2011; Mande and 
Son 2012).21 Moreover, given that the primary role of a CFO is the financial reporting 
and that the CFO compensation includes items that are sensitive to reported profits such 
as equity incentives and earnings-based bonuses (Thurm 2005; Wilson and Wang 2010), 
a CEO who is at the same time the CFO of a firm might have a greater impact on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts.22  
An alternative way of counting for earning forecast management is to focus on abnormal 
accruals (Leuz et al. 2003).23 Weak governance structure might encourage managers to 
involve in accruals manipulation and that, in turn, could result in impediments on the 
information disclosure regarding earnings (Leuz et al. 2003). Graham (2005) states that 
firms manage their reported earnings to meet analysts’ forecast. Furthermore, the author 
argues that around 73.5% of the CFOs consider achieving analysts’ forecasts as an 
important managerial target. Brown and Caylor (2005) show that during the period 
                                                          
21 Additionally, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) argue that credit ratings are negatively associated with CEO-
Chair duality, suggesting that rating agencies assign lower credit ratings to firms with powerful CEOs. 
22  Jiang et al. (2010) examine the relationship between the CEO and CFO equity incentives and the 
likelihood of meeting analysts’ forecasts. They show that the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts is more sensitive to the CFO equity incentives than those to the CEO. 
23 Abnormal accruals are defined as the difference between the total accruals and normal accruals. Normal 
accruals are estimated employing Jones (1991) model. 
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between 1996 and 2001, the main aim of firm managers was to eliminate negative 
earnings surprises rather than mitigate losses. 24  Furthermore, Dechow et al. (1995) 
support that firms that announce actual earnings close to the analysts’ forecasts have 
significantly higher discretionary accruals than other firms. In line with these findings, 
Matsumoto (2002) investigates whether firms manage earnings upward or try to guide 
analysts’ forecasts downwards to meet the earnings forecasts of the latter. The results 
indicate a positive relationship between earnings management and the probability of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts. In contrast, Athanasakou et al. (2009) who examine whether 
U.K. firms engage in earnings management to achieve analysts’ forecasts do not find a 
significant association between abnormal accruals and the probability of meeting analysts’ 
forecasts. However, firms that engage in earnings manipulation by using accruals are 
subject to U.S. SEC enforcement actions as they violate accounting principles reducing 
information transparency.25 Since previous literature (Dechow et al. 1995; Matsumoto 
2002; Payne and Robb 2000; Mande and Son 2012) supports that firms’ managers engage 
in earnings manipulation using abnormal accrual to achieve analysts’ forecasts, we 
conduct an additional analysis to investigate the impact of discretionary accruals on 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.  
This chapter contributes to the literature on analysts’ forecasts in many ways. First, it 
extends the limited research on the relationship between country-level governability and 
                                                          
24 Earnings surprises are the difference between the actual earnings as announced by the firm and analysts’ 
earnings forecast. 
25 Due to the ineffectiveness of internal governance in detecting managerial opportunism, new directives 
have been implied as regards the information disclosure by firms. Specifically, according to Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) requirements, audit committees should be comprised of independent directors so as to prohibit 
loans as a part of executive compensation, and requires the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) to confirm the firm’s SEC’s filings. In addition to the above, Dodd-Frank requires 
disclosure of the board’s compensation committee by expanding the SOX-based rules regarding 
compensation claw backs, and authorizes the SEC to provide greater information to investors. These 
regulations are based on the argument that internal governance has been ineffective in deterring managerial 
opportunism. For further details see Bainbridge (2010). 
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analysts’ accuracy for a sample of 911 firms in the Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP 
database for the period 2000 – 2014. Second, we investigate the impact of corporate 
governance, as well as, their cross interaction with country governability on analysts’ 
accuracy. Furthermore, this chapter takes into account firms’ engagement in earnings 
management by examining the impact of abnormal accruals on analysts’ forecasts. We 
also perform a sensitivity analysis to account for endogeneity and therefore, underlying 
causality, opting for a flexible panel VAR model. This model provides the response to 
analysts’ earnings forecasts to shocks in the main variables in the VAR. 
This chapter is organized as follows: In section 3.2. we develop the main hypotheses to 
be tested, section 3.3. describes our data selection, while section 3.4. presents the 
methodology and the estimated results. Next, section 3.5. provides the panel VAR model 
and reports the results, whilst section 3.6. concludes. 
3.2. Hypotheses to be tested 
3.2.1.  The impact of country governability on analysts’ forecast accuracy 
There is evidence that the degree of legal enforcement affects analysts’ forecast accuracy 
(Hope 2003; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat et al. 2006). The above literature demonstrates 
a significant positive relationship between the degree of legal enforcement and forecast 
accuracy indicating that a stronger country governance could enhance analysts’ accuracy. 
Despite this evidence, to the best of our knowledge, there is no detailed analysis regarding 
the association between analysts’ forecast accuracy and the level of the country 
governability. Therefore, we intend to fill this gap in the literature by testing the following 
hypothesis where we predict a positive sign for the impact of country-level factors on 
analysts’ accuracy (see Table 1): 
Hypothesis 1: Country-level governability could enhance analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
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3.2.2.  The impact of corporate governance on analysts’ forecast accuracy  
Lang and Lundholm (1996) provide evidence that increasing corporate governance 
disclosure would reduce analysts’ earnings forecast errors. Along these lines, Hope (2003) 
and Ashbaugh and Morton (2001) show that analysts’ forecast errors are negatively 
related to the degree of firms’ information disclosure. In this chapter, as indicators of 
corporate governance (micro-level factors), we include CEO equity incentives and CEO 
power. Concerning the impact of executive incentives on analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors, Kanagaretnam et al.  (2012) show that if a plethora of stock options are available 
this results in a lower analysts’ forecast accuracy and thereby, higher forecast errors due 
to a higher level of forecasting complexity.26  
Moreover, voluntary disclosure from management might increase forecast complexity. 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) examine stock price evolution around earnings forecasts and 
show that CEOs engage in opportunistically voluntary information disclosures about the 
grants of the compensation plans to maximize their gains. In a recent study, Devos et al.  
(2015) show that firms manipulate the stock splitting time announcement relative to CEO 
option grants in an attempt to maximize CEO compensation. To this end, it is possible 
that managers who are granted stock options might show opportunistic disclosure 
behaviour increasing the complexity of analysts’ earnings forecasts (Kanagaretnam et al. 
2012). Gong and Li (2013) suggest that analysts do not incorporate information about 
CEO equity incentives in their predictions and hence, including CEO equity incentives 
                                                          
26 The increase in forecasting complexity might be because the incentives for better managerial efforts 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2012). When firms use stock options as a part of the CEO compensation, they intend 
to motivate executives to exert higher effort for a better firm performance. These new incentives induce 
executives to put more emphasis on long-term performance (Bushman and Indjejikian 1993). The shift in 
the CEOs’ incentives from short-term oriented performance improvement efforts to long-term plans could 
have a negative impact on the current performance. Since this re-allocation in efforts is not directly 
observable by analysts, it might lead to an increase in forecast complexity (Kanagaretnam et al. 2012).  
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might increase their forecast accuracy.27 Therefore, we predict a negative sign for all CEO 
incentive variables (see the predicted signs for OPTIONS, EXOPTIONS, UNOPTIONS  
and ONEPCT in Table 1). Furthermore, boards with powerful CEOs might be less 
effective as they might be influenced by the dominant CEOs, who could discourage other 
directors from expressing their viewpoints (Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Adut et al. 2011; 
Mande and Son 2012). However, the opposite view also exists suggesting that powerful 
CEOs can increase the unity of the boards and form clear strategic lines fastening the 
decision-making procedures (Cannella and Monroe 1997; Adut et al. 2011). For this 
reason, a positive or a negative coefficient for the CEO power is equally likely. 
Based on this evidence, herein we extend previous studies to test whether CEO equity 
incentives, CEO-Chair/CEO-CFO duality, CEO ownership and tenure would also affect 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Thus, the following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 2: Corporate governance could affect analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
3.2.3. Earnings manipulation and analysts’ forecasts 
Despite the plethora of studies reporting a significant relationship between CEO – Board 
characteristics and earnings management (Xie et al. 2003; Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Rahman and Ali 2006; Ebrahim 2007; Cornett et al. 2008; Sáenz González and García-
Meca 2014), the empirical evidence on the association between analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and abnormal accruals is limited (Dechow et al. 1995; Payne and Robb 2000; 
Matsumoto 2002; Athanasakou et al. 2009; Mande and Son 2012). Specifically, Mande 
and Son (2012) test whether firms meet analysts’ earnings forecasts by using 
discretionary accruals. Their results provide evidence for earnings manipulation from 
                                                          
27 Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine whether higher CEO equity incentives are associated with a higher 
probability of meeting or even beating analysts’ forecasts. They argue that CEOs with high stock and stock 
option portfolios engage in earnings manipulation in order to avoid future earnings disappointments. 
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firms that achieve earnings forecasts. Additionally, Payne and Robb (2000) argue that 
when analysts’ forecasts in the month preceding the annual earnings announcement are 
greater than the actual earnings, firms increase discretionary accruals. 
 In this chapter, we extend the existing literature investigating whether earnings 
management and specifically the use of discretionary accruals affect analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. We predict a negative sign expecting that firms’ engagement in earnings 
manipulation would increase analysts’ forecast complexity leading to lower accuracy. 
Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Earnings manipulation could decrease analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. 
Table 1: Predicted signs for variables 
Variable Predicted sign 
Macro-level (Country Governability)  factors 
GOV_RULEOFLAW + 
GOV_QUAL + 
GOV_EFFECT + 
  
Micro-level (Corporate Governance) factors 
OPTION_GRANTS - 
EXOPTIONS - 
UNOPTIONS - 
ONEPCT - 
CEO_OWNERSHIP +/- 
CEO_CHAIR +/- 
CEO_CFO +/- 
CEO_TENURE +/- 
BOARDSZ +/- 
DA - 
SIZE + 
ROE +/- 
LOSS - 
DISP_AF - 
Notes: the table reports the predicted sign of the variables. A 
negative (positive) predicted sign corresponds to a decrease 
(increase) in analysts’ forecast errors. Finally, when either a positive 
or a negative relationship is equally likely, both signs are reported. 
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3.3.  Data Section  
 3.3.1.  Sample selection criteria 
Our sample consists of all firms covered by EXECUCOMP, I/E/B/S and COMPUSTAT 
databases over the years between 2000 and 2014. Data regarding CEO compensation and 
board characteristics such as total salary, stock options grants, board size and CEO-Chair 
duality are obtained from EXECUCOMP, while earnings forecasts, actual earnings and 
stock prices from I/B/E/S database. We use the mean of all forecasts issued for a specific 
year for a firm before the actual earnings announcement date for that year. The main 
advantage of using I/B/E/S as our source for actual and forecast earnings is that I/B/E/S 
forecasts exclude extraordinary items and other special items and therefore we ensure 
higher consistency in our data (Philbrick and Ricks 1991). 
We opt for COMPUSTAT for all other required firm-specific financial data. Additionally, 
because we want to control for CEO incentives, following Kanagaretnam et al. (2012), 
we exclude firms with total CEO compensation less than one million dollars to avoid 
firms with low CEO incentives. Furthermore, we require stock prices to be at least 1 dollar 
to avoid the small deflator problem. Finally, we restrict our sample to firms that have at 
least 3 years annually observations to ensure efficient estimation results. Our final sample 
consists of 7,868 firm-year observations for 911 firms.  
 3.3.2.  Measuring analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2012), we calculate analysts’ accuracy as minus one 
times the absolute value of the difference between mean earnings forecast and actual 
earnings for a year, divided by the stock price at the forecast date. Hence, forecast 
accuracy is defined as: 
ACCURACYit = (−1)
absolute(Fit−Ait)
Pit−1
∗ 100                                                             (1) 
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where, Ait represents the actual earnings for firm i in year t, and Fit is the forecast of the 
firm’s earnings for year t made at year t-1, while Pit−1 is the stock price at the forecast 
date.28 
 3.3.3. Determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
We control for analysts’ forecast characteristics and firm-specific characteristics. 
Particularly, we employ a dummy variable LOSS as previous literature documents that 
analysts’ forecasts for firms with losses are less accurate than those of profitable firms. 
This could be due to the problematic estimation of losses arising from managerial 
incentives such as “big baths” (Brown 2001; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Mande and 
Son 2012).29 Furthermore, we include firm size (SIZE) measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Since large firms operate in a more informative environment, we expect a 
positive relationship between firm size and analysts’ forecast accuracy. Moreover, 
analysts have greater incentives to release higher earnings forecasts for smaller firms than 
for larger. Analysts need to establish better relationships with the managers of smaller 
firms due to the lack of public information for these firms (Lim 2001; Kanagaretnam et 
al. 2012).  
Also, given that firm performance is a significant determinant of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Lim 2001; Loh and Mian 2006), we account for firm’s profitability and growth. 
We include firm return on equity (ROE) as a profitability measure and the sales growth 
                                                          
28 In this chapter, we employ analysts’ accuracy as minus one times the absolute value of the difference 
between mean earnings forecast and actual earnings for a year. We have decided to use this measure as we 
put a particular attention on the absolute magnitude of analysts’ forecast errors and not whether the latter 
are optimistic (positive forecast errors) or pessimistic (negative forecast errors) which was the case in 
Chapter 2. However, similar results were obtained using the same forecast measure with that used in 
Chapter 2. 
29 “Big bath” refers to the event when managers of a firm under-report earnings by a large amount. When 
firms take a big bath in the current period, it is more likely for earnings and managerial compensation to 
increase in the future (Frantz 1999). 
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(GROWTH) calculated as the ratio of the difference in current period sales and sales of 
the previous period over total assets. The above performance measures might have a 
significant impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy as could be important drivers of the 
forecast complexity. Finally, we also consider forecast uncertainty. Forecast uncertainty 
for a firm could affect analysts’ ability for earnings forecasts, leading to less accurate and 
more biased forecasts. Uncertainty is estimated by the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts for a firm scaled by the stock price (DISP_AF) (Zhang 2006; Amiram et al. 
2014).  
 3.3.4.  Measuring country governability 
We use the government index from the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI). We opt 
for three indicators that cover the rule of law (GOV_RULEOFLAW), the regulatory 
quality (GOV_QUAL) and the effectiveness of the government (GOV_EFFECT).  The 
rule of law captures “the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and 
the courts”. Regulatory quality stands for the quality of regulations imposed by the 
government and captures “the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”. Finally, government effectiveness captures “the effectiveness of public 
and civil services, and as well the degree of the independence of these services from 
political pressures and the credibility of government commitment to such policies”.30 
Additionally, we take into account the government effectiveness by interacting the 
GOV_EFFECT index with other determinants of analysts’ forecast accuracy. By 
employing the cross terms between country governability and other determinates for 
                                                          
30 Government index has been used in prior literature (Aidt 2009; Voliotis 2011; Galag 2011; Saenz 2014). 
The empirical analyses show that this index is an important factor in measuring the degree in which the 
governability of a country can eliminate or enhance opportunistic behaviour in firms. 
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analysts’ accuracy, we aim to reveal any complexities regarding the impact of 
governability on accuracy.31 
 3.3.5.  Measuring CEO equity incentives 
We employ different measures of CEO equity incentives. We use OPTION_GRANTS as 
the value of the total number of options granted to the CEO. As alternative measures of 
CEO incentives, we use existing exercisable options (EXOPTIONS) and existing 
unexercisable options (UNOPTIONS). Following McAnally et al. (2008), we scale CEO 
equity incentive metrics by CEO salary to capture the relative degree of incentive. 
Furthermore, as an additional equity incentive measure we calculate the dollar change in 
the value of CEO’s stock and option portfolio due to one percentage point increase in the 
company stock price (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) as follows: 
ONEPCT𝑖,𝑡 = 0.01 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 × (𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡)                                     (2) 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗𝑡 stands for firm’s stock price, 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗𝑡  for the number of shares held by 
the CEO and 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 stands for the total number of options held by the CEO.  
 3.3.6.  Measuring CEO Power 
We measure CEO power by employing CEO-Chair and CEO-CFO duality as dummy 
variables that take the value 1 if the CEO is the Chair of the board/CFO at the same time 
and 0 otherwise. As an additional measure of CEO power, we include CEO stock 
ownership. The important role of CEO stock ownership was introduced by Bhagat et al. 
(1999). CEOs with high stock ownership could monitor firms more efficiently, disclosing 
                                                          
31 Worldwide Governance Indicator measures are aggregate indexes reflecting the quality of the governance. 
In recent years these indexes have become popular. However, the reliability of these indexes has been 
questioned. Langbein and Knack (2008) show that while these indexes are supposed to measure distinct 
concepts such as the rule of law, government quality and government effectiveness, they essentially 
measure the same broad concept. Thus, the authors argue that these indexes fail to distinguish among 
various aspects of the quality of governance questioning the robustness of the models. There is also 
evidence arguing that the WGI measures lack precision (Knack and Manning 2000; Van de Walle 2006; 
Brewer et al. 2007) and thus could lead to meaningless results.  
99 
 
a greater amount of information to analysts, and thus, improve the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts for the latter (Johnson and Natarajan 2005). Our CEO stock ownership measure 
(CEO_OWNERSHIP) is the value of stocks owned by the CEO excluding options divided 
by executive’s salary. Finally, we include CEO tenure (CEO_TENURE) as an indicator 
of executive’s power measured as the natural logarithm of the years that the CEO has 
served as a CEO in a firm. 32 
We also account for board size. Board size might be related to the board performance as 
larger the size of the board, higher the knowledge base (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). 
However, there is some evidence that finds the opposite to be true (Yermack 1997). Also, 
Byardet et al. (2006) suggest that firms with a small board of directors are associated with 
increased voluntary information disclosure and thereby, decreased analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors.33  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 2.  
 
 
 
                                                          
32 In our analysis, we employ other corporate governance characteristics such as CEO gender and age. 
However, these variables do not appear to exert a significant impact on analysts’ accuracy, and thereby, we 
do not include them in our regressions. 
33 Board composition characteristics such as the presence of outside directors on the board could also be 
significant factors affecting analysts’ forecasts. Outside directors who are independent from the 
management could mitigate the conflict of interests between CEOs and shareholders making less 
pronounced the impact of CEO equity incentives. Dahya et al. (2016) examine the association between 
board structure and acquirer performance documenting a positive relationship between acquirer’s 
performance and the number of outside directors on the board.  In an earlier research, Dahya et al. (2002) 
motivated by Cadbury’s recommendations regarding the inclusion of outside directors on the board, report 
an increase in the sensitivity of managers’ turnover to performance due to the increase in the number of 
outside directors. Furthermore, Dahya and McConnell (2005) show that market participants appear to view 
the appointment of outside directors as a positive event expecting a better decision-making. Moreover, 
Dahya et al. (2008) document a positive relationship between corporate value and the number of outside 
directors. Interestingly, the authors argue that this relationship is more pronounced in countries with weak 
investor protection. However, in this thesis data availability issues regarding the presence of outside 
directors on the board dictate the choice of our variables. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
1. Forecast variables      
ACCURACY -0.0028 0.0076 -0.2117 0 
DISP_AF 0.0478 0.2365 0.0007 11.149 
2. Governability indexes     
GOV_QUAL 1.5024 0.1303 1.2600 1.7400 
GOV_RULEOFLAW 1.5628 0.0484 1.4300 1.6300 
GOV_EFFECT 1.6084 0.1047 1.5000 1.8400 
3. Corporate Governance     
OPTION_GRANTS 0.0018 0.0036 0 0.1111 
EXOPTIONS 0.0079 0.0130 0 0.3522 
UNOPTIONS 0.0038 0.0059 0 0.1375 
ONEPCT 931.75 11186 0 507181 
CEO_OWNERSHIP 0.0191 0.1105 0 3.6115 
CEO_CHAIR 0.2146 0.4105 0 1 
CEO_CFO 0.0007 0.0851 0 1 
BOARDSZ 5.7308 1.1297 2 12 
CEO_TENURE 12.697 7.6199 1 66 
4. Control variables     
SIZE 7.8527 1.5618 3.4543 13.589 
ROE 0.0550 0.0968 -2.369 0.5036 
GROWTH 0.4578 0.3608 -3.154 7.6436 
LOSS 0.0073 0.0851 0 1 
Note: This table displays the summary statistics for the variables used in the main 
regressions. ACCURACY  stands for analysts’ accuracy and is calculated as (-
1)*absolute value of (mean forecast – actual forecast)/price at forecast date, DISP_AF is 
the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by the stock price, 
OPTION_GRANTS stands for the ratio of the total value of options over CEO salary, 
EXOPTIONS is the ratio of existing exercisable options over CEO salary, UNOPTIONS 
is the ratio of existing unexercisable options over CEO salary, ONEPCT stands for the 
dollar change in the value of CEO’s stock and option portfolio due to one percentage 
point increase in the company stock price, CEO_OWNERSHIP is the ratio of total the 
value of firm’s stocks owned by the CEO (CEO stock ownership excluding options) 
divided by CEO salary, CEO_CHAIR is a dummy for CEO power that takes the value 
one if CEO is also the chairman of the board, CEO_CFO is a dummy that takes the value 
one if CEO is also the CFO, CEO_TENURE is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years the CEO has been CEO, BOARDSZ is the natural logarithm of as the number of 
board members, GOV_QUAL reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development, GOV_RULEOFLAW reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence, GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies, SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets,  ROE is the return on equity,  GROWTH is the ratio of the 
difference in sales and sales of the previous period over total assets and LOSS is a dummy 
that takes the value 1 for loss years.  
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 3.3.7. Measuring discretionary accruals 
We use the Jones (1991) model to estimate the discretionary accruals. We employ a cross-
sectional model to measure the discretionary accruals for each year and every industry 
classified by its 2-digit SIC code. This measure takes into account industry-level changes 
that might affect accruals and enables for time-varying coefficients based on the 
following model: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2
𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑘3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (3) 
 
where t indexes the fiscal year and i the frim. 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the total accruals defined as 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
 𝐸𝐵𝑋𝐼𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡, where EBXI presents the earnings before the extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations and CFO stands for the operational cash flows as are reported in 
the cash flow statement. Furthermore, we use total assets of the previous year 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) to deflate our variables while 𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the change in revenues. Finally, 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 represents the gross value of property, plant and equipment.  
We use the estimated coefficients form Equation (3) to calculate the normal accruals 
(𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡) for each firm.  
 
𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  ?̂?1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2
𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  ?̂?3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
                                         (4) 
 
We measure the discretionary accruals for each firm as the difference between total 
accruals and the estimated normal accruals based on the following equation:  
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
) −  𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡                                                                               (5) 
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Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the model.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for discretionary accruals. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DA -0.0907 0.0851 -0.8338 0.8105 
TA -0.1253 0.0887 -1.1535 0.6984 
ASSETS 10052.71 36394 31.6360 797769 
SALES 7803.51 21635 0 474259 
PPE 5189.54 12742 0.9490 178678 
EBXI 1.7234 2.5211 -29.72 44.64 
CFO 1033.17 2939 -3991 59713 
NA -0.0526 0.0343 -0.5219 0.2112 
Note: This table displays the summary statistics for the variables used for the 
estimation of discretionary accruals. DA is the discretionary accruals, TA is 
the total accruals calculated as the difference between the earnings before the 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations and the operational cash flows 
as are reported in the cash flow statement, ASSETS stands for the total assets, 
SALES is the total sales, PPE represents the gross value of property, plant and 
equipment, EBXI presents the earnings before the extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations, CFO stands for the operational cash flows as are 
reported in the cash flow statement and NA is firm-specific normal accruals.  
 
 
3.4. Empirical analysis and results 
3.4.1.  Country Governability and analysts’ forecast accuracy 
We examine the impact of country governability on analysts’ forecast accuracy by using 
the following regression. To control for industry and year fixed effects, we include year 
dummies and industry dummies based on the 2-digit SIC codes.   
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃_𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                    (6) 
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where t indexes the fiscal year and i the firm, 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡 stands for the 
macro/country-level governability indexes,  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 presents firm’s size and is calculated 
as the natural logarithm of total assets, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the return on assets for firm i in year t, 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 presents firms growth and is calculated as the ratio of the difference in sales 
and sales of the previous period over total assets. Finally, 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for loss years and zero otherwise and 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃_𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 stands for earnings 
forecast dispersion and is calculated as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled 
by the stock price.  
The individual impact of each of the three governability indexes is presented in Models 
(1) to (3) in Table 4. Results in Model (1) show that the relationship between analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and the quality of government regulations (GOV_QUAL) is positive 
and significant at 1% level. This finding indicates that earnings forecasts are more 
accurate when the government implements sound policies and regulations that promote 
private sector development. By contrast, the rule of law (GOV_RULEOFLAW) in Model 
(2) is negatively associated with analysts’ forecasts accuracy at 1% significance level, 
suggesting that greater contract enforcement, stronger property rights and more efficient 
courts could undermine analysts’ accuracy. Our results demonstrate that there might be 
some trade-off between further enforcement of government regulations and analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy, as the former increase red tape and bureaucracy at the expense of 
simplicity and transparency. 
Finally, in Model (3) we employ government effectiveness index (GOV_EFFECT). 
Estimation results show that analysts’ accuracy increases when a government promotes 
policies to improve the effectiveness of government services, such as the government 
independence from political pressures and the credibility of the commitment to such 
policies. Model (4) presents the regression results for the full model, where we account 
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for all governability indexes simultaneously. GOV_QUAL and GOV_EFFECT maintain 
their positive impact on analysts’ accuracy at 10% and 5% significance level respectively. 
The positive and significant at 5% level coefficient of government effectiveness in Model 
(4) indicates that when we control for the other governability indexes, a higher 
effectiveness of public and civil services, as well as greater independence from political 
pressures could enhance analysts’ forecast accuracy. These findings could be compared 
to those reported in the previous literature (Hope 2003; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat et al. 
2006) according to which stronger legal enforcement can increase analysts’ accuracy. 
Overall, our results provide evidence in favour of hypothesis H1, suggesting that the level 
of analysts’ forecast accuracy is associated with the level of the country governability. 
We notice a significant positive relationship between the level of country governability – 
as measured by the quality of government regulations and the degree of government 
effectiveness – and analysts’ accuracy. Whilst, our findings show that stronger rule of law 
undermines analysts’ forecast accuracy.  
Regarding the impact of control variables, size is positively related to forecast accuracy 
at 1% level. This positive relationship shows that it is easier for analysts to predict 
earnings for larger firms as larger firms disclose more information than smaller. Loss 
years undermine analysts’ accuracy. The negative coefficient of growth suggests that past 
sales growth is a significant determinant of analysts’ forecast accuracy, indicating that 
firms with increasing growth in the past increase forecast errors (Hribar and Jenkins 2004). 
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Table 4: Regression analysis of analysts' forecast accuracy on country 
governability. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
     
GOV_QUAL 0.0381***   0.0206* 
 (0.0133)   (0.0124) 
GOV_RULOFLAW  -0.0569***  0.0220 
  (0.0157)  (0.0336) 
GOV_EFFECT   0.0515*** 0.0423** 
   (0.0133) (0.0183) 
SIZE 0.0122*** 0.0113*** 0.0121*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0022) 
LOSS -0.0320*** -0.0318*** -0.0321*** -0.0322*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0054) 
ROE 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
GROWTH -0.0150** -0.0180*** -0.0160** -0.0147** 
 (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0064) 
DISP_AF -0.0325 -0.0325 -0.0323 -0.0324 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0236) 
Constant -0.173*** -0.0208 -0.0197*** -0.250** 
 (0.0354) (0.0256) (0.0350) (0.100) 
     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.1995 0.2084 0.1996 0.1966 
Observations 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 
Number of firms 911 911 911 911 
Note: this table reports regression results of analysts' forecast accuracy on country 
governability. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. ACCURACY stands for 
analysts’ accuracy and is calculated as (-1)*absolute value of (mean forecast – actual 
forecast)/price at forecast date. GOV_QUAL reflects perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development, GOV_RULEOFLAW reflects perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence, GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets,  ROE 
is the return on equity,  GROWTH is the ratio of the difference in sales and sales of the 
previous period over total assets and LOSS is a dummy that takes the value 1 for loss years. 
DISP_AF is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by stock price. All 
regressions are estimated with robust standard errors to solve issues of heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation.  Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.2.  Corporate governance and analysts’ forecast accuracy 
Our second hypothesis H2 tests whether the level of analysts’ forecast accuracy changes 
with the corporate governance structure based on the following model:  
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃_𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (7) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 stands for indicators of corporate governance structure. The first 
measure of corporate governance is the CEO equity incentives. Recall that we are using 
four different measures for equity incentives: total options (OPTION_GRANTS 
thereafter), existing exercisable options (EXOPTIONS thereafter), existing unexercisable 
options (UNOPTIONS thereafter) and the dollar change in the value of CEO’s stock and 
option portfolio due to one percentage point increase in the company stock price 
(ONEPCT thereafter). 
Table 5 represents estimation result for equation (7). Models (1) to (3) show that all 
measures of CEO equity-based incentives exert a negative impact on accuracy at 1% level. 
Model (4) suggests that 1% point change in the value of CEO equity-based compensation 
due to 1 % increase in firm’s share price will lead to 0.55% decrease in analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. Results obtained from Models (1) and (4) indicate that CEO equity incentives 
could weaken analysts’ forecast accuracy confirming Hypothesis 2. These findings are in 
agreement with those obtained from Kanagaretnam et al. (2012) and McAnally et al. 
(2008) who argue that CEOs with high equity-based compensation undermine analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy. Further, in Models (5) to (8), we include country-level governability 
indexes in our regressions. After accounting for one equity incentive measure at each 
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model, our findings show that greater government effectiveness and higher quality of 
government services enhance analysts’ forecasts at 5% and 10% level respectively. The 
impact of equity incentives after controlling for country governability is negative, albeit 
weak. Overall, results presented in Table 5 confirm hypotheses H1 and H2 according to 
which country and firm-level governability could affect analysts’ accuracy. 
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Table 5: Regression analysis of analysts' forecast accuracy on the corporate governance and country governability. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
OPTION_GRANTS -0.0196***    -0.0170*    
 (0.00457)    (0.00924)    
EXOPTIONS  -0.0253***    -0.0224*   
  (0.00581)    (0.0118)   
UXOPTIONS   -0.0784***    -0.0625  
   (0.0190)    (0.0384)  
ONEPCT    -0.557**    -0.318 
    (0.268)    (0.203) 
GOV_QUAL     0.0215* 0.0215* 0.0215* 0.0224* 
     (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) 
GOV_RULOFLAW     0.0194 0.0194 0.0194 0.0189 
     (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0336) 
GOVEFFECT     0.0397** 0.0397** 0.0397** 0.0394** 
     (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0181) 
SIZE 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00194) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00226) 
LOSS -0.0319*** -0.0319*** -0.0319*** -0.0317*** -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0324*** 
 (0.00536) (0.00536) (0.00536) (0.00542) (0.00541) (0.00541) (0.00541) (0.00547) 
ROE 0.00163 0.00163 0.00163 0.00164 0.00152 0.00152 0.00152 0.00153 
 (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00114) 
GROWTH -0.0189*** -0.0189*** -0.0189*** -0.0190*** -0.0147** -0.0147** -0.0147** -0.0147** 
 (0.00688) (0.00688) (0.00688) (0.00690) (0.00645) (0.00645) (0.00645) (0.00645) 
DISP_AF -0.0328 -0.0328 -0.0328 -0.0335 -0.0324 -0.0324 -0.0324 -0.0331 
 (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0240) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0239) 
Constant -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.109*** -0.243** -0.244** -0.243** -0.244** 
 (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) 
         
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
         
Adjusted R2 0.2119 0.2119 0.2119 0.2120 0.1975 0.1975   0.1975    0.1974 
Observations 7,868 7,868 7,786 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 
Number of firms 911 911 911 911 911 911 911 911 
Note: This table reports regression results of analysts' forecast accuracy on corporate governance and country governability. Year dummies and industry 
dummies are included. ACCURACY stands for analysts’ accuracy and is calculated as (-1)*absolute value of (mean forecast – actual forecast)/price at 
forecast date, OPTION_GRANTS stands for the ratio of the total value of options over CEO salary, EXOPTIONS is the ratio of existing exercisable 
options over CEO salary, UNOPTIONS is the ratio of existing unexercisable options over CEO salary, ONEPCT stands for the dollar change in the value 
of CEO’s stock and option portfolio due to one percentage point increase in the company stock price, GOV_QUAL reflects perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, GOV_RULEOFLAW 
reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets,  ROE is the return on equity,  GROWTH 
is the ratio of the difference in sales and sales of the previous period over total assets and LOSS is a dummy that takes the value 1 for loss years. DISP_AF 
is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by stock price. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors to solve issues of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Next, we test our second hypothesis about the impact of corporate governance on forecast 
accuracy using metrics of CEO power. We use four different measures for CEO power: 
CEO-Chair and CEO-CFO duality, CEO ownership and CEO tenure (CEO_CHAIR, 
CEO_CFO, CEO_OWNERSHIP and CEO_TENURE thereafter). Furthermore, we 
include board size as an additional indicator of corporate governance. Table 6 presents 
the estimation results. Our results demonstrate a strong positive impact of corporate 
governance measures on accuracy. Particularly, in Models (1) to (3) CEO_CHAIR, 
CEO_CFO and CEO_TENURE improve analysts’ accuracy at 5% significance level, 
while in Model (4) the coefficient of CEO_OWNERSHIP is significant at 1% level. 
Conversely, board size does not exert a significant impact on accuracy in Model (5). 
Our findings conform to hypothesis H2 which states that corporate governance could 
affect analysts’ forecast accuracy and in this case, analysts issue more accurate earnings 
forecasts for firms with powerful CEOs. A powerful CEO who is the Chair of the board 
or the CFO of the firm at the same time could have higher accountability enhancing the 
unity of the board and improving firm performance (Cannella and Monroe 1997; 
Finkelstein and D'aveni 1994; Adut et al. 2011) which, in turn, can increase analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Moreover, CEO with long tenure might be considered as a connoisseur 
of the firm with considerable experience in firm management, and therefore, CEO tenure 
can enhance analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.  Models (6) and (7) include the 
indicators of country governability in the regressions. After controlling for the impact of 
corporate governance on analysts’ forecasts, the degree of government effectiveness 
maintains its positive impact on accuracy at 5% level, suggesting that country-level 
governability is indeed a significant determinant of analysts’ accuracy. 
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Overall, the regression results presented in Tables (5) and (6) provide evidence in favour 
of the hypotheses H1 and H2, indicating that corporate governance and country 
governability could affect analysts’ accuracy. Specifically, this chapter suggests that 
increasing CEO power, constraining CEO equity incentives and implementing more 
effective government regulations could enhance analysts’ accuracy.
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Table 6: Regression analysis of analysts' forecast accuracy on corporate governance and country 
governability. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
CEO_ CHAIR 0.0531**     0.0528** 0.0128 
 (0.0230)     (0.0220) (0.0206) 
CEO_CFO  0.196**    0.239** 0.256** 
  (0.0968)    (0.108) (0.120) 
CEO_TENURE   0.0494**   0.0407 0.0202 
   (0.0245)   (0.0249) (0.0254) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP    0.0133***  0.0140*** 0.088*** 
    (0.00267)  (0.00274) (0.00238) 
BOARDSZ     0.0693 0.0772 0.0218 
     (0.0492) (0.0485) (0.0455) 
GOV_QUAL       0.0190 
       (0.0130) 
GOV_RULOFLAW       0.0274 
       (0.0338) 
GOV_EFFECT       0.0425** 
       (0.0179) 
SIZE 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00191) (0.00192) (0.00190) (0.00191) (0.00190) (0.00222) 
LOSS -0.0317*** -0.0316*** -0.0308*** -0.0317*** -0.0320*** -0.0315*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00537) (0.00541) (0.00542) (0.00542) (0.00553) (0.00556) 
ROE 0.00163 0.00163 0.00161 0.00162 0.00162 0.00156 0.00148 
 (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00107) (0.00109) (0.00112) (0.00105) (0.00106) 
GROWTH -0.0184*** -0.0189*** -0.0183*** -0.0183*** -0.0191*** -0.0173** -0.0139** 
 (0.00688) (0.00689) (0.00689) (0.00690) (0.00692) (0.00693) (0.00652) 
DISP_AF -0.0327 -0.0329 -0.0324 -0.0325 -0.0327 -0.0318 -0.0317 
 (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0234) (0.0233) 
Constant -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.120*** -0.107*** -0.120*** -0.131*** -0.263*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0173) (0.0158) (0.0198) (0.0215) (0.101) 
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VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.2063 0.2111 0.2027 0.2118 0.2109 0.2002 0.1932   
Observations 7,868 7,868 7,786 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 
Number of firms 911 911 911 911 911 911 911 
Note: this table reports regression results of analysts' forecast accuracy on corporate governance and country governability. Year dummies 
and industry dummies are included. ACCURACY stands for analysts’ accuracy and is calculated as (-1)*absolute value of (mean forecast 
– actual forecast)/price at forecast date, CEO_CHAIR is a dummy variable for the CEO power that takes the value one if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, CEO_CFO is a dummy that takes the value one if the CEO is also the CFO, CEO_TENURE is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the CEO has been CEO, CEO_OWNERSHIP is the value of firm’s stocks owned by the CEO (excluding 
options) divided by CEO salary, BOARDSZ is the natural logarithm of as the number of board members, GOV_QUAL reflects 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development, GOV_RULEOFLAW reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence, GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets,  ROE is the return on equity,  GROWTH is the ratio of the 
difference in sales and sales of the previous period over total assets and LOSS is a dummy that takes the value 1 for loss years. DISP_AF 
is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by stock price. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors to solve 
issues of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.3. The interaction effect between country governability and corporate governance 
structure on analysts’ accuracy 
Regarding the interaction effect of country governability and corporate governance 
measures on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy we opt for the following model: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐺𝑂𝑉 × 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃_𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (8)  
 
Table 7 reports the regression results for equation (8). As an indicator of country 
governability we employ the government effectiveness index (GOV_EFFECT). In all 
specifications in Table 6, GOV_EFFECT exerts a positive impact on forecast accuracy at 
1% significance level. Concerning the impact of the interaction terms between 
government effectiveness and corporate governance, our results show that while the 
impact of the interaction terms between GOV_EFFECT – ONEPCT and GOV_EFFECT 
– CEO_CHAIR is insignificant, the coefficients for the interaction terms 
OPTION_GRANTS×GOV_EFFECT, CEO_CFO×GOV_EFFECT and 
CEO_OWNERSHIP×GOV_EFFECT are significant. One can notice that, while the 
individual impact of GOV_EFFECT on accuracy is positive, the interaction term 
OPTION_GRANTS×GOV_EFFECT in Model (1) is of opposite sign. This finding 
reveals the complexities associated with the governability and CEO equity incentives. 
Although the individual effect of the CEO equity incentives on analysts’ forecast 
accuracy maintains its negative sign, the interaction term 
OPTION_GRANTS×GOV_EFFECT exerts a weaker impact on accuracy (see Model (1) 
in Table 4 and Models (1) - (2) in Table 7). Our findings indicate that when government 
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enhances the effectiveness of public and civil services as well as the independence of 
government authorities from political pressures, the negative impact of equity incentives 
on analysts’ accuracy becomes less pronounced. Next, the positive and significant 
coefficients of the interaction terms CEO_CFO×GOV_EFFECT and 
CEO_OWNERSHIP×GOV_EFFECT in Models (4) - (6) suggest that government 
effectiveness can augment the positive impact of CEO-CFO duality and CEO ownership 
on accuracy. Overall, regression results in Table 7 show that effective governability not 
only can improve analysts’ forecast accuracy but further, it can mitigate the negative and 
enhance the positive impact of corporate governance on accuracy.  
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Table 7: Regression analysis of the interactions between governability and corporate governance for analysts' 
forecast accuracy. 
VARIABLES  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
       
OPTION_GRANTS×GOV_EFFECT -0.0129**     -0.0145* 
 (0.00512)     (0.00878) 
ONEPCT×GOV_EFFECT  -0.225    -0.205 
  (0.138)    (0.148) 
CEO_CHAIR×GOV_EFFECT   0.00713   0.0146 
   (0.0125)   (0.0124) 
CEO_CFO×GOV_EFFECT    0.145**  0.150** 
    (0.0681)  (0.0714) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP×GOV_EFFECT     0.00636*** 0.00144 
     (0.00153) (0.00486) 
GOV_EFFECT 0.0509*** 0.0516*** 0.0498*** 0.0517*** 0.0525*** 0.0493*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0132) 
SIZE 0.0120*** 0.0121*** 0.0120*** 0.0121*** 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 
 (0.00207) (0.00209) (0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00205) (0.00205) 
LOSS -0.0324*** -0.0323*** -0.0322*** -0.0322*** -0.0322*** -0.0322*** 
 (0.00539) (0.00545) (0.00540) (0.00539) (0.00544) (0.00545) 
ROE 0.00156 0.00156 0.00156 0.00156 0.00154 0.00154 
 (0.00114) (0.00115) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00111) (0.00111) 
GROWTH -0.0159** -0.0160** -0.0159** -0.0159** -0.0153** -0.0152** 
 (0.00664) (0.00665) (0.00665) (0.00664) (0.00666) (0.00667) 
DISP_AF -0.0322 -0.0329 -0.0323 -0.0323 -0.0319 -0.0319 
 (0.0235) (0.0238) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0234) 
Constant -0.196*** -0.198*** -0.195*** -0.0198*** -0.198*** -0.193*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0352) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0348) 
       
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.2005 0.2005 0.1989 0.1996 0.2000 0.1986 
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VARIABLES  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
       
Observations 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 
Number of firms 911 911 911 911 911 911 
Note: this table reports regression results of the interactions between governability and corporate governance for analysts' forecast accuracy. Year 
dummies and industry dummies are included. ACCURACY stands for analysts’ accuracy and is calculated as (-1)*absolute value of (mean forecast 
– actual forecast)/price at forecast date, OPTION_GRANTS×GOV_EFFECT and ONEPCT×GOV_EFFECT stand for the interaction terms between 
OPTION_GRANTS – GOV_EFFECT and ONEPCT– GOV_EFFECT respectively. CEO_CHAIR×GOV_EFFECT, CEO_CFO×GOV_EFFECT 
and CEO_OWNERSHIP×GOV_EFFECT are the interaction terms between CEO_CHAIR – GOV_EFFECT, CEO_CFO – GOV_EFFECT and 
CEO_OWNERSHIP – GOV_EFFECT respectively. GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. OPTION_GRANTS stands for the ratio of the total value of options over CEO salary, ONEPCT stands 
for the dollar change in the value of CEO’s stock and option portfolio due to one percentage point increase in the company stock price, CEO_CHAIR 
is a dummy variable for the CEO power that takes the value one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, CEO_CFO is a dummy that takes the 
value one if the CEO is also the CFO and CEO_OWNERSHIP is the value of firm’s stock owned by the CEO (CEO stock ownership excluding 
options) divided by CEO salary. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, ROE is the return on equity, GROWTH is the ratio of the difference 
in sales and sales of the previous period over total assets and LOSS is a dummy that takes the value 1 for loss years. DISP_AF is the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by stock price. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors to solve issues of heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.4.  Earnings management and analysts’ forecast accuracy  
We use the following regression to estimate the impact of discretionary accruals on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃_𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                   (9) 
 
where 𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 stands for the discretionary accruals used by firm i during year t. We account 
for corporate governance by including CEO equity incentives (OPTION_GRANTS), 
CEO-Chair/CFO duality (CEO_CHAIR and CEO_CFO respectively), CEO ownership 
(CEO_OWNERSHIP), CEO tenure (CEO_TENURE) and board size (BOARDSZ). As 
an indicator for country governability we use the government effectiveness index 
(GOV_EFFECT). 
 Table 8 represents regression results for equation (9). Model (1) examines the individual 
impact of discretionary accruals on analysts’ accuracy. The coefficient of DA is negative 
and significant at 1% level. This finding confirms hypothesis H3 which tests whether 
earnings management could affect analysts’ accuracy. Particularly, in this case, we show 
that firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation undermines analysts’ accuracy. This 
relationship is in agreement with previous evidence (Bradshaw et al. 2001; Cohen and 
Lys 2003; Ahmed et al. 2005) according to which earnings management through the use 
of discretionary accruals might increase the complexity of analysts’ forecasts resulting in 
less accurate forecasts for the latter. The coefficient of discretionary accruals maintains 
its negative sign after controlling for other control variables in Model (2), country 
governability in Model (3), corporate governance in Model (4) and all determinants 
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simultaneously in Model (5). Regression results obtained from Model (5) suggest that 
government effectiveness exerts a positive impact on analysts’ accuracy at 1% 
significance level even after controlling for earnings manipulation, highlighting the 
importance of an effective governability for analysts’ forecasts.   
 
Table 8: Regression analysis of analysts' forecast accuracy on discretionary 
accruals, corporate governance and country governability. 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
      
DA -0.111*** -0.101*** -0.0304 -0.0752** -0.0882** 
 (0.0337) (0.0328) (0.0388) (0.0321) (0.0436) 
OPTION_GRANTS    -0.0181 -0.0170 
    (0.0140) (0.0168) 
CEO_CHAIR    0.0534** 0.0407 
    (0.0232) (0.0251) 
CEO_CFO    0.225 0.305** 
    (0.146) (0.152) 
CEO_OWNERSHIP    -0.00417 0.00452 
    (0.00778) (0.00939) 
CEO_TENURE    0.0367* 0.0326 
    (0.0209) (0.0341) 
BOARDSZ    0.0765* 0.0545 
    (0.0451) (0.0645) 
GOV_EFFECT   0.0509***  0.0687*** 
   (0.0150)  (0.0208) 
SIZE  0.00995*** 0.0104*** 0.00987*** 0.0203*** 
  (0.00162) (0.00170) (0.00164) (0.00567) 
LOSS  -0.0364*** -0.0368*** -0.0359*** -0.0259*** 
  (0.00599) (0.00602) (0.00610) (0.00577) 
ROE  0.00126 0.00124 0.00122 0.00576 
  (0.00838) (0.00844) (0.00797) (0.00661) 
GROWTH  -0.0168** -0.0141* -0.0159** -0.00723 
  (0.00773) (0.00762) (0.00783) (0.00621) 
DISP_AF  -0.0390 -0.0385 -0.0385 -0.0106 
  (0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0269) (0.0150) 
Constant -0.0185*** -0.0991*** -0.181*** -0.121*** -0.310*** 
 (0.00193) (0.0140) (0.0333) (0.0182) (0.0761) 
      
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.0303 0.2464 0.2367 0.2381 0.2401 
Observations 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 7,868 
Number of firms 911 911 911 911 911 
Note: this table reports regression results of analysts' forecast accuracy on discretionary accruals, 
corporate governance and country governability. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. 
ACCURACY stands for analysts’ accuracy and is calculated as (-1)*absolute value of (mean forecast – 
actual forecast)/price at forecast date, DA stands for the discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings 
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manipulation by firms. OPTION_GRANTS stands for the ratio of the total value of options over CEO 
salary, CEO_CHAIR is a dummy variable for the CEO power that takes the value one if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, CEO_CFO is a dummy that takes the value one if the CEO is also the CFO 
and CEO_OWNERSHIP is the ratio of the value of firm’s stocks owned by the CEO (CEO stock 
ownership excluding options) divided by CEO salary. CEO_TENURE is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years the CEO has been CEO and BOARDSZ is the natural logarithm of the number of board 
members. GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, ROE is the return on equity, GROWTH is the ratio of the difference in sales and 
sales of the previous period over total assets and LOSS is a dummy that takes the value 1 for loss years. 
DISP_AF is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by stock price. All regressions are 
estimated with robust standard errors to solve issues of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.5. A panel-VAR model: the impact of shocks 
As a part of the sensitivity analysis and in order to take into account possible criticism 
regarding the endogeneity of some of the covariates in the previous analysis, we opt for 
a panel VAR model. Such model also allows identifying the underlying causality 
directions between the main variables of our analysis in a dynamic way. To account for 
endogeneity, we employ the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for the lag order of one.34 
Moreover, to simplify the exposition, we present a first order 4x4 panel VAR model as:35 
tiitiit e ,1  XX  ,  i =1,…, N, t=1,…,T.                                                 (10) 
where Xit is a vector of four random variables that is the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, CEO power, government effectiveness and growth. Thus, Φ indicates a matrix 
of coefficients (4x4), whilst μi a vector of firm-specific effects and ei,t  iid residuals. 
Essentially, the panel VAR is a system of equations as: 
                                                          
34 We seek for the optimal lag order following Lutkepohl (2006). We also apply the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and the Arellano-Bond AR tests. The optimal lag identified is equal to one. Sargan test 
reports for lag equals to one the null hypothesis is not rejected. Results are available upon request. 
35 Note that without loss of generality we could estimate a panel VAR 5x5, and so on. 
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The above system of equations has a moving average (MA) representation as a function 
of a set of present and past residuals e1, e2, e3 and e4. Given possible endogeneity, these 
equations could be correlated and thereby, the coefficients of the MA representation are 
not meaningful. A way to have meaningful estimations is to orthogonalize the residuals 
opting for the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix. In addition, we introduce 
fixed effects to ensure heterogeneity in the levels.36  
 
3.5.1  Impulse Response Functions and Variance Decompositions: the response of 
forecast accuracy on shocks in discretionary accruals, CEO power and 
government effectiveness 
IRFs in Figure 1 present the response of accuracy to shocks in accuracy, discretionary 
accruals, CEO power, government effectiveness and growth (ACCURACY, DA, CPS, 
GOV_EFFECT and GROWTH respectively). The reverse ordering has also been 
estimated to further control for issues related to endogeneity. Results remain similar to 
the one reported herein. 
                                                          
36 Following Love and Zicchino (2006), we apply the Helmert procedure to the dataset. That is the data are 
forward mean differenced. 
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From the first row of Figure 1, the second plot from the left shows that the effect of one 
standard deviation shock of discretionary accruals on accuracy is negative across the 
whole period. It converges to equilibrium after around the third period. This result is 
consistent with our main results as reported in Section 3.4.4. (see Table 8) and in 
agreement with hypothesis H3, suggesting that analysts’ forecast accuracy decreases as 
firms engage in earnings manipulation by using accruals. 
One can notice from the third plot in the first row of Figure 1 shows that the effect of one 
standard deviation shock of CEO power based on stock ownership (CPS) on accuracy is 
positive and it converges towards the equilibrium after the first period. This result is in 
agreement with previous results reported in Table 6, where CEO stock ownership 
enhances analysts’ accuracy (see Section 3.4.2.). Furthermore, our findings conform to 
the hypothesis H2, suggesting that corporate governance and in this case, powerful CEOs, 
can enhance analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
Finally, in the case of government effectiveness, the panel VAR methodology appears to 
confirm the findings of Table 4 (see Figure 1, the fourth plot from the left in the first row 
that reports the response of ACCURACY to one standard deviation shock of 
GOV_EFFECT. The response is positive across the whole period and in agreement with 
the positive coefficients of GOV_EFFECT as presented in Section 3.4. Thus, the panel 
VAR results show that a higher government effectiveness enhances financial analysts’ 
accuracy confirming hypothesis H1. 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions for ACCURACY, DA, CEO POWER, 
GOV_EFFECT, GROWTH. 
 
Note: The figure presents Impulse Response Functions for  ACCURACY which  stands for 
analysts’ accuracy and is calculated as (-1)*absolute value of (mean forecast – actual 
forecast)/price at forecast date, DA stands for the discretionary accruals, CPS which stands for 
CEO power as measured by CEO stock ownership, GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies and GROWTH which is the ratio 
of the difference in sales and sales of the previous period over total assets. Dashed lines are 5% 
S.E. on each side generated by Monte Carlo with 500 replications. 
 
 
 
Next, in Table 9 we present VDCs, which show the percent of the variation in one variable 
that is explained by the shock to another variable, accumulated over time. The variance 
decompositions show the magnitude of the total effect. We report the total effect 
accumulated over the 10 and 20 years. Longer time horizons produced equivalent results. 
Table 8 presents the VDCs estimations. These results come in agreement with the ones 
reported by the IRFs, and provide further evidence that the level of country governability 
explains the variation of accuracy, though mostly it is accuracy itself that explains its 
variation. Particularly, around 0.31% of the forecast accuracy after ten years is explained 
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by shocks in the DA variable. Furthermore, the VDCs results show that the level of 
government effectiveness explains around 1.24% of the variation of accuracy.  
 
Table 9: Variance Decompositions for ACCURACY, DA, CEO POWER, 
GOV_EFFECT, GROWTH. 
 S ACCURACY DA CPS GOV_EFFECT GROWTH 
ACCURACY 10 0.976869 0.003128 0.000839 0.012350 0.006814 
DA 10 0.012183 0.955333 0.001088 0.031113 0.000282 
CPS 10 0.004659 0.001707 0.989837 0.003792 0.000006 
GOV_EFFECT 10 0.005691 0.005962 0.008181 0.974383 0.005783 
GROWTH 10 0.033728 0.014320 0.001649 0.000781 0.949522 
ACCURACY 20 0.976800 0.003129 0.000840 0.012416 0.006815 
DA 20 0.012184 0.955153 0.001091 0.031287 0.000285 
CPS 20 0.004659 0.001707 0.989825 0.003804 0.000006 
GOV_EFFECT 20 0.005709 0.005987 0.008200 0.974301 0.005804 
GROWTH 20 0.033728 0.014320 0.001649 0.000782 0.949522 
Note: The table presents Variance Decompositions for  ACCURACY which  stands for analysts’ 
accuracy and is calculated as (-1)*absolute value of (mean forecast – actual forecast)/price at forecast 
date, DA stands for the discretionary accruals, CPS which stands for CEO power measured by CEO 
stock ownership, GOV_EFFECT reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
and  GROWTH which is the ratio of the difference in sales and sales of the previous period over total 
assets. Finally, s is the number of time periods ahead. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This main contribution of this chapter lies on investigating the effect of the rule of law, 
regulatory quality and the effectiveness of the government on analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy for the first time in the literature. Our evidence reports that governance variables 
such as government effectiveness and quality of government regulations positively affect 
analysts’ accuracy. Corporate governance such as CEO equity incentives, on the other 
hand, asserts a negative impact on accuracy. Our results further provide evidence for a 
positive association between CEO power and accuracy, whilst there exists evidence of 
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cross term relationship between the government effectiveness and the latter. We also 
provide evidence for a significant negative impact of discretionary accruals on analysts’ 
accuracy, suggesting that analysts’ forecast accuracy reduces as firms engage in earnings 
manipulation by using discretionary accruals. Panel VAR modeling enriches the previous 
finding as it sheds new light regarding the underlying causality of the main covariates of 
earnings forecasting accuracy, whilst also tackling issues related to endogeneity.  
Overall, the results show that analysts’ accuracy improves with stronger governability 
and regulatory quality. Additionally, corporate governance structure, such as CEO-
Chair/CFO duality and CEO ownership assert a positive impact on analysts’ accuracy. 
Conversely, analysts’ make less accurate earnings forecasts when firms engage in 
earnings manipulation by using discretionary accruals. Given that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are an important source of information for market participants, the present 
results are of value to policymakers, investors, and academics as they indicate that 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy could benefit from a strong and effective governance. 
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Chapter 4: Does corruption matter for analysts’ forecasts? A global 
evidence. 
 
4.1. Introduction   
Corruption is considered as cancer in the society and the economy (Everett et al. 2007). 
The World Bank (1997, p. 8) defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private 
gain’.37  Macrae (1982) argues that corruption is ‘an arrangement that involves a private 
exchange between two parties which can influence the allocations of sources and might 
involve the abuse of public or collective responsibility for private gain’.38  
Transparency International (2007) describes corruption as a serious global problem that 
can affect countries. The globalization and interaction among countries have stimulated 
the interest of researchers regarding the effects of corruption. There is strong evidence 
that corruption can reduce foreign direct investment, public investment in education and 
health and economic growth (Mauro 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Wei 2000; Gupta et 
al. 2002). Furthermore, early research demonstrates that corruption undermines the trust 
in the political system and mitigates the legitimacy of transactions in markets (Seligson 
2002; Branco and Delgado 2012). Initially, most of the corruption related studies have 
been focused on the impact of the former on economic growth, leaving a space for further 
research regarding its interaction with financial markets. Understanding the effects of 
                                                          
37  Other international organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Transparency International have conducted many 
surveys regarding the level of corruption internationally, aiming to combat corruption. 
38 Argandoña (2005, p. 252) proposes a more complex definition of corruption as “the act or effect of giving 
or receiving a thing of value, in order that a person do or omit to do something, in violation of a formal or 
implicit rule about what that person ought to do or omit to do, to be benefit of the person who gives the 
thing of the value or a third party”. 
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corruption and its relationship with financial markets can facilitate the assessment of risks 
and opportunities (Kimbro 2002). 
In addition to the early research on the detrimental impact of corruption on the economy, 
there has also been research on the importance of the quality of financial reporting and its 
association with corruption. Existing literature provides strong evidence of the adverse 
effects of corruption on the quality of financial reporting (Kimbro 2002; Riahi-Belkaoui 
2004; Wu 2005; Riahi-Belkaoui and Al Najjar 2006; Malageño et al. 2010). These studies 
show that the quality of both legal and accounting system is negatively associated with 
corruption. Furthermore, since managers can obfuscate the quality of the financial 
reporting by engaging in earnings manipulation practices (Biddle et al. 2009), many 
studies consider the indirect impact of corruption on earnings management (Leuz et al. 
2003; Han et al. 2010; Sáenz González and García-Meca 2014). These studies examine 
the relationship between earnings manipulation and institutional settings, such as the 
degree of the legal enforcement and they suggest that earnings manipulation can strive in 
weak institutional environments.39 
Financial reporting aims to provide market participants with useful information that 
facilitates their investment decision making. At the same time, the importance of financial 
analysts as intermediaries providing valuable information that enhances market efficiency 
is unequivocal (Cheng 2005). Given that analysts use financial reports as their main 
source of information (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Byard et 
al. 2006), greater quality and quantity of information disclosed through financial reports 
could decrease their forecast errors (Byard et al. 2006). There is also some evidence that 
firms’ engagement in earnings management using discretionary accruals increases 
                                                          
39 The degree of the legal enforcement is computed as a linear combination of the La Porta et al. (1997) 
enforcement variables. These variables are the efficiency of judicial system, the rule of law, the level of 
corruption, the risk of expropriation and the risk of contract repudiation. 
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analysts’ forecast errors (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003). Motivated by the above insights, 
we expect that corruption can affect analysts’ forecast accuracy through the lower quality 
of financial reporting. 
Although prior research has documented a link between corruption and the quality of 
financial reporting (Kimbro 2002; Riahi-Belkaoui 2004; Wu 2005; Riahi-Belkaoui and 
Al Najjar 2006; Malageño et al. 2010), the relationship between corruption and analysts’ 
forecasts accuracy has left almost untouched. A few studies on analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy consider the effects of institutional settings, some related to corruption (Hope 
2003; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2010). Among these studies, 
only Chen et al. (2010) examine the indirect effects of corruption on analysts. Their 
analysis is focused on the impact of political connections on analysts’ accuracy and how 
corruption affects this association for the case of 17 jurisdictions between 1991 and 2001. 
The rest of existing studies investigate the relationship between analysts and corruption 
employing a legal enforcement variable as proposed by La Porta (1997). According to 
this strand of literature, the legal enforcement depends on the level of corruption so that 
greater corruption can result in a weaker legal enforcement and poor quality of financial 
reporting, leading to higher forecasts errors. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on analysts’ forecast accuracy in several 
ways. First, unlike previous research (Hope 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Hope and Kang 2005; 
Bhat et al. 2006; Han et al. 2010; Sáenz González and García-Meca 2014) that uses an 
indicator of the legal enforcement, this study sheds light on the direct relationship 
between corruption and analysts’ accuracy. Second, while Chen et al. (2010) use a firm-
level data of 17 jurisdictions between 1997 and 2001, we construct a unique global cross-
country sample of 102,188 observations for 14,449 firms in 71 counties over the period 
2000 - 2014. The global sample involves combining multiple data sources such as I/B/E/S, 
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Compustat Global, North America and Transparency International. There are also 
methodological advantages of employing a global sample, as it provides appropriate 
variability across many countries. As corruption varies from country to country, and 
thereby, its impact on analysts’ forecasts could also vary, we assemble a global sample. 
Such variability comes from the heterogeneity across countries that we adequately deal 
within a panel regression setting, which also takes into account possible issues related to 
endogeneity. Third, to fully reveal the link between corruption and analysts’ accuracy, 
we take into account the heterogeneity across countries without loss of the variability in 
the underlying data generating process by classifying countries into advanced, emerging 
and developing based on IMF World Economic Outlook. Moreover, we contribute to the 
earnings management literature by examining whether the effect of earnings manipulation 
on analysts’ forecasts varies with the level of corruption. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that considers the interaction between discretionary accruals and 
corruption at a global level. Finally, we investigate whether the degree of country freedom 
and anti-corruption institutional arrangements, interact with corruption and affect analysts’ 
accuracy. 
A glimpse in our results reveals that corruption negatively affects analysts’ accuracy 
across the world, with some variability though. Analysts’ forecast accuracy appears 
higher for firms located in less corrupt advanced and emerging countries, whereas for 
firms located in developing countries, results show that corruption could enhance analysts’ 
accuracy. Further, we find that earnings manipulation can exacerbate analysts’ accuracy 
for firms in emerging and developing countries with corruption present. Additionally, we 
use data from World Freedom Index and Press Freedom Index obtained from the Freedom 
House as proxies of country freedom. We examine the interaction between country 
freedom and corruption in relation to the impact of the latter on accuracy. The present 
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analysis reveals the plethora of complexities involved in the relationship between 
corruption and analysts’ forecasts. Our results suggest that country freedom in parallel 
with corruption would improve forecast accuracy. 
The remainder of this chapter (Chapter 4) is organized as follows: Section 4.2. develops 
the main hypotheses of our analysis; Section 4.3. describes our sample selection and 
defines variables, while section 4.4. presents the methodology and the various results. 
Finally, section 4.5. concludes and provides the policy implication of our findings. 
 
4.2. Hypotheses to be tested 
 4.2.1.  Corruption and analysts’ forecast accuracy 
There  are studies that investigate the impact of institutional settings, some related to 
corruption, on analysts’ accuracy (Hope 2003; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat et al. 2006; 
Chen 2010).  Hope (2003) and Hope and Kang (2005) in a cross-country analysis, 
investigate the relationship between analysts’ accuracy and the degree of information 
disclosure/enforcement of the accounting standards.40 The authors show that both firm-
level disclosures and country-level enforcement can enhance analysts’ accuracy. Their 
results indicate that a strong legal enforcement forces managers to follow the rules and 
hence, reduces analysts’ uncertainty.  
Bhat et al. (2006) explore the impact of governance transparency on analysts’ forecast 
accuracy for 21 countries. The authors employ a country-level proxy of governance 
                                                          
40 The authors measure the firm-level disclosure using the total disclosure index obtained from the Centre 
for International Financial Analysis. Regarding the legal enforcement variable, they construct a composite 
index based on the following country-level factors: audit fees, insider trading laws, judicial efficiency (La 
Porta et al. 1997), rule of law (La Porta et al. 1997), and shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 1998).   
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transparency as developed by Bushman et al. (2004).41 Bhat et al. (2006) demonstrate that 
governance transparency is positively related to analysts’ accuracy and that this 
association is more pronounced in countries with weak institutional settings.42 Chen et al. 
(2010) using firm-level data over the period 1997 – 2001 for 17 jurisdictions examine the 
relationship between ‘political connections’ and analysts’ forecast errors. They find a 
positive association between politically connected firms and forecast errors. While the 
authors consider the level of corruption, their main research question is whether the effect 
of political connections on analysts is stronger with a higher level of corruption. After 
accounting for the interaction term between corruption and political connections, they 
show that the effect of political connections on accuracy can strive in corrupt countries, 
while they also report a positive relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and 
corruption. 
Another strand of literature explores the relationship between corruption and the quality 
of financial reporting (Kimbro 2002; Riahi-Belkaoui 2004; Wu 2005; Riahi-Belkaoui and 
Al Najjar 2006; Malageño et al. 2010). Kimbro (2002) using a sample of 61 countries 
investigates the association between economic, cultural and institutional/monitoring 
variables and corruption. The author captures the institutional and monitoring variables 
with the quality of legal and accounting system.43 The findings suggest that the quality of 
both legal and accounting system is negatively associated with corruption. Specifically, 
the quality of financial reporting is higher in countries with a lower level of corruption. 
                                                          
41 Bushman et al. (2004) account for corporate reporting, acquisition of private information and information 
dissemination. The authors also consider the number of analysts following the firms and media coverage.  
42 Bhat et al. (2006) capture the strength of institutional setting through the degree of legal enforcement.   
43 Kimbro (2002) proxies the quality of legal system using the average of the Rule of Law and the Efficiency 
of Judiciary variables obtained from International Country Risk Guide. The quality of accounting standards 
in each country is measured by the average of the Quality of Financial Accounting Statements variable 
obtained by CIFAR’s general index and the concentration of accountants per capita. 
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A higher quality in financial reporting leads to a greater and more accurate information 
disclosure, and this, in turn, can uncover corrupt practices mitigating corruption. 
Wu (2005) examines the link between accounting quality and bribery for Asian firms. 
The author concludes that a higher accounting quality can mitigate bribery by decreasing 
the information asymmetry between market participants and imposing a greater risk of 
punishment in case of discovery. Malageño et al. (2010) using a sample of 57 countries 
investigate the relationship between accounting/auditing quality and corruption. The 
authors capture the accounting and auditing quality with the presence of BIG4 firms. 
Their findings indicate that countries with a greater quality of financial reporting exhibit 
a lower level of perceived corruption and that corruption can be reduced by enhancing 
accounting and auditing quality. 
Finally, Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) and Riahi-Belkaoui and Al Najjar (2006) examine the 
determinants of earnings opacity for 34 countries.44 Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) suggests that 
corruption increases earnings opacity and thus, leads to a decrease in the quality of 
financial reporting. The main argument according to the author is that corruption fosters 
a ‘camouflage’ environment facilitating financial misreporting for managers with self-
serving interests (Leuz et al. 2001). In a further analysis, Riahi-Belkaoui and Al Najjar 
(2006) provide evidence for a positive relationship between earnings opacity and 
corruption/rule of law/economic growth and a negative relationship between earnings 
opacity and economic freedom/quality of life. 
                                                          
44 Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) and Riahi-Belkaoui and Al Najjar (2006) use earnings opacity as a proxy for the 
quality of financial reporting. The authors employ three measures of earnings opacity as proposed by 
Bhattacharya et al. (2002): (i) earnings aggressiveness, (ii) loss avoidance and (iii) earnings smoothing. 
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Financial misreporting can help firms to dodge tax liabilities or to achieve corporate 
targets such as sales growth and earnings.45 Therefore, firms in corrupt countries might 
have fewer incentives to improve the quality of their financial reporting.  Corruption not 
only could tolerate the low quality of accounting information, but it can also encourage 
fraudulent accounting practices by rapacious governmental officials. This study builds on 
the notion that poor information disclosure can increase the uncertainty in markets, and 
that financial reports are the main source of information for analysts (Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Byard et al. 2006).  Hence, we expect that corruption 
can affect analysts’ forecasts through its detrimental impact on the quality of financial 
reporting. 
However, in countries with extensive bureaucratic burden, the ‘grease the wheels’ 
hypothesis might dominate (Leff 1964; Leys 1965; Huntington 1968). According to the 
‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis, corruption could be beneficial for the economy mitigating 
the distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions. Leff (1964), Leys (1965) and 
Huntington (1968) state that bureaucracy is an obstacle to economic growth and that 
corruption can add some ‘speed’ or ‘grease’ facilitating transactions. Corruption might 
also be considered as a source of competitive advantage or as a mechanism reducing 
transaction costs in over-regulated countries (Cuervo-Cazura 2016). The ‘grease the 
wheels’ hypothesis in terms of the content of the current analysis would suggest that 
corruption might improve analysts’ accuracy. It could be the case that in countries with 
                                                          
45 Regarding the earnings targets, there is a strong evidence that market places higher value to firms that 
achieve analysts’ earnings forecasts on a continuous basis than to those firms that meet analysts’ 
expectations occasionally. In addition, De Jong et al. (2014) in an interview based survey of 306 analysts 
employed by 11 of the world’s largest investment banks conclude that 88.2% of the analysts believe that 
firms achieving their forecasts built credibility with capital markets and the 87.5% of them sate that meeting 
earnings forecasts enhances firm’s future growth prospects to investors. 
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inefficient governance, corruption enhances the information exchange between firms and 
analysts.46  
A positive relationship between accuracy and corruption might also exist due to the 
‘income-smoothing’ hypothesis (Chen et al. 2010). In this study, the ‘income-smoothing’ 
hypothesis would suggest that analysts’ forecast accuracy should be higher in countries 
that are more corrupt since higher corruption could help firms smooth their earnings. It 
could be the case that managers smooth earnings to send signals to markets regarding the 
future performance of the firms (Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; Tucker and Zarowin 
2006; Badertscher et al. 2012). This, in turn, makes earnings more predictable leading to 
a greater forecast accuracy. Apparently, where corruption is present, managers might 
have greater incentives to engage in earnings manipulation practices, as they can bribe 
government officials to reduce monitoring of their activities and thus, there is a lower 
chance of discovery and punishment. 
In this research, we hypothesize that corruption can affect analysts’ forecasts through its 
detrimental impact on the quality of financial reporting.Therefore, we predict a negative 
sign for the corruption variable as reported in Table 1. The first hypothesis we would test 
in this chapter is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Corruption could undermine analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
 
 4.2.2. Earnings manipulation, corruption and analysts’ forecast accuracy 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts might be more complex for firms that engage in earnings 
manipulation than for those that do not. Following Leuz et al. (2003), we define earnings 
                                                          
46 Leff (1964) claims that corruption might raise the level of investments in the economy as it can constitute 
a hedge against risks streaming from inefficient political system and weak governability. Furthermore, Lui 
(1985) argues that corruption could reduce the time cost of queues. 
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manipulation as the intentional misreporting of firms’ performance and/or misapplication 
of accounting standards by insiders to deceive and mislead market participants. Firms’ 
engagement in earnings manipulation come through various channels, i.e. through the use 
of discretionary accruals that increases analysts forecast errors (Abarbanell and Lehavy 
2003).  
Some studies examine the links between earnings manipulation and institutional settings 
(Leuz et al. 2003; Han et al. 2010; Sáenz González and García-Meca 2014; Blaylock et 
al. 2015). Leuz et al. (2003), Han et al. (2010) and Blaylock et al. (2015) using a cross-
country analysis show that weak institutional settings, proxied by the mean score across 
the three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1997), go hand in hand with earnings 
manipulation. In line with these findings, Dyreng et al. (2012) examine the location of 
earnings management for a sample of U.S. firms covering the period between 1994 and 
2009. The authors conclude that firms tend to manipulate domestic earnings more, 
relative to foreign earnings. Moreover, they argue that this event is more pronounced in 
countries with a weak rule of law than in locations with a strong rule of law.  Recently, 
Sáenz González and García-Meca (2014) analyzed the impact of institutional structure on 
the magnitude of earnings manipulation in Latin America.   The authors construct a 
government index using three governance indicators taken from the World Bank 
Indicators: (i) the rule of law, (ii) the control of corruption, and (iii) the government 
effectiveness (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p. 4). They suggest that a stronger institutional 
structure can lead to a lower level of discretionary accruals.  
Two arguments motivate this study. Firstly, that corruption affects the quality of financial 
reporting (Kimbro 2002; Riahi-Belkaoui 2004; Wu 2005; Riahi-Belkaoui and Al Najjar 
2006; Malageño et al. 2010), and secondly, that firms’ engagement in earnings 
management indicates a lower quality in financial reporting. For the above reasons, we 
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expect that in countries in which corruption is high, earnings manipulation is likely to be 
greater, leading to poor earnings forecasts. Therefore, we consider the interaction between 
the level of corruption and the degree of earnings manipulation. By including this 
interaction term, we aim to examine whether the effect of earnings manipulation related 
to discretionary accruals on analysts’ accuracy is more pronounced in countries with 
higher corruption. For this reason in Table 1, we expect that when corruption is present, 
the negative impact of earnings management will be augmented, predicting a negative 
sign for the interaction term between corruption and earnings management. Conversely, 
we expect that stronger control of corruption would mitigate the impact of earnings 
management on accuracy, predicting a positive sign for the interaction term between 
control for corruption and earnings management. 
Thus, our second hypothesis is sated as follows:   
Hypothesis 2: The effect of earnings manipulation on analysts’ forecast accuracy is more 
pronounced with a higher level of corruption. 
 
 4.2.3. Country freedom, corruption and analysts’ forecast accuracy 
The negative effects of corruption might be mitigated through a greater country freedom. 
The institutional settings literature (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000) has highlighted the role 
of democracy in relation to corruption, as the former could deter the latter. Sandholtz and 
Koetzle (2000) demonstrate that country freedom subdues the level of corruption through 
the democratic freedoms, such as political rights and civil liberties.47 Montimola and 
Jackman (2002) and Sung (2004) suggest that democratization, as reflected by stronger 
                                                          
47 Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) employ the Corruption Perception Index obtained from Transparency 
International while they capture the impact of democratization through Freedom House indexes of political 
and civil liberties.   
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political rights, affects the level of corruption positively, albeit this effect is nonlinear.48 
The initial increase in the level of corruption can be explained through the renewed 
corrupt practices induced by the political liberalization. Moreover, it is possible that in 
globalized economies, the liberalization of the political and economic systems can both 
increase the opportunities for corrupt practices and make the detection of corruption more 
difficult because of electronic commerce and financial renovation (Sung 2004). 
Furthermore, the availability and quality of information is a significant determinant of the 
decision-making by market participants (Bushman et al. 2004). According to the World 
Bank (2002), media increases the accountability of businesses and governments and 
reduces information asymmetry between market participants when it is independent, it 
provides good-quality information and it has a broad reach. In most countries, press serves 
as an information intermediary in capital markets, and there is evidence that a greater 
press coverage shrinks information asymmetries around earnings announcements, leading 
to more accurate forecasts (Ying et al. 2014). However, there is also evidence suggesting 
that in countries with a high level of corruption, press freedom might serve for 
opportunistic behaviour by mimicking the voice of powerful corporations connected to 
them (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Chen et al. 2010). 
Given this evidence, it would be of interest to examine whether country freedom can 
affect analysts’ forecast accuracy when corruption is present. Our focus on the interaction 
between corruption and country freedom variables aims to examine whether the latter 
                                                          
48 Montimola and Jackman (2002) employ two measures of corruption. First, the average score of three 
indicators obtained from Business International (BI) which are: (i) legal system and judiciary, (ii) 
bureaucracy and red tape, and (iii) business transactions that involve corruption or questionable payments. 
As a second measure, they use the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International. 
Furthermore, the authors account for the democratization using a measure developed by Bollen (2001) 
obtained from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). This measure is 
the average of the following indicators: (i) freedom of group oppositions, (ii) political rights, (iii) 
effectiveness of the legislative body and (iv) an indicator of voter turnout. Regarding Sung (2004), the 
author accounts for the democratization through the Political Rights Index taken from Freedom House, 
while as corruption indicator he employs Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International. 
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lessens the effect of corruption on analysts’ forecast accuracy. For this reason, in this 
analysis we predict a positive sign both for the individual impact of country freedom 
variables and their interaction terms with corruption (see Table 1).  Thus, our third 
hypothesis is stated as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: Country freedom could ease the adverse effect of corruption on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. 
Table 1: Predicted sign for the variables employed in the analysis 
Variable Predicted sign 
 Advanced 
countries 
Emerging 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Country-level variables 
CPI - - - 
CONT_CORR + + + 
DA - - - 
WF + + + 
PR + + + 
CL + + + 
PFI + + + 
Interaction terms 
CPI×NUMANA -/+ -/+ -/+ 
CONT_CORR×NUMANA -/+ -/+ -/+ 
CPI×DA - - - 
CONT_CORR×DA + + + 
CPI×WF + + + 
CONT_CORR×WF + + + 
CPI×PR + + + 
CONT_CORR×PR + + + 
CPI×CL + + + 
CONT_CORR×CL + + + 
CPI×PFI + + + 
CONT_CORR×PFI + + + 
Other variables 
L.ACCURACY  + + + 
NUMANA -/+ -/+ -/+ 
DISP - - - 
ROE + + + 
LOSS - - - 
GDP + + + 
Notes: the table reports the predicted sign of the variables. A negative (positive) predicted sign 
corresponds to a decrease (increase) in analysts’ forecast errors. Finally, when either a positive or 
a negative relationship is equally likely, both signs are reported. 
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4.3. Data Section  
We employ the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Summary History file 
to obtain annual data on analysts’ earnings forecasts and actual earnings. I/B/E/S provides 
the actual earnings, announce date of actual earnings, corresponding consensus forecast, 
forecast period end and analysts’ identity codes. For each year, analysts can make many 
and different forecasts until the end of forecast period. The consensus earnings forecast 
for each firm-year is the mean of the multiple analysts’ earnings forecasts for the specific 
firm and year. The main advantage of using I/B/E/S as our source for actual and forecast 
earnings is that I/B/E/S forecasts exclude extraordinary items and other special items and 
therefore, we ensure higher consistency in our data. Furthermore, we opt for Compustat 
Global and North America to obtain firm-specific financial data. For consistency, we drop 
firms with missing actual and consensus forecast earnings and firms with less than three 
consecutive observations. Using a wide range of datasets allows us to ensemble a 
comprehensive sample that includes 102,188 firm-year observations for 14,449 firms in 
71 counties including both North America and international firms covered by I/B/E/S 
database from 2000 to 2014. Given the variability of the many countries in our sample, 
we account for differences in the level of economic development and thereby, select three 
groups: advanced, emerging and developing economies according to IMF World 
Economic Outlook April 2014.49  
                                                          
49 The group of advanced countries consists of 83,380 firm-year observations and a total of 10,996 firms 
for the following 33 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom and United States. The emerging countries group includes 27 
countries with 18,368 firm-year observations and a total of 3,340 firms from Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Arab Emir and Venezuela. Finally, developing countries consists of 11 countries with 440 observations and 
113 firms from Botswana, Croatia, Egypt, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Morocco, Sri Lankan, Ukraine 
and Zimbabwe. All available data have been used. 
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 4.3.1. Measuring analysts’ forecast accuracy 
Following O'Brien (1990), we opt for the absolute forecast error as a measure of forecast 
accuracy (ACCURACY thereafter). Specifically, for each firm-year, we estimate 
ACCURACY as the absolute value of the difference between mean earnings forecast and 
actual earnings for a year multiplied with minus one. By multiplying the absolute forecast 
error with minus one, we obtain a measure that increases with higher forecast accuracy, 
and thus, larger errors correspond to a lower level of accuracy. Finally, consistent with 
the prior literature (Duru and Reeb 2002; Hope 2003; Bhat et al. 2006) that use stock 
price as a deflator of analysts’ forecast errors to facilitate comparisons across countries, 
we scale the accuracy measure with the stock price of firm j one year before the forecast 
period ends. Hence, forecast accuracy is defined as: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (−1) ∗ 
|𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡−𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡|
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 100                                                                             (1)                                                                 
where 𝐹𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the consensus forecast of the firm’s earnings for year t made at year t-
1 and 𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 represents the actual earnings for firm i in year t. Finally, 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 𝑗,𝑡−1 
is the stock price of firm i one year before the forecast period end. ACCURACY is 
negative by construction and values closer to zero indicate more accurate forecasts.50 
 
                                                          
50 In line with Chapter 3, in this chapter we employ analysts’ accuracy as minus one times the absolute 
value of the difference between mean earnings forecast and actual earnings for a year. By employing this 
measure of accuracy, we focus on the absolute value (magnitude) of analysts’ forecast errors and not 
whether the latter are optimistic (positive forecast errors) or pessimistic (negative forecast errors) which 
was the case in Chapter 2. However, estimated results using the FE variable (Chapter 2) are similar to those 
obtained in this chapter. 
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 4.3.2. Measuring corruption 
We account for corruption by employing the Corruption Perception Index (CPI thereafter) 
obtained from the Transparency International Organisation (Transparency International 
2014). The Corruption Perception Index ranks countries based on how corrupt their public 
sector is perceived to be. Corruption reflects illegal practices that are hidden until scandals 
are uncovered. Transparency International organization attempts to capture perceptions 
of corruption of business people and country experts who can offer assessments of the 
level of the public sector corruption. The index takes values from 0 to 100, where 0 is the 
highest level of perceived corruption, and 100 equals the lowest level of perceived 
corruption.51 
In addition, we opt for the control for corruption index (CONT_CORR thereafter) 
provided by the World Bank as an alternative measure of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 
2010). The control for corruption index obtained from World Governance Index reflects 
‘ perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and 
private interests’ (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p. 4). It takes values between -2.5 (weak) and 
2.5 (strong) control for corruption.52 
                                                          
51 For purposes of consistency with the ACCURACY measurement, we multiply the CPI index with minus 
one so that higher values would indicate higher degree of corruption hereafter. 
52 Both the Corruption Perception and Control for Corruption indexes have been widely used in previous 
studies revealing the significant impact of corruption on the economy (Habib and Zurawicki 2001; Graeff 
and Mehlkop 2003; Akhter 2004; Shen and Williamson 2005; DiRienzo et al. 2007; Andersson and 
Heywood 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Méon and Weill 2010; Ngobo and Founta 2012; Petrou and Thanos 2014; 
Petrou 2015; Gokalp et al. 2017). However, these indexes are aggregate indexes reflecting the quality of 
the governance.  There are studies that have questioned the reliability of these indexes arguing that while 
these indexes are supposed to measure distinct concepts such as the perception of corruption and the control 
for corruption, they essentially measure the same broad concept (Langbein and Knack 2008). Thus, 
aggregate indexes might fail to distinguish among various aspects of the quality of governance questioning 
the robustness of the models. There is also evidence arguing that the aggregate indexes such as corruption 
perception index lack precision as it presents the perception of corruption of a specific group of people 
(Knack and Manning 2000; Van de Walle 2006; Brewer et al. 2007) and thus, could lead to 
misinterpretation or meaningless results. 
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 4.3.3.  Measuring earnings manipulation  
We account for firm engagement in earnings manipulation by employing firm’s 
discretionary or abnormal accruals. While the normal accruals reflect fundamental 
performance, the discretionary accruals capture distortions due to earnings misreporting 
and inappropriate application of accounting rules (Leuz et al. 2003). 
We use the Jones (1991) model to calculate discretionary accruals. We employ a cross-
sectional model to measure the discretionary accruals for each year and each firm 
classified by its GIC code. This measure takes into account firm-level changes that might 
affect accruals and enables for time-varying coefficients. We measure discretionary 
accruals as: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2
𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑘3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                         (2) 
 
where t indexes the fiscal year and i the firm, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the total accruals defined as 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
 𝐸𝐵𝑋𝐼𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡, where 𝐸𝐵𝑋𝐼𝑖𝑡 presents the earnings before the extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations and 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 stands for the operational cash flows as reported in 
the cash flow statement. Furthermore, we use total assets of the previous year 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) to deflate our variables while 𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the change in revenues. Finally, 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 represents the gross value of property, plant and equipment.  
We use the estimated coefficients from equation (2) to calculate the normal accruals (𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡) 
for each firm as: 
𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  ?̂?1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2
𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+  ?̂?3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
                                                          (3) 
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We measure the discretionary accruals for each firm as the difference between total 
accruals and the estimated normal accruals based on the following equation:  𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
(
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
) −  𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡.  
 
 4.3.4.  Measuring country freedom 
As a first measure of country freedom, we use the World Freedom Index obtained from 
the Freedom House organization (Puddington 2015). For each country, the index includes 
one rating for political rights (PR) and one for civil liberties (CL) with 1 representing the 
most free and 7 the least free. While the overall index (WF) is a dummy that takes the 
value one for a country with status “free” and zero for “partially” or “non-free” status.53 
Furthermore, we include the Press Freedom Index (PFI) obtained from Freedom House 
as an additional measure for the degree of country freedom (Puddington 2015). Press 
Freedom Index comprises 23 methodology questions and 132 sub-questions. For each 
methodology question, low numbers indicate more freedom. An aggregate score of 0 to 
30 shows free press, 31 to 60 partly free and 61 to 100 not free.54 
 
 4.3.5. Control Variables  
Concerning our control variables, we include the number of analysts following the firm 
(NUMANA) and the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (DISP). NUMANA is calculated as 
the natural logarithm of the number of distinct analysts that follow each firm for each 
                                                          
53 Freedom House is an American independent organization founded in 1941 aimed to defend human rights 
and promote democratic change focused on political rights and civil liberties across countries. Each country 
score is based on two numerical ratings from 0 to 7 for political rights and civil liberties. The two ratings 
are based on scores assigned to 25 more detailed indicators. The average of a country or territory’s political 
rights and civil liberties ratings determines whether it is “free”, “partly free”, or “not free”.  
54 As lower values of the PFI indicate higher degree of freedom, we multiply the index with minus one so 
as higher values indicate higher degree of freedom. 
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year and presents a proxy for analysts’ coverage. A greater number of analysts following 
a firm might improve information disclosure (Yu 2008), and as a result, it might enhance 
analysts’ accuracy (Duru and Reeb 2002; Gu and Wu 2003). However, the greater number 
of analysts following a firm might signal higher competition among the analysts who 
strive for better commission fees and management relations leading them to issue less 
accurate forecasts (Gu and Wu 2003). Thus, a positive or a negative sign for the 
relationship between NUMAN and ACCURACY is equally likely as reported in Table 1. 
DISP stands for forecast dispersion, calculated as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts divided by the total assets. A higher dispersion in earnings forecasts could 
indicate greater uncertainty in analysts’ forecasts, resulting in a lower forecast accuracy 
(Duru and Reeb 2002; Gu and Wu 2003). 
Losses in previous years might also enhance uncertainty. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) 
show that analysts’ forecasts are less accurate for firms with losses than those of profitable 
firms. Thus, we also employ a dummy variable for years with loss (LOSS). Also, given 
that firm performance is a significant determinant of analysts’ earnings forecasts, we 
account for firm profitability by including firm’s return on equity (ROE).  We expect that 
better performing firms would disclose greater amount of information leading to more 
accurate analysts’ forecasts. Finally, since our study consists of a global sample, we 
include the natural logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each country as a 
country-specific variable. Higher GDP could enhance analysts’ forecast due to the greater 
level of country development. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the mean analyst forecast accuracy, discretionary 
accruals and the number of analysts following each firm for advanced, emerging and 
developing countries over the period 2000 – 2014. Our global sample reveals interesting 
details regarding the accuracy of analysts, the use of earnings manipulation practices and 
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analysts’ coverage across countries. The mean ACCURACY is -0.030, -0.055 and -0.050 
for advanced, emerging and developing countries respectively, implying higher mean 
accuracy for firms located in advanced countries. Forecast accuracy for emerging and 
developing countries are comparable with developing countries exhibiting relatively 
higher accuracy. The mean use of discretionary accruals is -0.376, 0.117 and -0.491 for 
advanced, emerging and developing countries respectively, documenting higher earnings 
manipulation from firms in developing countries. Concerning analysts’ coverage, the 
mean number of analysts following firms is around 9, 8 and 4 in advanced, emerging and 
developing countries respectively. Apparently, analysts prefer most following firms 
located in advanced countries and least firms in developing countries.  
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Table 2: ACCURACY, DA and NUMANA across advanced, emerging and developing countries 
for the period 2000 - 2014.  
ACCURACY, DA and NUMANA cross advanced countries for the period 2000 – 2014 
Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA 
        
Australia -0.043 -0.006 6.966 Japan -0.017 -0.023 7.859 
Austria -0.051 -0.072 7.871 Latvia -0.036 -0.017 1.286 
Belgium -0.045 -0.019 8.056 Lithuania -0.023 . 2.2 
Canada -0.013 0.163 7.123 Luxembourg -0.139 -0.07 10.06 
Cyprus -0.084 0.24 7.5 Netherlands -0.061 -0.023 15.123 
Czech Republic -0.029 -0.063 10.971 New Zealand -0.022 -0.004 5.476 
Denmark -0.060 -0.03 8.288 Norway -0.103 0.175 8.629 
Estonia -0.047 -0.071 2.183 Portugal -0.039 -0.033 8.635 
Finland -0.028 -0.027 11.145 Singapore -0.024 0.01 9.576 
France -0.033 -0.032 10.561 Slovenia -0.035 -0.016 2.4 
Germany -0.068 -0.039 11.065 Spain -0.084 -0.047 15.478 
Greece -0.045 0.023 9.159 Sweden -0.046 -0.015 9.022 
Hong Kong -0.026 0.073 11.358 Switzerland -0.027 -0.036 10.918 
Iceland -0.010 . 3.667 Taiwan -0.016 -0.037 7.382 
Ireland -0.063 -0.038 7.524 United Kingdom -0.040 -0.036 9.012 
Israel -0.086 -0.128 4.515 United States -0.020 -0.73 9.523 
Italy -0.043 0.034 9.585 Mean -0.030 -0.376 9.364 
ACCURACY, DA and NUMANA cross emerging countries for the period 2000 – 2014 
Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA 
        
Argentina -0.070 -0.147 4.674 Pakistan -0.017 -0.295 3.876 
Bahrain -0.022 . 1.333 Peru -0.056 -0.526 3.339 
Brazil -0.234 -0.045 9.098 Philippines -0.383 -0.835 7.631 
Bulgaria -0.097 . 1.556 Poland -0.026 -0.444 7.411 
Chile -0.015 -0.01 5.218 Qatar -0.005 0.005 6.741 
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ACCURACY, DA and NUMANA cross emerging countries for the period 2000 – 2014 
Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA 
        
China -0.014 0.034 6.592 Romania -0.032 0 9.229 
Colombia -0.006 0.051 3.143 Russia -0.160 -0.085 6.427 
India -0.020 0.109 12.256 Saudi Arabia -0.009 -0.013 6.332 
Indonesia -0.235 -0.1 9.681 South Africa -0.032 0.082 5.989 
Kuwait -0.014 0.188 6.085 Thailand -0.037 -0.017 10.552 
Malaysia -0.026 0.361 8.692 Turkey -0.050 0.092 9.342 
Mexico -0.043 -0.023 7.926 United Arab Emir -0.053 0.084 6.468 
Nigeria -0.026 0.138 3.938 Venezuela -0.010 . 7.2 
Oman -0.046 20.234 4 Mean -0.055 0.117 8.16 
ACCURACY, DA and NUMANA cross developing countries for the period 2000 – 2014 
Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA Country ACCURACY DA NUMANA 
Botswana -0.057 . 1 Lebanon -0.009 . 3.5 
Croatia -0.021 0.065 3.405 Morocco -0.018 -0.11 4.219 
Egypt -0.026 -0.769 5.65 Sri Lanka -0.020 . 2.071 
Ghana -0.037 . 1.444 Ukraine -0.343 -0.204 3.318 
Jordan -0.075 -0.152 2.393 Zimbabwe -0.015 . 2.5 
Kenya -0.027 -0.077 3.455 Mean -0.050 -0.491 4.27 
Note: Table 2 presents the mean for analysts’ accuracy (ACCURACY), discretionary accruals (DA) and the number of analysts’ 
following each firm (NUMANA) for advanced, emerging and developing countries over the period between 2000 and 2014. 
Accuracy is defined as the absolute value of the difference between mean earnings forecast and actual earnings for a year 
multiplied with minus one, while discretionary accruals are measured as the difference between total accruals and estimated 
normal accruals. 
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4.4. Methodology and Estimated Results 
4.4.1.  Persistence in analysts’ forecast errors  
In this analysis, we include the lagged value of ACCURACY ( 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 ). 
Predominantly, there is evidence that analysts’ forecast errors are positively correlated 
with their lagged values. This is the case as analysts do not learn instantly from previous 
mistakes but they need time to incorporate these mistakes in the current forecasts (Boudt 
et al. 2015). For this reason, we predict a positive and significant coefficient for 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 as reported in Table 1. 
Previous studies (Duru and Reeb 2002; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat et al. 2006; Chen et 
al. 2010) have not dealt with endogeneity concerns. As endogeneity is an issue that has 
attracted criticism, we propose to estimate using a dynamic panel analysis model. We 
employ the two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator of 
Roodman (2009) who extends Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator with biased-corrected 
robust standard errors.55 The main advantage of the proposed estimation method is that it 
adequately deals with criticism related to endogeneity with independent variables that are 
not strictly exogenous.56 Furthermore, the GMM estimator accounts for fixed effects, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals (Rootman 2006).57 
                                                          
55 In this analysis, we use the xtabond2 STATA command that implements the two-step system GMM 
estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction to the reported standard errors. In the one-step system 
GMM robust standard errors are reported which are robust to heteroscedasticity. In the two-step GMM 
error terms are already robust and Windmeijer (2005) correction is implemented to standard errors. The 
two-step system GMM estimator uses the consistent variance covariance matrix from first step GMM to 
reconstruct the weight matrix. Without this correction, the standard errors tend to be downward biased. It 
also offers forward orthogonal deviations, as an alternative to differencing that preserves sample size in 
panel with gaps. 
56 As exogenous variables we consider the year, country and industry variables and as endogenous the 
lagged dependent variable and firm-specific variables. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), the estimation 
results obtained from the two-step system GMM estimator are tested by (i) the Hansen’s J diagnostic test 
concerning the instrument validity and (ii) the test for the second-order autocorrelation of the error terms. 
57  We test for multicollinearity before running the models and the results do not demonstrate high 
correlation within the variables.  
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Thus, we estimate the following model: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 ×
𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎5𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎6𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑎7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑎8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                      (4) 
 
where t indexes the year and i the firm, 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1  is the lagged value of forecast 
accuracy. The lagged value of analysts’ accuracy in equation (4) captures the persistence 
in analysts’ forecast accuracy. 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡  stands for the level of corruption for 
country j in year t, 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 × 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡  present the interaction between the 
level of corruption and the number of analysts’ following a firm. Yu (2008) argues that 
analysts’ coverage serves as a monitoring mechanism to managers. The author finds that 
firms followed by a greater number of analysts are less likely to engage in earnings 
management increasing the quality of financial reporting. Since a greater number of 
analysts following the firm can improve the quality of financial reporting, one might 
expect that the number of analysts can affect the impact of corruption on analysts’ forecast. 
Next, 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the return on 
assets for firm i in year t. 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy for loss year, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 is the natural 
logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product for country j in year t. Finally, besides the firm-
specific effects, we further include year, country and industry-specific effects to control 
for any remaining variation that is not captured by the main variables (Oehmichen et al. 
2016).  
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4.4.2.  Corruption and analysts’ forecast accuracy  
In Table 3, Panels A, B and C report two models for the impact of Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI thereafter) on analysts’ forecast accuracy in advanced, emerging and 
developing countries respectively. Model (1) shows the individual impact of CPI on 
accuracy and Model (2) adds the interaction term between CPI and the number of analysts 
following a firm (CPI×NUMANA thereafter).  
Table 3 reports that the coefficient of CPI is negative and significant at 1% level for 
advanced and emerging countries in Model (1) of Panel A and Model (3) of Panel B 
respectively. These results suggest that analysts experience greater difficulty in 
forecasting earnings of firms in corrupted countries. Our findings complement those 
obtained from Chen et al. (2010). Chen et al. (2010) using the CPI index examine whether 
the impact of high-level political connections on analysts’ forecasts strive when 
corruption is present in 17 countries between 1997 and 2001. Among their findings, the 
negative relation between analysts’ forecasts and corruption is reported but not analyzed. 
Thus, our study contributes to this research employing a sample of 71 countries, covering 
the period between 2000 and 2014 and accounting for cross-country differences in 
development. Furthermore, to the degree that some components of institutional settings 
also capture the effect of corruption our results are in line with Hope (2003) and Hope 
and Kang (2005). It is of some interest that for developing countries, see Model (5) in 
Panel C, the relationship between accuracy and corruption is insignificant. For most 
countries, we find evidence in favour of Hypothesis 1, suggesting that corruption 
undermines analysts’ forecast accuracy. However, given the variability across countries, 
Hypothesis 1 does not hold for developing economies. When it comes to the effect of 
corruption on analysts’ accuracy, not one-size fits all cases is identified. In fact, we reveal 
that such relationship has underlying complexities that warrant further scrutiny.  
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The interaction term between the CPI and the number of analysts following a firm 
(CPI×NUMANA) is negative and significant at 1% level as presented in Model (2) in 
Panel A. This finding shows that with corruption present, the number of analysts 
following a firm would reduce accuracy.  The greater number of analysts following a firm 
might signal higher competition among the analysts who strive for better commission fees 
and management relations leading them to issue less accurate forecasts (Gu and Wu 2003). 
 
Table 3: Dynamic panel analysis results for advanced, emerging and developing 
countries using Corruption Perception Index as a corruption measure.  
 Panel A: Advanced 
countries 
Panel B: Emerging 
countries 
Panel C: Developing 
countries 
VARIABLES  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
       
L.ACCURACY  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.373 0.652 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.401) (0.428) 
NUMANA -0.012 -0.604*** -0.003 0.287*** -0.000 0.359*** 
 (0.012) (0.096) (0.010) (0.097) (0.009) (0.095) 
DISP -0.041** -0.042*** -0.111*** -0.116*** -3.789*** -3.192*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) (0.406) (0.428) 
ROE 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.015) (0.001) 
LOSS -0.121*** -0.129*** -2.017*** -2.112*** -0.302*** -0.348*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.253) (0.282) (0.066) (0.070) 
GDP -0.033* -0.045*** 0.517*** 0.412* 0.346 0.616** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.198) (0.231) (0.356) (0.311) 
CPI -0.001*** -0.003** -0.052*** -0.043* 0.004 -0.014 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.024) (0.015) (0.018) 
CPI×NUMANA  -0.008***  0.008***  0.012*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.869* 1.156*** -17.003*** -13.682** -6.681 -13.006* 
 (0.512) (0.365) (5.924) (6.913) (8.885) (7.829) 
       
Firm effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 65,752 65,752 12,997 12,997 228 228 
Number of firms 10,482 10,482 3,003 3,003 80 80 
Hansen-pvalue 0.137 0.0522 0.144 0.235 0.799 0.793 
AR(2)-pvalue 0.954 0.870 0.284 0.296 0.303 0.120 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for advanced, emerging and developing 
countries using the Corruption Perception Index as a corruption measure. The two-step system GMM 
(Arellano and Bover 1995) is used with robust standard errors. We consider as exogenous country, year 
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and industry variables and as endogenous the lagged value of analysts’ accuracy and firm-specific 
variables. AR(2) stands for the p-value of the second order residual autocorrelation test. Hansen test stands 
for the p-value of Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity. The dependent variable is the 
ACCURACY which presents the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and is measured as the absolute 
value of the difference between mean earnings forecast and actual earnings for a year multiplied with 
minus one and scaled with the stock price of the firm in the previous year, L.ACCURACY is the lagged 
value of analysts’ accuracy,   CPI is the Corruption Perception Index obtain from the Transparency 
International Organisation, CPI×NUMANA is the interaction term between Corruption Perception Index 
and the number of analysts following the firm. NUMANA is the number of analysts following each firm 
during each year, DISP presents analysts forecast desperation calculated as the standard deviation of 
analysts’ forecasts divided by the total assets, ROE is the return on assets, LOSS is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if the firm reports losses and zero otherwise, while GDP is the natural logarithm of 
the Gross Domestic Product for each country. Regression estimations account for firm-specific effects 
while year, country and industry effects are also included in all specifications but not reported.  ***, ** 
and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Regarding the interaction term CPI×NUMANA for emerging and developing countries, 
the coefficient of CPI×NUMANA is positive and significant at 1% level in Models (4) 
and (6) respectively. These results suggest that the impact of analysts’ coverage varies 
across countries. For emerging and developing countries where corruption is dominant, 
the greater number of analysts would improve analysts’ accuracy. Increasing the number 
of analysts the information disclosure and the quality of financial reporting would also 
increase (Yu 2008), and thus, one would expect that the forecast accuracy would be 
improved (Duru and Reeb 2002; Gu and Wu 2003). 
Table 4 presents the regression results using the Control for Corruption Index (thereafter 
CONT_CORR) as an alternative measure of corruption. The impact of CONT_CORR on 
accuracy is positive and significant at 1% level for advanced and emerging countries (see 
Panel A and B in Table 4). These findings show that the greater control for corruption 
enhances analysts’ forecasts accuracy confirming Hypothesis 1. Our results are in line 
with Hope (2003), Hope and Kang (2005) and Bhat et al. (2006) who document higher 
analysts’ accuracy in countries with strong institutional settings. For the group of 
developing countries, Models (5) and (6) in Panel C show that the control for corruption 
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undermines analysts’ forecast accuracy at 1% and 5% level respectively. Therefore, our 
findings provide evidence against Hypothesis 1 for the group of developing countries. 
These results could explain that for developing economies the ‘grease the wheels’ and/or 
the ‘income-smoothing’ hypotheses might indeed be valid (Leff 1964; Leys 1965; Bayley 
1966; Méon and Weill 2010; Mendoza et al. 2015). In our analysis, the ‘grease the wheels’ 
hypothesis would suggest that in countries with inefficient governance, corruption could 
improve the information exchange between firms and analysts. From another hand, the 
‘income-smoothing’ hypothesis would suggest that analysts’ forecast accuracy should be 
higher in countries that are more corrupt as higher corruption could help firms smooth 
their earnings (Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Badertscher 
et al. 2012).  
Nevertheless, Table 4 suggests that future research in this area needs to concentrate on 
developing countries. Looking towards future research concerning the impact of 
corruption on analysts’ accuracy in developing countries, we need to consider other firm 
and country-level factors that could affect our results. 58  Furthermore, our results as 
                                                          
58 A limitation of this chapter, and thus an opportunity for further research is the role of “crony capitalism”.  
Most of the research on corporate governance examines the impact of governance structure in the U.S., 
which is a well-regulated country with transparent financial markets and a high degree of ownership 
dispersion, leaving the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. However, in East Asia and 
Western Europe, the majority of the firms are controlled by a family. Worldscope database analysis reveals 
that in the nine most advanced East Asian and Western Europe countries, eight groups control more than 
one-quarter of the firms (Faccio et al. 2001). This phenomenon indicates an extraordinary concentration of 
control in these regions. 
We recognize the significant role of ownership-control structure across countries. An extraordinary 
concentration could disrupt the effective competition leading to less transparent capital markets, which in 
turn could affect analysts’ forecasts. High concentration of control would ultimately result in a systematic 
exportation of outside shareholders by the controlling shareholders. In this case, the agency problem is 
mainly the conflict of interests between majority and minority shareholders. Faccio et al. (2001) address 
this issue in a detailed analysis arguing that this problem should be recognized as a political, rather than 
pure corporate governance problem. In an earlier study, La Porta et al. (2000b) suggest that stronger legal 
protection of minority shareholders could eliminate the conflict of interests between majority and minority 
shareholders. Building on these insights, we would expect that in countries with corruption present, the 
agency problem between minority and majority shareholders would be more pronounced leading to less 
transparent markets. In countries where corruption is dominant, controlling managers’ might have greater 
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regards the effects of corruption should be interpreted with caution. There is evidence 
arguing that aggregate indexes such as the Corruption Perception Index lack precision as 
it presents the perception of corruption of a specific group of people (Knack and Manning 
2000; Van de Walle 2006; Brewer et al. 2007) and thus, could lead to misinterpretation 
or meaningless results. 
Regarding the interaction terms, the positive coefficient of CONT_CORR×NUMANA 
(see Model (2) in Panel A), indicates that the number of analysts following a firm 
increases accuracy in advanced countries where the control for corruption is present. The 
greater number of analysts would lead to a greater information disclosure, enhancing 
forecast accuracy. On the other hand, the interaction terms CONT_CORR×NUMANA in 
Models (4) and (6) suggest that in emerging and developing countries where governments 
control more for corruption, the number of analysts following a firm would lower forecast 
accuracy. 
Overall, results in Tables 3 and 4 shed new light and reveal the complexities involved as 
we accept Hypothesis 1 for advanced and emerging countries, demonstrating that 
corruption undermines analysts’ forecast accuracy, but for developing economies there is 
no significant relationship. We also find that when corruption is present in advanced 
countries, greater analysts’ coverage undermines forecast accuracy. On the other hand, 
analysts’ coverage enhances forecast accuracy in emerging and developing countries 
where corruption exists. Our results in Table 4 also propose that in advanced countries 
where the control for corruption is promoted, the greater number of analysts following 
firms can improve accuracy. Apparently, the findings of this analysis suggest that this is 
                                                          
incentives to engage in earnings manipulation providing further support for the “income-smoothing 
hypothesis” in developing countries. Unfortunately, data availability issues restrict our choice of variables, 
recommending a new area for future research.   
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an important area for future research. Given the complexities, we shall proceed with a 
further analysis where firm-level evidence of financial reporting manipulation would be 
introduced. 
 
Table 4: Dynamic panel analysis results for advanced, emerging and developing 
countries using Control for Corruption Index as a corruption measure. 
 Panel A: Advanced 
countries 
Panel B: Emerging 
countries 
Panel C: Developing 
countries 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
       
L.ACCURACY  0.009*** 0.008*** 0.088*** 0.157*** 0.407 0.168 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.439) (0.553) 
NUMANA -0.013 -0.235*** -0.005 -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.154** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.065) 
DISP -0.033** -0.019** -0.119*** -0.055*** -3.519*** -3.316*** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.463) (0.440) 
ROE 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.0016 0.008 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
LOSS -0.119*** -0.126*** -2.426*** -0.374*** -0.301*** -0.287*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.310) (0.108) (0.063) (0.083) 
GDP -0.035** -0.049*** 0.190 -0.145 0.561 0.353 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.209) (0.112) (0.374) (0.408) 
CONT_CORR 0.018*** 0.085*** 0.549*** 1.279*** -0.955*** -0.638** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.210) (0.225) (0.174) (0.314) 
CONT_CORR×N
UMANA 
 0.139***  -0.073**  -0.206* 
  (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.105) 
Constant 1.023* 1.354*** -5.332 4.490 -11.937 -6.101 
 (0.539) (0.406) (6.047) (3.267) (9.229) (9.977) 
       
Firm effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 65,752 65,752 12,997 12,997 228 228 
Number of firms 10,482 10,482 3,003 3,003 80 80 
Hansen-pvalue 0.150 0.0732 0.713 0.103 0.791 0.799 
AR(2)-pvalue 0.944 0.939 0.291 0.236 0.280 0.174 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for advanced, emerging and developing 
countries using the Control for Corruption Index as a corruption measure. The two-step system GMM 
(Arellano and Bover 1995) is used with robust standard errors. We consider as exogenous country, year and 
industry variables and as endogenous the lagged value of analysts’ accuracy and firm-specific variables. 
AR(2) stands for the p-value of the second order residual autocorrelation test. Hansen test stands for the p-
value of Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity. The dependent variable is the ACCURACY 
which presents the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and is measured as the absolute value of the 
difference between mean earnings forecast and actual earnings for a year multiplied with minus one and 
scaled with the stock price of the firm in the previous year, L.ACCURACY is the lagged value of analysts’ 
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accuracy, CONT_CORR is the Control for Corruption Index as obtained from the World Bank. 
CONT_CORR×NUMANA is the interaction term between Control for Corruption Index and the number 
of analysts’ following the firm. NUMANA is the number of analysts following each firm during each year, 
DISP presents analysts forecast desperation calculated as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts 
divided by the total assets, ROE is the return on assets, LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
if the firm reports losses and zero otherwise, while GDP is the natural logarithm of the Gross Domestic 
Product for each country. Regression estimations account for firm-specific effects while year, country and 
industry effects are also included in all specifications but not reported.  ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3. Earnings manipulation, corruption and analysts’ forecast accuracy 
In this section we examine whether corruption would make more pronounced the impact 
of firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation practices on analysts’ accuracy by 
estimating the following equation:  
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝑎2𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 × 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑎3𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎6𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑎7𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑎8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                           
(5)                                           
 
where t indexes the year and i the firm. The new variable introduced in this model is the 
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 which stands for the level of discretionary accruals used by firm i during year t. The 
interaction term 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 × 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 presents the interaction between corruption and 
the discretionary accruals. 
Estimation results of equation (5) are presented in Tables 5. Models (1) and (2) show 
results for advanced countries, Models (3) and (4) for emerging and Models (5) and (6) 
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refer to developing countries. The Corruption Perception Index continues to assert a 
significantly negative effect on accuracy for advanced and emerging countries as reported 
in Model (1) and Model (3). Similarly, the effect of Control for Corruption Index is 
positive and significant at 5% level in Model (2) and Model (4), suggesting that when we 
account for earnings manipulation, control for corruption maintains its positive impact on 
accuracy. Both the individual impact of DA and that of the interaction between corruption 
and discretionary accruals (thereafter CPI×DA) are insignificant in Model (1).  
Interestingly, the coefficient of DA is negative and significant at 1% level for emerging 
countries (see Models 3 and 4). Our findings imply that firms’ engagement in earnings 
manipulation practices undermines analysts’ accuracy. What is more interesting is that 
the interaction term CPI×DA is significantly negative at 1% level in Model (3).  Thus, 
our findings conform to Hypothesis 2 according to which corruption exacerbates the 
impact of earnings manipulation on analysts’ forecast accuracy for firms in emerging 
countries. These results could be compared with prior research (Kimbro 2002; Riahi-
Belkaoui 2004; Wu 2005; Riahi-Belkaoui and Al Najjar 2006; Malageño et al. 2010) 
which finds that countries with a lower quality of financial reporting exhibit a higher level 
of perceived corruption. Moreover, the interaction term between the control for 
corruption and discretionary accruals (thereafter CONT_CORR×DA) in Model (4) is 
positive and significant at 5% level indicating that in emerging countries greater control 
of corruption curbs the negative effect of earnings manipulation on accuracy. This result 
shows that firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation would increase the incentives for 
stronger control of corruption leading to higher accuracy for analysts.  
Results in Model (5) in Table 5 report a positive coefficient for the CPI, suggesting that 
corruption would enhance analysts’ forecast accuracy for firms in developing countries. 
This result is in agreement with the ‘grease the wheel’ and/or the ‘income-smoothing’ 
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hypotheses. Regarding the impact of discretionary accruals, DA exerts a negative impact 
on accuracy implying that firms’ involvement in earnings manipulation undermines 
accuracy. The interaction term CPI×DA carries a negative sign and is significant at 1% 
level indicating that corruption in parallel with earnings manipulation has a negative 
impact on accuracy. The positive and significant at 1% level coefficient of the interaction 
term between the control for corruption and discretionary accruals (CONT_CORR×DA) 
in Model (6) is in line with Hypothesis 2 according to which corruption enhances the 
effect of earnings manipulation on forecast accuracy.  
Our findings presented in Table 5 suggest that, although firms’ engagement in earnings 
manipulation does not exert a significant impact on forecast accuracy in advanced 
countries, eliminating the use of discretionary accruals can directly increase analysts’ 
accuracy in emerging and developing countries. Furthermore, the interaction analysis 
shows that when corruption and earnings manipulation coexist in emerging and 
developing countries, the former augments the impact of the latter on analysts’ accuracy. 
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Table 5: Dynamic panel analysis results for advanced, emerging and developing 
countries for the impact of earnings manipulation. 
 Panel A: Advanced 
countries 
Panel B: Emerging 
countries 
Panel C: Developing 
countries 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
       
L. ACCURACY  0.090*** 0.111*** 0.959*** 0.960*** 0.585* 0.536* 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.001) (0.001) (0.313) (0.316) 
NUMANA 0.008** 0.004 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.008** -0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
DISP -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.273 -0.508** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.218) (0.206) 
ROE 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.021*** 0.012* -0.039*** -0.026* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) 
LOSS -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.130*** -0.126*** -0.027* -0.028* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) 
GDP 0.001 -0.001 -0.028* -0.035** -0.012 0.153 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.014) (0.174) (0.108) 
DA -0.054 -0.041 -0.343*** -0.017*** -0.631** -0.377*** 
 (0.047) (0.067) (0.060) (0.006) (0.312) (0.039) 
CPI -0.002***  -0.006***  0.019**  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.009)  
CPI×DA -0.007  -0.007***  -0.023***  
 (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.007)  
CONT_CORR  0.014**  0.038**  -0.061 
  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.130) 
CONT_CORR×DA 0.010  0.034**  0.383*** 
  (0.041)  (0.015)  (0.139) 
Constant -0.172 -0.030 0.636 0.994*** 1.216 -3.829 
 (0.133) (0.124) (0.428) (0.386) (4.499) (2.580) 
       
Firm effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 49,658 49,658 6,921 6,921 136 136 
Number of firms 9,135 9,135 1,943 1,943 50 50 
Hansen-pvalue 0.147 0.495 0.210 0.232 0.798 0.798 
AR(2)-pvalue 0.173 0.115 0.103 0.123 0.365 0.332 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for advanced, emerging and developing 
countries using the discretionary accruals as a proxy for firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation 
practices. The two-step system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) is used with robust standard errors. We 
consider as exogenous country, year and industry variables and as endogenous the lagged value of analysts’ 
accuracy and firm-specific variables. AR(2) stands for the p-value of the second order residual 
autocorrelation test. Hansen test stands for the p-value of Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity. 
The dependent variable is the ACCURACY which presents the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and is 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between mean earnings forecast and actual earnings for a 
year multiplied with minus one and scaled with the stock price of the firm in the previous year, 
L.ACCURACY is the lagged value of analysts’ accuracy, CPI is the Corruption Perception Index obtain 
from the Transparency International Organisation, DA stands  for the use  of discretionary accruals, 
CPI×DA presents the interaction term between Corruption Perception Index and discretionary accruals, 
CONT_CORR×DA presents the interaction term between Control for Corruption Index and discretionary 
accruals, NUMANA is the number of analysts following each firm for each year, DISP presents analysts 
forecast desperation calculated as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided by the total assets, 
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ROE is the return on assets, LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value one if s firm reports losses and 
zero otherwise, while GDP is the natural logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product for each country. 
Regression estimations account for firm-specific effects while year, country and industry effects are also 
included in all specifications but not reported.  ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. 
 
 
4.4.4.  Country freedom, corruption and analysts’ forecast accuracy  
We examine the interaction of country freedom and corruption for the relationship 
between the latter and analysts’ accuracy by estimating the following equation: 
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝑎2𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 ×
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑗,𝑡+ 𝑎3𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑗,𝑡 +
 𝑎5𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎6𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎7𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑎8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 +
 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                (6)                                                                                  
 
where t indexes the fiscal year and i the firm. 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 × 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑗,𝑡 presents 
the interaction between corruption and the degree of freedom for country j in year t. In 
our analysis, we use four indexes as proxies of country freedom. These are the overall 
index of freedom (WF thereafter), the political rights (PR thereafter), the civil liberties 
(CL thereafter) and the press freedom index (PFI thereafter). 
Estimated results for equation (6) are presented in Table 6. Panels A and B of Table 6 
report results for the group of advanced, emerging and developing countries using the 
CPI and CONT_CORR indexes respectively. Results show that corruption is a significant 
determinant of accuracy after controlling for different proxies of country freedom. In 
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Model (1) of Table 6, the impact of WF on accuracy as well as the interaction term 
between WF and Corruption Perception Index (thereafter CPI×WF) are positive. These 
results imply that in advanced countries where corruption exists the greater freedom 
would improve accuracy, conforming to Hypothesis 3. The interaction terms between 
Corruption Perception Index and Political Rights (thereafter CPI×PR) and between 
Corruption Perception Index and Press Freedom Index (thereafter CPI×PFI) in Model (1) 
are negative and significant at 10% and 1% level respectively. Our findings suggest that 
stronger political rights and greater freedom of the press would impair accuracy in 
advanced countries with corruption present. There is some evidence suggesting that in 
countries where corruption is present, press freedom would serve opportunistic 
behaviours by mimicking the voice of the underlying powerful vested interests and 
enhancing rent-seeking activities (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). 
Next, we turn to the emerging countries. Model (2) in Table 6 reports positive coefficients 
for both the individual impact of WF and the interaction term CPI×WF at 1% level, in 
line with Hypothesis 3. The interaction term CPI×CL in Model (2) shows that in emerging 
countries where corruption is present, stronger civil liberties deteriorate analysts’ 
accuracy. This finding could be compared with those obtained from Montimola and 
Jackman (2002) and Sung (2004) who demonstrate that democratic practices might 
increase corruption. 
What is interesting is that greater freedom harms analysts’ accuracy for firms in 
developing countries as reported by the negative and at 1% level significant coefficient 
of WF variable in Model (3). It might be the case that in countries with weak institutional 
settings, greater freedom enhances the incentives for corrupted practices reducing 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Furthermore, Model (3) reports a negative coefficient for the 
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interaction term CPI×WF at 1% significance level suggesting that the greater country 
freedom vitiates forecast accuracy in developing countries when corruption is present. 
In Model (3) the effect of the interaction term CPI×CL carries a negative sign, indicating 
that civil liberties impair forecast accuracy in developing countries where corruption 
exists. On the other hand, the interaction terms CPI×PR and CPI×PFI have positive 
coefficients and are significant at 5% and 1% level respectively, showing that stronger 
political rights and freedom of the press when coexist with corruption improve analysts’ 
accuracy in developing countries. The positive coefficient of CPI×PR for developing 
countries is in line with Montimola and Jackman (2002) and Sung (2004) who state that 
stronger political rights would curb corruption. Our findings reveal the complexities 
regarding the interaction between corruption and country freedom for the group of 
developing countries. Therefore, an imperative goal for future research in this area could 
be the investigation of these relationships paying attention to the measurement of 
corruption and freedom indicators. Also, other corporate governance factors in 
developing countries, such as the ownership-control structure, could shed further light on 
the above complexities. 
Regarding the effect of control for corruption on accuracy, Models (4) and (5) in Table 6 
report negative and significant at 5% and 1% level coefficients respectively for the 
interaction term between country freedom and control for corruption 
(CONT_CORR×WF thereafter). These findings suggest that a greater degree of freedom 
undermines analysts’ accuracy in advanced and emerging countries where control for 
corruption is stronger. Greater freedom might reduce the incentives for control of 
corruption inducing degraded practices through the process of further liberalization 
(Cohen 1995; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) and this, in turn, renders the detection of 
corruption more difficult (Williams and Beare 1999). 
163 
 
Table 6: Dynamic panel analysis results for the impact of country freedom on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy for advanced, emerging and developing countries. 
 Panel A: Perception of corruption  Panel B: Control for corruption 
 Advanced Emerging Developing Advanced Emerging Developing 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
       
L.ACCURACY 0.001 0.141*** 0.882 0.005*** 0.129*** 0.652 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.891) (0.001) (0.004) (0.734) 
NUMANA -0.034 -0.221*** -0.030** -0.011 -0.026** -0.024** 
 (0.025) (0.080) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
DISP -0.001** -0.062*** -4.116*** -0.092** -0.118*** -3.909*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.408) (0.040) (0.001) (0.431) 
ROE 0.037*** -0.022 0.011 0.037*** 0.006 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.031) (0.015) (0.003) (0.010) (0.012) 
LOSS -0.227*** -2.234*** -0.070 -0.074*** -0.830*** 0.010 
 (0.029) (0.503) (0.123) (0.007) (0.216) (0.093) 
GDP 0.006 0.102 1.083 -0.056 0.142 0.960 
 (0.006) (0.753) (0.799) (0.043) (0.162) (0.700) 
CPI -0.266** -1.319*** 2.785***    
 (0.121) (0.354) (1.011)    
CPI×WF 0.190* 0.494*** -0.425***    
 (0.103) (0.041) (0.137)    
CPI×PR -0.023* 0.017 0.071**    
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.032)    
CPI×CL 0.004 -0.150*** -0.100**    
 (0.005) (0.023) (0.042)    
CPI×PFI -0.020*** -0.161 0.676***    
 (0.007) (0.104) (0.247)    
CONT_CORR    1.671* 1.727 -3.321*** 
    (1.003) (1.840) (1.198) 
CONT_CORR×WF    -2.246** -1.030*** 5.773*** 
    (0.918) (0.362) (1.918) 
CONT_CORR×PR    0.271*** -0.717*** -0.990* 
    (0.088) (0.246) (0.590) 
CONT_CORR×CL    0.004 1.262*** 0.405 
    (0.044) (0.211) (0.605) 
CONT_CORR×PFI    -0.315*** -0.221 -7.158*** 
    (0.094) (0.616) (2.568) 
WF 14.665* 15.986*** -12.485*** 4.009** 0.790*** 4.424 
 (7.941) (1.018) (4.461) (1.594) (0.252) (2.718) 
PR -1.345* 0.838 2.312** -0.166* -0.320* -0.604* 
 (0.809) (0.559) (1.049) (0.092) (0.182) (0.358) 
CL 0.297 -6.611*** -3.417*** -0.078 -1.268*** 0.524 
 (0.372) (0.773) (1.217) (0.070) (0.210) (0.559) 
PFI -1.577*** -3.170 19.364** 0.447*** 2.500*** -5.269** 
 (0.583) (3.534) (7.771) (0.142) (0.502) (2.214) 
Constant -20.582** -39.879 54.013 -1.410 -1.760 -45.799* 
 (9.147) (26.328) (33.330) (1.989) (5.135) (24.256) 
       
Firm effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 65,752 12,997 228 65,752 12,997 228 
Number of firms 10,482 3,003 80 10,482 3,003 80 
Hansen-pvalue 0.577 0.324 0.799 0.0731 0.160 0.780 
AR(2)-pvalue 0.820 0.190 0.310 0.917 0.251 0.0587 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for advanced, emerging and developing 
countries using the World Freedom Index, Political Rights, Civil Liberties and Press Freedom index as 
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proxies of country freedom. The two-step system GMM (Arellano and Bover 1995) is used with robust 
standard errors. We consider as exogenous country, year and industry variables and as endogenous the 
lagged value of analysts’ accuracy and firm-specific variables. AR(2) stands for the p-value of the 
second order residual autocorrelation test. Hansen test stands for the p-value of Hansen’s J diagnostic 
test for instrument validity. The dependent variable is the ACCURACY which presents analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy and is measured as the absolute value of the difference between mean 
earnings forecast and actual earnings for a year multiplied with minus one and scaled with the stock 
price of the firm in the previous year, L.ACCURACY is the lagged value of analysts’ accuracy, WF 
stands for the freedom index obtained from the Freedom House organization, PR presents the political 
rights of a country  with higher values indicating greater freedom in political system, CL stands for the 
civil liberties of a country and higher values indicate greater civil liberties . PFI stands for the Freedom 
of the Press Index obtained from Freedom House, CPI is the Corruption Perception Index obtain from 
the Transparency International Organisation, CONT_CORR is the Control for Corruption Index as 
obtained from the World Bank, CPI×WF is the interaction term between CPI and WF, CPI×PR and 
CPI×CL are the interaction terms between CPI-PR and CPI-CL respectively while CPI×PFI stands for 
the interaction term between CPI and PFI. CONT_CORR×WF is the interaction terms between 
CONT_CORR and WF, CONT_CORR×PR and CONT_CORR×CL present the interaction between 
CONT_CORR-PR and CONT_CORR-CL respectively while CONT_CORR×PFI stands for the 
interaction term between CONT_CORR and PFI. NUMANA is the number of analysts following each 
firm during each year, ROE is the return on assets, DISP presents analysts forecast desperation 
calculated as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided by the total assets, LOSS is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if a firms report losses and zero otherwise, while GDP is the is the 
natural logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product for each country. Regression estimations account for 
firm-specific effects while year, country and industry effects are also included in all specifications but 
not reported.  ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
The interaction term between Control for Corruption Index and Political Rights 
(CONT_CORR×PR thereafter) in Model (4) carries a positive and significant coefficient, 
implying that in advanced countries where the control for corruption and stronger political 
rights coexist, the latter increases forecast accuracy. However, for the same countries, the 
interaction term between Control for Corruption Index and Press Freedom Index 
(CONT_CORR×PFI thereafter) is negative and significant at 1% level as presented in 
Model (4). This result implies that freedom of the press in parallel with control for 
corruption might reduce the incentives for control of corruption and this, in turn, reduces 
analysts’ accuracy.  
Next, Model (5) reports negative coefficient for the interaction term CONT_CORR×PR 
at 1% significance level, suggesting that stronger political rights lower accuracy in 
emerging economies that control for corruption. The positive and significant at 1% level 
coefficient for the interaction term between Control for Corruption Index and Civil 
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Liberties (thereafter CONT_CORR×CL) in Model (5) suggests that stronger civil liberties 
in combination with control for corruption enhance analysts’ accuracy in emerging 
countries. Finally, the interaction term CONT_CORR×WF is positive and significant in 
developing economies (see Model (6) in Table 6), whereas the interaction between 
CONT_CORR×PR is negative albeit weak indicating that stronger political rights would 
reduce accuracy with control of corruption present.  
The impact of different proxies of country freedom varies across advanced, emerging and 
developing countries revealing the complexities associated with the level of country 
development. Overall, estimated results provide evidence in favour of Hypothesis 3 
according to which country freedom could ease the adverse effect of corruption on 
forecast accuracy.  
 
4.5.  Conclusion 
Using a unique global sample for 71 counties, our results demonstrate a strong impact of 
corruption on analysts’ accuracy. The sign and magnitude of the relationship vary across 
advanced, emerging and developing countries. Results show that corruption undermines 
earnings forecast accuracy for firms in advanced and emerging countries, while for firms 
located in developing countries corruption might enhance analysts’ accuracy. We also 
show that the engagement of firms in earnings manipulation deteriorates accuracy in 
emerging and developing countries when corruption is present, though earnings 
manipulation might increase the incentives for control of corruption and thus, would 
improve analysts’ accuracy. Furthermore, our study suggests that greater country freedom 
improves analysts’ accuracy with some variability in developing countries.  
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Our results show that the presence of corruption necessitates greater effort, in terms of 
resources, in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Additionally, firms’ engagement in earnings 
manipulation is an indicator that a further vigilance is warranted. Governance is also of 
importance. When it comes to policy implications, therefore, we show that further 
investing in controlling for corruption, enhancing regulatory framework to improve the 
accounting information disclosure and supporting democratization would improve 
analysts’ accuracy.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. We examine the impact of the CEO compensation, analyst-specific 
characteristics, earnings management and country governability on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. We put particular emphasis on the impact of corruption on analysts’ forecast 
accuracy by opting for a global sample. It has been well documented that earnings 
forecasts issued by financial analysts play an important role in capital markets mitigating 
information asymmetries between firms and investors (Loh and Mian 2006; Hall and 
Tacon 2010). On this ground, the contribution of this thesis could be of importance to 
financial analysts, investors and regulators as well.  
The contribution of this thesis starts by employing forecast errors issued by individual 
analysts, rather than the consensus forecasts over 20 years in Chapter 2. From a 
methodological point of view, this thesis extends prior literature that uses consensus 
forecasts (Kanagaretnam et al. 2012) and corrects for aggregation bias in analysts’ 
forecasts that could emerge from consensus forecast. We further extend the analysis 
beyond the impact of the CEO stock options on analysts’ forecasts to cover also other 
forms of compensation. This thesis shows that CEO compensation such as restricted stock 
holdings and stock ownership could correct analysts’ optimism reducing their forecast 
errors. Conversely, CEO cash bonus, sensitivity to changes in firm’s equity value and in-
the-money options could enhance analysts’ optimism. Furthermore, since prior research 
argues that CEO option grants increase the likelihood for financial misreporting, we 
consider the effect of earnings management on analysts’ forecasts and investigate whether 
this effect varies with CEO compensation. This thesis shows that earnings management 
increases analysts’ forecast errors and that proxies of CEO compensation, such as CEO 
sensitivity to changes in firm’s value, restricted stock holdings and stock ownership can 
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mitigate this effect. On the other hand, CEOs who enjoy high cash bonus can augment 
the above relationship. We also assume that analysts’ forecasts are not the outcome of a 
process in a vacuum. To this end, this thesis suggests that the interaction between analysts’ 
characteristics and CEO compensation is of high importance. To address this issue, the 
interaction terms between analysts’ characteristics and CEO compensation variables have 
been employed. Estimation results indeed provide evidence for channels of interaction 
between CEOs and analysts with analysts’ experience being the leading indicator that 
corrects optimism for firms where CEOs enjoy high compensation, cash bonus, are 
sensitive to changes in firm’s value and have greater stock ownership. Multiple 
forecasting horizons have also been employed, reporting a stronger impact of CEO 
compensation on analysts’ forecasts for the current year forecasts. 
This thesis further provides evidence of significant interaction effects between CEO 
compensation and earnings management on analysts’ forecasts. These interactions would 
mitigate the impact of CEO compensation on the forecast errors. The impacts of the 
Global Statement Regulation and Dodd-Frank Act on analysts’ accuracy have also been 
examined. Estimation results show that although these regulations can reduce analysts’ 
optimism, they do not affect the relationship between forecasts errors and analysts’ 
characteristics/CEO compensation in the same way. Variability exists both across firms 
with different CEO compensation and across analysts’ characteristics. 
These findings could be of high interest to several groups. In particular, they could be of 
interest when designing compensation packages for the executives. Additionally, these 
findings could provide investors with valuable information when it comes to the 
reliability of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Investors take into account analysts’ forecasts 
when they decide on their portfolio allocation. Thus, our findings could facilitate 
investors’ ability to assess the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. This study also 
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provides new evidence to broker houses that employ financial analysts. We show that 
experienced analysts issue more optimistic earnings forecasts and thus, brokers might 
consider a threshold in the number of years that an analyst could follow a firm. In this 
way, the networking channel between analysts and firms might be mitigated. Furthermore, 
since forecast frequency corrects analysts’ optimism, brokers should introduce a 
minimum number of forecasts by each analyst for each firm during the forecast period. 
Moreover, given the evidence that the impact of CEO compensation on analysts’ forecasts 
varies with analysts’ characteristics, brokers could enhance the forecasts of analysts’ that 
they employ in several ways. First, by assigning relatively more experienced analysts to 
firms where CEOs have higher compensation. Second, reducing the forecast frequency 
for analysts’ following firms where CEOs enjoy higher compensation and cash bonus. 
Finally, brokers can reduce analysts’ optimism by increasing the forecast frequency for 
firms where CEOs are more sensitive to changes in firm’s value and hold substantially 
higher amount of restricted stocks. 
The main contribution of Chapter 3 lies on investigating the effect of governance on 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. This chapter extends the limited research on the 
relation between governability and analysts’ accuracy for a sample of 911 firms in the 
Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOMP database for the period 2000 – 2014. Chapter 3 also 
investigates the impact of corporate governance duality, as well as, their cross interaction 
with country governability on analysts’ accuracy. Furthermore, this chapter takes into 
account firms’ engagement in earnings management by examining the impact of 
abnormal accruals on analysts’ forecasts. Our evidence reports that governance variables 
such as government effectiveness and quality of government regulations positively affect 
analysts’ accuracy. CEO incentives such as CEO option holdings, on the other hand, 
assert a negative impact on accuracy. Our results further provide evidence for a positive 
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association between CEO power and analysts’ accuracy, whilst there exists evidence of a 
cross-term relationship between the government effectiveness and the latter. In this 
chapter (Chapter 3), we report a significant negative impact of discretionary accruals on 
analysts’ accuracy, suggesting that analysts’ forecast accuracy reduces as firms engage in 
earnings manipulation. Panel VAR modeling enriches previous findings as it sheds new 
light regarding the underlying causality of the main covariates of earnings forecasting 
accuracy, whilst also tackling issues related to endogeneity. Given that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are a crucial source of information, the present analysis is of value for 
policymakers, investors, and academics as they clearly indicate that analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy could benefit from a strong and effective governance. 
Moving to Chapter 4, the contribution of this thesis is significant not only to the financial 
analysts’ literature but also for the earnings management and corruption literature. This 
thesis contributes to the growing literature on analysts’ forecast accuracy in several ways. 
First, unlike previous research (Hope 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Hope and Kang 2005; Bhat 
et al. 2006; Han et al. 2010; Sáenz González and García-Meca 2014) that uses an indicator 
of the legal enforcement, this study sheds light on the direct relationship between 
corruption and analysts’ accuracy.59 Second, from a data collection point of view, this 
thesis opts for a unique global cross-country sample of 71 counties over the period 2000 
- 2014. There are methodological advantages of employing a global sample, as it provides 
appropriate variability across many countries. As corruption varies from country to 
country, and thereby, its impact on analysts’ forecasts could also vary, it is appropriate to 
assemble a global sample. To fully reveal the link between corruption and analysts’ 
accuracy, we take into account the heterogeneity across countries without loss of the 
                                                          
59 According to this strand of literature, the legal enforcement depends on the level of corruption, so that 
greater corruption can result in a weaker legal enforcement and a poor quality of financial reporting, leading 
to higher forecasts errors. 
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variability in the underlying data generating process by classifying countries into 
advanced, emerging and developing based on IMF World Economic Outlook. Moreover, 
this thesis contributes to the earnings management literature by examining whether the 
effect of earnings manipulation on analysts’ forecasts varies with the level of corruption. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that considers the interaction between 
discretionary accruals and corruption at a global level. Finally, this thesis shows whether 
the degree of country freedom and anti-corruption institutional arrangements, interact 
with corruption and affect analysts’ accuracy. 
A glimpse in our results reveals that corruption negatively affects analysts’ accuracy 
across the world, with some variability though. Analysts’ forecast accuracy appears 
higher for firms located in less corrupt advanced and emerging countries, whereas for 
firms located in developing countries, results show that corruption could enhance analysts’ 
accuracy. Further, we find that earnings manipulation can exacerbate analysts’ accuracy 
for firms in emerging and developing countries with corruption present. Additionally, a 
plethora of complexities involved in the relationship between corruption and analysts’ 
forecasts have been revealed in this study. Our results suggest that country freedom in 
parallel with corruption would improve forecast accuracy. This thesis shows that the 
presence of corruption necessitates greater effort, in terms of resources, in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Additionally, firms’ engagement in earnings manipulation is an 
indicator that further vigilance is warranted. When it comes to policy implications, 
therefore, we show that further investing in controlling for corruption, enhancing 
regulatory framework to improve the accounting information disclosure and supporting 
democratization would improve analysts’ accuracy.   
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